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3Abstract
Differential games deal with problems involving multiple players, possibly competing,
that inﬂuence common dynamics via their actions, commonly referred to as strategies.
Thus, differential games introduce the notion of strategic decision making and have a
wide range of applications.
The work presented in this thesis has two aims. First, constructive approximate
solutions to differential games are provided. Different areas of application for the theory
are then suggested through a series of examples. Notably, multi-agent systems are iden-
tiﬁed as a possible application domain for differential game theory. Problems involving
multi-agent systems may be formulated as nonlinear differential games for which closed-
form solutions do not exist in general, and in these cases the constructive approximate
solutions may be useful.
The thesis is commenced with an introduction to differential games, focusing on
feedback Nash equilibrium solutions. Obtaining such solutions involves solving coupled
partial differential equations. Since closed-form solutions for these cannot, in general,
be found two methods of constructing approximate solutions for a class of nonlinear,
nonzero-sum differential games are developed and applied to some illustrative examples,
including the multi-agent collision avoidance problem. The results are extended to a class
of nonlinear Stackelberg differential games. The problem of monitoring a region using
a team of agents is then formulated as a differential game for which ad-hoc solutions,
using ideas introduced previously, are found. Finally mean-ﬁeld games, which consider
differential games with inﬁnitely many players, are considered. It is shown that for a class
of mean-ﬁeld games, solutions rely on a set of ordinary differential equations in place of
two coupled partial differential equations which normally characterise the problem.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Objectives
Control theory is the study of dynamical systems and their behaviours. Given a mathe-
matical model of such a system the idea is, as the name suggests, to control the system in
some way. It may, for example, be of interest to render an equilibrium stable or to ensure
that the output tracks a desired reference signal. Control theory provides tools to iden-
tify if a certain behaviour is achievable, and if so how it can be a achieved. Because of its
abstract nature, control theory is interdisciplinary and thus plays a fundamental role in
many ﬁelds of engineering and mathematics.
For example, control theory is important in ﬁelds such as robotics, automation and
electrical engineering. It plays an important role in power generation and in maintaining
the safe operation of power plants. In nuclear power plants, for instance, it is common
to use remote-controlled technologies to handle radioactive waste, thus minimising the
exposure of human beings to toxic materials. Futhermore, in the event of an accident,
control systems are often central in managing damage. For example, after the recent nu-
clear disaster in Fukushima robots have been used to monitor and clean the areas affected
by the nuclear leak [1]. With the advance of robotics and small-scale electronic devices,
control theory plays a growing role in biomedical engineering: robotic assisted surgery
is becoming more common, as are robotic prosthetics [2–4]. These “traditional” applica-
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tions aside, control theory appears in many different areas too. For instance, in [5] the
authors apply control theoretic methods to enhance the immune system of patients in-
fected with the human immunodeﬁciency virus (HIV) infection. More precisely, a math-
ematical model of the development of the HIV infection in a patient shows that there are
two asymptotically stable equilibria, only one of which is favourable. In [5] drug therapy
scheduling in order to drive the patient to the favourable equilibrium is proposed using
a reduced-order model of the HIV infection dynamics. It is evident that control theory
has a wide range of applications, many of which are of great importance to society.
On another front, since the 1940’s mathematicians, with Von Neumann and Morg-
ernstern at the forefront, have studied the ﬁeld of game theory. Game theory is the study
of problems involving several players and the decisions these players make to optimise
their own performance criteria [6, 7]. In the well-known zero-sum games, these perfor-
mance criteria are purely competitive in the sense that a gain for one player must mean
an equivalent loss for other players. A large variety of “typical” games, such as poker
and standard pursuit-evasion games, can be described by this class of games. For a 2-
player zero-sum game, a win for one player implies that the other player inevitably loses
the game which, for example, is the case in a game of chess. Nonzero-sum games, on
the other hand, generalise this concept by allowing the players to have individual goals
that may, or may not be, conﬂicting. Therefore, in this framework a gain for one player
need not imply a loss for any of the other players. In both nonzero- and zero-sum games,
given a group of players with their own goals, game theory deals with determining the
“best” strategies for each of the players. Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele, published in
1928 by Von Neymann and Morgenstern, is often considered the ﬁrst paper on game
theory and The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour published in 1944, by the same au-
thors, is pivotal to the formalisation of game theory. However, ideas relating to the topic
also appeared previously, notably by Cournot as early as in 1838 and by Stackelberg in
1935 [8, 9]. Different solution concepts for a game exist, the most common one being the
so-called Nash equilibrium solution, named after John Nash, who won a Nobel prize for
his work on game theory in 1994 [10–12].
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Whereas game theory deals with static problems, differential games are their dy-
namic counterpart. That is, differential games are concerned with situations in which
several players inﬂuence a common dynamical system, via their control strategies, to at-
tain some predeﬁned goals. Notions of solutions and equilibria are identical to those in
game theory, however additional care must be taken to ensure stability properties. In
general a differential game is characterised by a dynamical system and a set of N players
each associated with a cost functional that quantiﬁes the goal of the player.
Since both control theory and differential games deal with dynamical systems one
might wonder whether the two ﬁelds have more in common and whether the framework
provided by differential game theory can be of use to control theory. To answer this ques-
tion consider ﬁrst the well-established topic of optimal control. In optimal control, given
a dynamical system, the problem of determining the best control input to minimise (or
maximise) a cost functional is considered, i.e. the problem is to determine the best strat-
egy of a single decision maker. Differential games, on the other hand, can be viewed as
an extension of this in which, instead of one decision maker, there are several decision
makers. These decision makers are referred to as players, each seeking to minimise (or
maximise) their own cost functionals, subject to the dynamics of the system. Thus, differ-
ential games introduce the notion of strategic behaviour to control theory. This is naturally
useful for control problems in which a dynamical system has several inputs that may
have different goals, such as what is seen in robust control. H∞ control considers prob-
lems in which a dynamical system is inﬂuenced by an adversarial disturbance in addition
to the control input. The control input is then designed to guarantee certain performance
criteria, which is often done by formulating the robust control problem as a zero-sum
differential game, in which the control input and the adversarial disturbance are “oppos-
ing players” [13]. Similarly, mixed H2/H∞ control is concerned with selecting a control
input guaranteeing given performance criteria, while simultaneously attempting to op-
timise a given cost functional. Such problems can be formulated as nonzero-sum differ-
ential games as done on [14] for linear systems and [15] for nonlinear systems. However,
differential games can be useful to other areas of control theory as well. Some notable
examples, which illustrate possible areas of applications of differential game theory, are
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introduced and studied in this thesis. To motivate the theory developed in the remainder
of the thesis, a brief introduction and description of some of these examples are provided
here.
The ﬁrst example to make a point of at this stage is the differential game involving
a so-called Lotka-Volterra model considered in Section 3.7.2. In this example a biological
system consisting of two competing species is considered. The population of the two
species are represented by the states, x1 and x2, of the system and their dynamics are
given by
x˙1 = b1x1 − a11x21 − a21x1x2 ,
x˙2 = b2x2 − a12x1x2 − a22x22 ,
where bi > 0 and aij > 0, for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, are birth rates and predation ef-
ﬁciencies, respectively. We consider the case in which there are two players which can
inﬂuence the predation efﬁciencies via control inputs, uij , where i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, in
such a way that the efﬁciencies are given by aij = a∗ij + uij , where a
∗
ij > 0 with i = 1, 2
and j = 1, 2. The input ui = (ui1, ui2) is the control strategy of player i and we assume
that that players 1 seeks to drive the population x2 to a value x∗2 > 0 whereas player 2
seeks to drive the population x1 to a value x∗1 > 0. Furthermore, each player attempts
to do so while minimising its own effort and attempting to maximise the efforts of the
other player. This problem describes a competitive biological system and illustrates the
possible application of differential game theory to analyse and sythesise the behaviour of
certain biological systems.
The multi-agent collision avoidance problem, introduced in Section 3.8, describes the
task of maneuvering a team of N agents with single-integrator dynamics from given
initial positions, xi(0) ∈ R2, i = 1, . . . , N , to predeﬁned target positions, denoted by
x∗i ∈ R2, i = 1, . . . , N , while avoiding inter-agent collisions. Furthermore, each agent
attempts minimising its efforts while doing so. The problem is formulated as a nonzero-
sum differential game where agent i seeks to minimise a cost functional of the form
Ji(u1, . . . , uN ) =
1
2
∫ ∞
0
((
αi + βigi(x1, . . . , xN )
)
(xi − x∗i )(xi − x∗i ) ,+‖ui(t)‖2
)
dt ,
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where xi(t) ∈ R2 is the position of agent i at time t > 0, αi > 0 and βi > 0 are con-
stants and the function gi(x1, . . . , xN ), which is discussed in more detail in Section 3.8, is
such that it encourages the agent to maintain a so-called safety distance between itself and
other agents. Approximate solutions for the resulting nonzero-sum differential game, in
terms of Nash equilibrium strategies, are found using the theory presented in Section 3.6.
The multi-agent collision avoidance problem demonstrates how a problem involving several
agents can be formulated as a differential game.
As the name suggests, multi-agent systems are systems consisting of several
agents, which may in general be heterogeneous. The agents may be any dynamical sys-
tems, such as, for example, mobile sensors, robots, unmanned vehicles (UVs) or indi-
viduals in a social network [16]. Multi-agent systems have gained a signiﬁcant level of
attention in recent years which may be attributed to several factors, two of which may
be considered as the main motivators [16]. First, many systems occurring in nature, for
example in biology or material sciences, consist of individual elements that have a col-
lective functionality, and the behaviour of such complex systems may be understood by
considering them as networked multi-agent systems [16–19]. Secondly, the ever increas-
ing availability of cheap autonomous robots has resulted in an interest in the synthesis of
networked engineering systems, such as multi-vehicle systems and sensor networks [16].
In fact, many engineering applications of multi-agent systems take inspiration from bio-
logical systems: in [20] the behaviour of a school of ﬁsh is used as an inspiration to de-
velop a coordinated control strategy for distributed sensors to sample an environment. A
similar problem is studied in [21], where the coverage of a planar region by a multi-agent
system, which could represent a sensor network or animal groups foraging for food, is
studied. Multi-agent systems are also used to implement intelligent swarm behaviour,
often drawing inspiration from the motion of swarms of birds [22,23]. Other areas of ap-
plication include military and defense, power systems, sensor networks and search and
rescue missions, social networks, quantum networks and nanostructures [16, 19].
System of systems is another area that has gained interest within the control com-
munity in recent years and plays a signiﬁcant role in many applications, such as military,
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security, aerospace, manufacturing and environmental systems [24, 25]. Different deﬁni-
tions of a system of systems exist, but in essence this is a collection of individual systems
that are integrated together to solve a task collaboratively. The individual systems may
be either heterogeneous or homogeneous and the idea behind integrating them together
may, for example, be to enhance certain aspects, such as robustness or reliability, of the
overall system. A system of systems approach provides a high-level point-of-view to
study problems involving a group of interconnected, individual systems. A multi-agent
system can be thought of as a particular example of a system of systems, where each
agent is an individual system, whereas the team of agents can be thought of as a overall
system, yielding the term system of systems. In [26,27], for example, a swarm of cooperat-
ing robots is considered as a system of systems. Whichever perspective one may choose
to study multi-agent systems, many open problems exist. For example more research
is needed to extend standard notions from traditional control theory, such as stability,
controllability, observability, etc., to the high-level system of systems [24]. In a system
consisting of several agents, local and global stability are not the same and neither is
individual optimality and group optimality [19]. Thus, the study of local interactions
and collective behaviour introduce challenges both in terms of analysis and synthesis of
networked multi-agent systems [16, 19]. In fact, in [24], the authors even suggest that
the research on complex systems may be the birth of a new engineering discipline which
they term “Systems-of-systems engineering”.
Systems consisting of several agents can perform complex tasks that would other-
wise be difﬁcult, dangerous or even impossible. For example, in natural systems collec-
tive behaviour, such as ﬂocking, can protect individuals in a group from predators and it
is well-known that migrating birds ﬂy in a so-called “V-formation” to minimise the effort
required by each individual bird [19]. In engineered systems it is typically desirable for
the team of agents to collectively perform a task. Autonomous multi-agent systems can
perform useful tasks without human involvement and as a result treacherous tasks can be
undertaken without directly involving and endangering human life. For example, in the
event of a natural disaster a team of autonomous agents with sensors can gather informa-
tion that could aid search and rescue missions without directly involving or endangering
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the lives of a rescue team. This is what motivates the work in Chapter 5, where the prob-
lem of continuously monitoring a region using a team of agents equipped with sensors
is formulated as a differential game, for which ad-hoc solutions are obtained. Both this
problem and the multi-agent collision avoidance problem suggests multi-agent systems
as a possible application domain for the framework provided by differential game the-
ory. In fact, since multi-agent systems consist of several, possibly heterogeneous, agents
that solve tasks, either cooperatively or competitively, simply interchanging the words
“agents” and “players”, it appears natural that problems involving multi-agent control
can be formulated as differential games and, more precisely, as nonzero-sum differential
games.
In some applications a differential game may have many participating players, or
a multi-agent system may consist of a large number of agents. It will become apparent
that as the number of players participating in a differential game grows large, obtain-
ing solutions becomes increasingly cumbersome. Drawing inspiration from statistical
physics, mean-ﬁeld games consider differential games with an inﬁnite number of indistin-
guishable players. Mean-ﬁeld games were introduced independently by J.M. Lasry and
P.L. Lions in [28] and by M.Y. Huang, P.E. Caines and R.P. Malhame´ in [29, 30]. In some
cases it is more feasible to obtain solutions to the mean-ﬁeld counterpart of a N -player
differential game than the differential game itself. Thus, solutions to mean-ﬁeld games
can be used to approximate the solutions of N -player differential games for a class of
games in which the N players are “small” and identical. In the limit as N tends to in-
ﬁnity the approximate solutions become exact. Mean-ﬁeld games can, for example, be of
use when considering problems involving social networks or distributed power systems
with renewable energy sources.
The aim of this thesis is twofold. First, since it is generally not possible to obtain
closed-form solutions to differential games, methods for constructing approximate solu-
tions to differential games are developed. Second, the use of differential game theory to
formulate and solve problems is demonstrated on the aforementioned notable examples,
thus illustrating possible areas of applications for the theory.
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1.2 Contributions
First, differential games are considered, starting with a brief background on differential
games is provided in Chapter 2. Here general 2- and N -player differential games and
their solutions, in terms of feedback Nash equilibria, are formally deﬁned. The Nash equi-
librium is the most common solution concept associated with differential games. Assum-
ing all players are rational, a set of strategies is said to be a Nash equilibrium solution if
it is such that a player cannot achieve a better performance by deviating from its Nash
equilibrium strategy. This solution concept assumes that all players have full informa-
tion regarding the state of the system, is aware of the cost functionals all of the players
seek to minimise and that the players announce their strategies simultaneously. A special
class of differential games, namely linear-quadratic differential games are then considered
in Section 2.3. Obtaining equilibrium strategies for linear-quadratic differential games
rely on the solution of coupled algebraic Riccati equations. However, even in this case
obtaining solutions is not generally straight-forward, which motivates the construction
of approximate solutions for differential games. The aim of this chapter is to provide the
background necessary to follow the remainder of the material in Chapters 3 and 4. For a
more comprehensive introduction to differential games the reader is referred to [6,31–33].
In Chapter 3 a class of nonlinear nonzero-sum differential games are considered.
Once again, the differential games and their feedback Nash equilibrium solutions are
formally deﬁned. The standard notion of α-admissible strategies is deﬁned before we
introduce the somewhat different notion of α-Nash equilibrium solutions. Some proper-
ties relating to linear-quadratic differential games are then brought to light. In particular
an α-Nash equilibrium solution is a set of strategies, u∗ = {u∗1, . . . , u∗N}, which ensures
that if any one player deviates from its α-Nash equilibrium strategy and the resulting set
of strategies is such that the zero equilibrium of the closed-loop system is locally expo-
nentially stable and that the decay rate can be bounded from above by a constant α > 0,
the player can gain no more than α > 0 compared to its outcome corresponding to the
set u∗. The possible additional gain α is parametrised with respect to the minimum
decay rate α, and if α = 0, the α-Nash equilibrium solution coincides with the Nash
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equilibrium solution. We show that for linear-quadratic differential games solving cou-
pled algebraic Riccati inequalities allows us to determine α-Nash equilibrium solutions
where the value α can be found by solving a Lyapunov equation as detailed in Section
3.3. The notion of algebraic P¯ matrix solution is then deﬁned in Section 3.4. This provides
a tool that allows for the construction of dynamic feedback laws that constitute local α-
Nash equilibrium solutions for a differential game, as discussed in Section 3.5 and 3.6, i.e.
in these sections two methods for constructing approximate solutions to nonlinear dif-
ferential games are developed. In this case the α term is the upper bound of an integral,
which may not, in general, be straight-forward to evaluate. In Section 3.7 two numerical
examples are considered and the dynamic approximate solutions are compared to the
linear-quadratic approximations of the differential games. As a ﬁnal example one of the
developed methods is applied to a problem involving a multi-agent system in Section 3.8,
where to so-called multi-agent collision avoidance problem is introduced. The multi-agent
collision avoidance problem is deﬁned as a differential game, an algebraic P¯ matrix solution
for the game is identiﬁed and used to construct local α-Nash equilibrium strategies and
the theory is illustrated by a set of simulations. As mentioned previously, this example
suggests that multi-agent systems as a possible application domain for the theory.
In Chapter 4, a class of 2-player Stackelberg differential games, i.e. 2-player differ-
ential games with a certain hierarchy between the players, is considered. The methods of
constructing dynamic feedback strategies constituting α-Nash equilibrium strategies for
Nash differential games are extended to this class of hierarchical differential games. The
information structure associated with this solution concept is inherently different from
that associated with Nash equilibrium solutions. When seeking Stackelberg equilibrium
solutions it is assumed that the players announce their strategies sequentially and it is
not assumed that all players know the performance criteria of all other players [11]. This
solution concept may, for example, be useful when formulating problems in which some
players are able to announce their strategies faster than the other players, possible due
to differences in computational power available for the players. The 2-player Stackel-
berg differential game studied in this chapter is the ﬁrst step towards deﬁning and con-
structing approximate solutions to differential games with more complicated information
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structures.
The task of monitoring a region using a team of agents equipped with sensors,
i.e. optimal monitoring, is studied in Chapter 5. A general literature review on this topic
is given in Section 5.2, before focusing on approaches that make us of the framework
provided by game theory. In Section 5.4 the problem is formulated as a differential game.
Although this problem formulation has several advantages, it is particularly notable that
it allows for the use of heterogeneous agents. The problem is deﬁned within the framework
of differential games and a way of obtaining ad-hoc solutions for the optimal monitoring
problem is then presented and the theory is illustrated by simulations.
In Chapter 6 mean-ﬁeld games are introduced. Using the standard framework
for mean-ﬁeld games introduced by J.M. Lasry and P.L. Lions and by M.Y. Huang, P.E.
Caines and R.P. Malhame´, a brief introduction and background to mean-ﬁeld games is
given in Section 6.2. In problems involving mean-ﬁeld games it is common to include
uncertainties and disturbances, for this reason the problems considered in Chapter 6 in-
clude elements of stochastic control theory. As a result the theory is somewhat different
in nature to the preceding parts of the thesis. A background on stochastic control theory
is not included in this thesis, and for more information on this the reader is, for exam-
ple, referred to [34]. A speciﬁc class of scalar mean-ﬁeld games and their solutions are
then considered in Sections 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3. Here, we prove that for certain classes
of mean-ﬁeld games, obtaining solutions relies on solving a two-point boundary value
problem. Simulations illustrating the theory are provided in Section 6.4.
Finally, the thesis is concluded in Chapter 7 in which a summary of the work and
directions for future work are provided.
1.3 Notation
Standard notation has been adopted in this thesis, some of which is deﬁned in this section
and used throughout the remainder of this thesis. When new notation, not included in
this section, is introduced these will be deﬁned in the relevant parts of the thesis.
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First, R denotes the set of real numbers, whereas R+ denotes the set of positive
real numbers. Likewise, C denotes the complex plane and C− denotes the left half of the
complex plane. The set of positive natural numbers is denoted by Z+.
Let x ∈ Rn, n > 0 and let V (x) denote a function of the vector x. Suppose the
function is continuously differentiable with respect to x. Then
∂V
∂x
is used to denote the
gradient of the function with respect to the vector x.
Consider a matrix M ∈ Rn×n and let M denote its transpose. The spectrum of M
is then denoted by σ(M). Furthermore I and 0 are used to denote that identity and zero
matrices, respectively. The matrix M is said to be positive deﬁnite if xMx > 0 , for all
x ∈ Rn. Similarly, M is said to be positive semi-deﬁnite if xMx ≥ 0 , for all x ∈ Rn. A
(block) diagonal matrix is denoted by
diag (M11, . . . ,MNN ) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
M11 0 . . . 0
0 M22 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Suppose M = M > 0 and consider a vector x ∈ Rn. The Euclidean norm of x
is denoted by ‖x‖, whereas ‖x‖M denotes the Euclidean norm of the vector weighted by
the matrix M , i.e. ‖x‖M = (xMx) 12 .
1.4 Published Results
The work presented in Chapter 3 and preliminary results have been published in [35–37]
and the multi-agent collision avoidance problem discussed in Section 3.8 is considered
in [38]. The results relating to Stackelberg differential games have been submitted for
publication in [39]. The contributions related to optimal monitoring in Chapter 5 have
been published in in [40] and partly in [41]. The results relating to mean-ﬁeld games in
Chapter 6, and more speciﬁcally in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 have been published in [42, 43].
Some other results relating to mean-ﬁeld games, which are not included in this thesis,
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have been published in [44].
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Chapter 2
Introduction and Preliminaries to
Differential Game Theory
2.1 Introduction
Game theory, with its roots in von Neumann and Morgenstern’s works during the late
1940’s, is the study of multi-player decisions. Differential games, in turn, consider multi-
player decision making over time. Since most situations call for making choices of some
kind, differential games have a vast range of applications. Traditionally game theoretic
methods play a signiﬁcant role in the study of management and economics [45–47], and
military and defense [31, 48]. They also appear in mathematical biology, for example
in the study of the evolution of biological systems [49–51]. Furthermore, the agents in
a multi-agent systems can be considered as players and thus, as will be seen in later
sections, differential game theory is applicable to many problems involving multi-agent
systems. Differential games also play an important role in the ﬁeld of robust control,
which deals with the study of dynamic systems and feedback control in the presence of
uncertainties and disturbances [52–54]. For example, H∞ optimal control, where con-
troller synthesis with guaranteed stability properties in the presence of a disturbance
signal is studied, boils down to a minimax optimisation problem and can be thought of
as a zero-sum differential game where the controller seeks to minimise a cost which the
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disturbance seeks to maximise [13]. For linear systems, the problem of mixed H2/H∞
control has been studied as a nonzero-sum game [14, 55]. Mixed H2/H∞ control for a
class of nonlinear systems has been studied in [15]. In summary, there is no doubt that
differential games play a central role in a diversity of applications.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, differential games can be considered as a generalisa-
tion of optimal control. In the latter, the problem lies in determining the best strategy
for one player attempting to optimise a performance criterion subject to the dynamics of
the state variable, whereas in the former, the problem is to determine the strategies for
several players, each attempting to optimise its own performance criterion subject to com-
mon state dynamics. Thus differential games introduce the notion of strategic behaviour to
control theory [6, 31, 32, 56–60]. A signiﬁcant amount of work has been done in the ﬁeld
of zero-sum games, which consider the case in which the sum of the performance criteria
of the players is zero, as, for example, is the case in a game of poker, a closed market
with several buyers and sellers or an election [6, 10]. In particular two-player zero-sum
games, in which the players have opposite performance criteria, i.e. a gain for one player
implies a similar loss for its opponent, have been studied extensively by Isaacs [31]. The
standard pursuit-evasion game with two participants is a classic example of such a dif-
ferential game [60].
In zero-sum differential games a gain for one player implies a similar loss for its
opponents and vice versa and, as a result, this class of games describes purely competitive
situations [6, 31, 60]. However, in some situations, a gain for one player need not imply
a loss for another. In certain scenarios involving decisions, one may encounter ”win-win
situations” which result in a positive outcome for all parties. Such situations, and many
other scenarios, are not captured by the class of games that can be described as zero-sum.
Non-zero sum differential games, on the other hand, regard the wide class of differential
games, where there are several players, each attempting to optimise its own, individual,
performance criterion, subject to the common state dynamics. Thus players are allowed
to have different goals, which may or may not be competing [6, 32, 33, 58, 61]. As a re-
sult nonzero-sum differential games can be used to study and describe many different
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scenarios that involve strategic decisions and consequently have a large variety of ap-
plications. For example, differential games that are not necessarily purely competetive
appear in economics and management, defense, evolutionary biology, political science
and social networks [31,45,47,49–51,62]. A well-known example of a nonzero-sum game
is the Prisoner’s Dilemma [6].
It is clear that differential games theory provides a powerful framework that can
be useful to several engineering applications. Solving a differential game boils down to
determining equilibrium strategies for all the players [6, 31, 32, 58]. In the following two
chapters we focus on feedback Nash equilibrium strategies for non-cooperative, nonzero-
sum differential games. Determining these equilibrium strategies involves solving the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs partial differential equations (PDEs) associated with the prob-
lem [6]. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDEs are a generalisation of the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman PDE encountered in optimal control. Closed-form solutions to PDEs are not, in
general, readily found. Thus, solving PDEs is often the main obstacle when studying
optimal control problems and, since solving a differential game requires solving coupled
PDEs, the same challenge is encountered when seeking solutions for differential games.
Therefore, although differential games theory provides a powerful framework that can
be useful to several engineering applications, closed-form solutions may not be available
making it necessary to seek approximate solutions of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDEs.
In [63] a method of constructing approximate solutions to optimal control prob-
lems using a dynamic feedback and the notion of a algebraic P¯ solution has been devel-
oped. In Chapter 3 a somewhat similar approach is taken to obtain approximate solu-
tions to a class of nonzero-sum differential games. However, in the case of N -player
nonzero-sum differential games, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations consist of a sys-
tem of N coupled PDEs, where N is the number of players participating in the game, in
place of a single PDE encountered in optimal control problems and in H∞ optimal con-
trol [6,32]. Thus, it is necessary to consider a notion somewhat different from the algebraic
P¯ solution of [63], namely, we introduce algebraic P¯ matrix solution. Two methods of con-
structing dynamic control laws that satisfy N coupled partial differential inequalities are
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derived. For optimal control problems, solving a partial differential inequality instead
of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDE corresponds to solving an optimal control problem
with an additional running cost associated to the negativity gap in the inequality, so the
level of approximation is directly quantiﬁable. In differential games, however, solving par-
tial differential inequalities in place of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations is related to
-Nash equilibria and the level of approximation is not directly quantiﬁable in the same way
as is the case with optimal control problems.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information on differential
games that serves as an introduction to the problems described in Chapter 3. With this in
mind, differential games and their solutions in terms of feedback Nash equilibrium strategies
are considered. First, a differential game and its solution are formally deﬁned. A special
class of nonzero-sum differenetial games, namely linear-quadratic differential games, is then
described and ﬁnally the notion of -Nash equilibrium strategies is deﬁned. To clarify
the various concepts and notation 2-player differential games are considered before the
attention is shifted to generalN -player differential games. A more thorough background
on differential game theory can be found in [6, 31, 32].
2.2 Problem Formulation
A differential game consists of N players, where N ∈ Z+. For the special case in which
N = 1 the differential games becomes a problem of optimal control, as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1. We therefore focus our attention on differential games with N ≥ 2 players. The
problem of solving inﬁnite-horizon nonzero-sum differential games in terms of feedback
Nash equilibrium strategies is deﬁned in this section.
2.2.1 2-Player Differential Games
Consider a system with state x(t) ∈ Rn and dynamics
x˙ = f˜(x, u1, u2) , (2.1)
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where f˜(x, u1, u2) is a mapping and u1(t) ∈ Rm1 and u2(t) ∈ Rm2 , with m1 ≤ n and
m2 ≤ n, are the control actions, often referred to as the strategies, of players 1 and 2,
respectively. Players 1 seeks to select its strategy u1(t) to minimise the cost functional
J1(x(0), u1, . . . , uN , T ) =
∫ T
0
q1(x, u1, u2)dt+ r1(x(T )) ,
where q1(x, u1, u2) is a running cost and r1(x(T )) is a terminal cost. Similarly, player 2
seeks to minimise the cost functional
J2(x(0), u1, . . . , uN , T ) =
∫ T
0
q2(x, u1, u2)dt+ r2(x(T )) ,
where q2(x, u1, uN ) and r2(x(T )) are the running cost and terminal cost, respectively.
This problem is known as a 2-player ﬁnite-horizon differential game. The two players must
determine their strategies u1 and u2 to minimise these cost functionals subject to the state
dynamics (2.1).
In the limit as T approaches inﬁnity the problem becomes a 2-player inﬁnite-horizon
differential game. In some applications, for example in the setting of economics, the dura-
tion of a game may be long or even unkown. It is then common to consider these to be
of inﬁnite horizon [45]. In inﬁnite-horizon differential games it is assumed that by means
of their respective control strategies, players 1 and 2 seek to minimise cost functionals of
the form
J1(x(0), u1, u2) =
∫ ∞
0
q˜1(x, u1, u2)dt ,
J2(x(0), u1, u2) =
∫ ∞
0
q˜2(x, u1, u2)dt .
(2.2)
Note that there is no terminal cost in the cost functionals for the inﬁnite-horizon differen-
tial game and care must be taken to ensure that the cost functionals are bounded. Often
this is ensured by imposing certain restrictions on the cost functionals, as in Chapter 3,
or by introducing a so-called discount factors to the running costs, as in [45].
The cost functionals of the players need not be conﬂicting, i.e. the players may, but
need not be, competing. For the special case in which the sum of the cost functionals of
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the two players is zero, i.e. q1(x, u1, u2) = −q2(x, u1, u2), a gain for player 1 implies an
equal loss for player 2 and vice versa. Differential games that fall within this category are
known as 2-player zero-sum differential games [6, 31]. The general case in which the sum of
the two cost functionals is not zero is known as a 2-player nonzero-sum differential game. In
what follows the notation S = {u1, u2} is used to denote the strategies u1 and u2 adopted
by players 1 and 2, respectively.
In an optimal control problem the optimal control is such that the cost functional
is minimised subject to the system dynamics. For a differential game, on the other hand,
the concept of optimality is not as straight-forward and intuitive. Consider, for example,
a two-player differential game and two sets of strategies S1 = {u1, u2} and S2 = {w1, w2}
and suppose that the set of strategies S1 is favourable for player 1 whereas the set S2 is
favourable for player 2. Clearly, in contrast to what is the case for optimal control prob-
lems, it is not straight-forward to determine which of the two sets of strategies is “better”
than the other. Thus, different notions of solutions of differential games must be intro-
duced.
The deﬁnition of optimality for differential games is not unique and several dif-
ferent solution concepts exist, the most common one being the so-called Nash equilibrium
strategies [11]. We focus on feedback Nash equilibrium strategies, which are formalised in the
following deﬁnitions. In what follows ui is used to denote the feedback strategy of player
i, i.e. ui(t) = ui(x(t)).
Deﬁnition 1. A pair of state feedback control strategies S = {u1, u2} is said to be admis-
sible for the non-cooperative differential game (2.1), (2.2), if the zero-equilibrium of the
system (2.1) in closed-loop with S is (locally) asymptotically stable.
Deﬁnition 2. The state feedback control strategies u∗1 and u∗2 are said to be Nash equilib-
rium strategies of player 1 and player 2, respectively, for the non-cooperative differential
game (2.1), (2.2), if the pair of strategies S∗ = {u∗1, u∗2} is admissible and satisﬁes the
inequalities
J1(x(0), u
∗
1, u
∗
2) ≤ J1(x(0), u1, u∗2)
J2(x(0), u
∗
1, u
∗
2) ≤ J2(x(0), u∗1, u2) ,
(2.3)
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for all admissible feedback strategy pairs S1 = {u1, u∗2} and S2 = {u∗1, u2} where u1 = u∗1
and u2 = u∗2.
The set of Nash equilibrium strategies S∗ is referred to as the feedback Nash equilibrium so-
lution of the differential game. As mentioned in Chapter 1 this solution concept assumes
that all players have full access to information regarding the state x, the cost function-
als of all the players and that the players announce their strategies simultaneously. This
assumption is relaxed in Chapter 4 where a 2-player Stackelberg differential game is con-
sidered.
The Nash equilibrium solution of a differential game is such that if any one de-
viates from its Nash equilibrium strategy, while assuming all other players are rational,
this results in a loss for the deviating player [32]. This does not, however, imply that the
players cannot both perform better by adhering to different strategies. In fact, strategies
that result in the best outcomes for both players, if they exist, are known as Pareto optimal
strategies.
We now focus our attention on obtaining feedback Nash equilibrium solutions for
nonzero-sum differential games with inﬁnite horizon, i.e. we consider the following prob-
lem.
Problem 1. Consider the system (2.1) and the cost functionals (2.2). The problem of
solving the 2-player, non-cooperative, differential game consists in determining a pair
of admissible feedback strategies S∗ = {u∗1 , u∗2} such that the inequalities (2.3) hold for
all admissible pairs of feedback strategy S1 = {u1, u∗2} and S2 = {u∗1, u2} where u1 = u∗1
and u2 = u∗2.
As in optimal control one way of obtaining solutions to differential games is through
dynamic programming [6, 32]. Players 1 and 2 are associated with value functions,
V1(x(0), u1, u2) and V2(x(0), u1, u2), such that
V1(x(0), u1, u2) = J1(x(0), u1, u2) ,
V2(x(0), u1, u2) = J2(x(0), u1, u2) .
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Using the principles of dynamic programming it can be shown that the value functions
satisfy
min
ui
Hi
(
x, u1, u2,
∂Vi
∂x
)
= 0 , (2.4)
where i = 1, 2 and Hi(x, u1, u2, λi) is the Hamiltonian function of player i deﬁned as
Hi (x, u1, u2, λi) = q˜i(x, u1, u2) + λ

i f(x(t), u1(t), u2(t)) ,
and λi is the costate of player i. Suppose u∗1 = u1
(
x(t),
∂V1
∂x
,
∂V2
∂x
)
and u∗2 =
u2
(
x(t),
∂V1
∂x
,
∂V2
∂x
)
are the control strategies that achieve the minimum in (2.4) for
i = 1, 2. It then follows that the value function Vi(x0, u1, u2) satisﬁes the PDE
Hi
(
x, u∗1, u
∗
2,
∂Vi
∂x
)
= 0 , (2.5)
for i = 1, 2, subject to the system dynamics (2.1). Note that (2.5) hold for inﬁnite-horizon
problems only, as the partial derivatives of the value functions with respect to time, i.e.
∂Vi
∂t
, are nonzero and the Hamiltonians are functions of time for ﬁnite-horizon problems.
Thus, obtaining solutions to the 2-player inﬁnite-horizon nonzero-sum differential game,
i.e. Problem 1 involves solving the coupled PDEs resulting from (2.5). Supposing stabilis-
ing solutions to these PDEs can be obtained, the Nash equilibrium strategies for players
1 and 2, which constitute the solution of Problem 1, are u∗1 and u∗2, respectively.
2.2.2 N -player differential games
The concepts introduced for 2-player differential games can be extended to the general
case in which there are N players in a straight-forward manner. Consider the N -player
equivalent of (2.1), i.e. consider the dynamical system
x˙ = f˜(x(t), u1(t), . . . , uN (t)) , (2.6)
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where f˜(x, u1, . . . , uN ) is a mapping and ui(t) ∈ Rmi , with mi ≤ n, is the control strategy
of player i, for i = 1, . . . N . Furthermore, each of the players aims to select its control
strategies to minimise its own cost functionals, which is of the form
Ji(x, u1, . . . , uN , T ) =
∫ T
0
qi(x, u1, . . . , uN )dt+ ri(x(T )) ,
for i = 1, . . . , N , where qi(x, u1, . . . , uN ) is a running cost and ri(T ) is a terminal cost, i =
1, . . . , N . This problem is known as the N -player ﬁnite-horizon differential game. Similarly
to what was seen in Section 2.2.1, N -player iniﬁnite-horizon differential games considers the
problem in which T approaches inﬁnity and the cost functionals of the players are of the
form
Ji =
∫ ∞
0
q˜i(x, u1, . . . , uN )dt , (2.7)
for i = 1, . . . , N
The special case in which the sum of the players cost functionals is zero is known
asN -player zero-sum differential games, whereas the more general class ofN -player dif-
ferential games in which the sum of the costs is not zero is known as N -player nonzero-
sum differential games. The latter is considered herein and, as with the 2-player dif-
ferential games encountered in Section 2.2.1, we focus our attention on inﬁnite-horizon
differential games. The concepts of admissible strategies and feedback Nash equilibrium
solutions for N -player differential games are natural extensions of Deﬁnitions 1 and 2
seen in the 2-player case.
Deﬁnition 3. The set of feedback control strategies S = {u1, . . . , uN} is said to be ad-
missible for the non-cooperative differential game (2.6), (2.7) i = 1, . . . , N , if the zero-
equilibrium of the system (2.6) in closed-loop with S is (locally) asymptotically stable.
Deﬁnition 4. The state feedback control strategies u∗1 , . . . , u∗N are said to be Nash equilib-
rium strategies of players 1 . . . N , respectively, for the non-cooperative differential game
(2.6), (2.7), if the set strategies S∗ = {u∗1, . . . , u∗N} is admissible and satisﬁes the inequali-
ties
Ji(u
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
i , . . . u
∗
N ) ≤ Ji(u∗1, . . . , ui, . . . , u∗N ) , (2.8)
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for all admissible feedback sets of strategies S = {u∗1, . . . , ui, . . . , u∗N}, with ui = u∗i .
The set of feedback strategies S∗ is said to be the Nash equilibrium solution of the N -player
differential game. The inﬁnite-horizon N -player nonzero-sum differential game is then
deﬁned as follows.
Problem 2. Consider the system (2.6) and the cost functionals (2.7). The problem of
solving the N -player, non-cooperative differential game consists in determining a set
of admissible feedback strategies S∗ = {u∗1, . . . , u∗N} such that the inequalities (2.8),
i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , N , j = i, hold for all admissible sets of strategies S =
{u∗1, . . . , ui, . . . , u∗N} where ui = u∗i , for i = 1, . . . , N .
As in the two-player case solutions can be found by applying principles of dynamic pro-
gramming. The Hamiltonian associated with player i is
Hi(x, u1, . . . , uN , λi) = q˜N (x, u1, . . . , uN ) + λ

i f(x(t), u1(t), . . . , uN (t)) ,
where λi is the costate. Solving Problem 2 involves obtaining solutions to N coupled
PDEs
Hi
(
u∗1, . . . , u
∗
N ,
∂Vi
∂x
)
= 0 , (2.9)
i = 1, . . . , N , subject to the state dynamics (2.6), where the Nash equilibrium strategy of
player i, u∗i , is the minimiser of the Hamiltonian of the player i. Consequently, solving
N -player nonzero-sum differential games involves obtaining (stabilising) solutions forN
coupled PDEs.
2.3 Linear-Quadratic Differential Games
In Chapted 3 a class of 2- andN -player nonlinear differential games is considered. To pro-
vide some insight prior to this, and to illustrate the background presented in Section 2.2,
linear-quadratic differential games are discussed in this section. This class of differential
games has been extensively studied in the literature, see for example [64]. In short, this is
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the class of differential games in which the system satisﬁes linear dynamics and the cost
functionals, which the players seek to minimise, are quadratic.
Linear-quadratic differential games are comparable to their counterpart in opti-
mal control, namely linear-quadratic regulator problems. The optimal control for such
a problem relies on the solution of an algebraic Riccati equation (ARE). In the case of
linear-quadratic differential games, obtaining Nash equilibrium feedback strategies is
not as straight-forward. The ﬁrst complication is that Nash equilibrium solutions to
linear quadratic differential games may be nonlinear, i.e. the feedback strategies u∗i ,
i = 1, . . . , N , satisfying (2.8), if they exist, may be nonlinear functions of the state [64,65].
However, it is common to seek linear feedback strategies for linear-quadratic differential
games.
As in [64,65], we restrict the solutions of linear-quadratic differential games to the
class of linear feedback strategies. The rationale behind this choice is twofold. Firstly,
since the dynamical system is linear it is natural to consider linear control laws that do
not perturb the nature of the closed-loop system. Secondly, it is computationally appeal-
ing to determine such linear feedback strategies by solving systems of coupled matrix
equations, or inequalities, in place of partial differential equations as in the genuinely
nonlinear setting.
Among the class of linear feedback strategies, Nash equilibrium solutions to
linear-quadratic differential games are obtained by solving a set of coupled AREs as
discussed in this section. However, even when restricting ourselves to linear feedback
strategies for linear-quadratic differential games, obtaining the Nash equilibrium solu-
tions is not trivial, due to the nature of the coupled AREs. In what follows 2- and N -
player linear-quadratic differential games are considered. Some remarks on the coupled
AREs and their solutions are then given in Section 2.3.3.
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2.3.1 2-player Linear-Quadratic Differential Games
Consider a 2-player differential game in which the system (2.6) is linear, namely the sys-
tem dynamics are given by
x˙ = Ax+B1u1 +B2u2 , (2.10)
where x, u1, and u2 are the state and the players’ strategies as deﬁned in Section 2.2, and
A ∈ Rn×n, B1 ∈ Rn×m1 and B2 ∈ Rn×m2 are constant matrices. Furthermore, the players
seek to minimise the following cost functionals, which are quadratic in the state variable
and the control strategies,
J1 =
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
xQ1x+ u1 R11u1 + u

2 R12u2
)
dt ,
J2 =
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
xQ2x+ u1 R21u1 + u

2 R22u2
)
dt ,
(2.11)
where Q1 ≥ 0, Q2 ≥ 0 and the weighting matrices satisfy R11 = R11 > 0, R22 = R22 > 0.
Differential games of this form are known as 2-player linear-quadratic nonzero-sum differen-
tial games.
Theorem 1. [32] Suppose P1 = P1 and P2 = P2 are such that P1 + P2 > 0 and satisfy
the coupled AREs
P1A+A
P1 +Q1 − P1B1R−111 B1 P1 − P1B2R−122 B2 P2
− P2B2R−122 B2 P1 + P2B2R−122 R12R−122 B2 P2 = 0 ,
P2A+A
P2 +Q2 − P2B2R−122 B2 P2 − P2B1R−111 B1 P1
− P1B1R−111 B1 P2 + P1B1R−111 R21R−111 B1 P1 = 0 .
(2.12)
Then, the linear feedback strategies
u∗1 = −R−111 B1 P1x , u∗2 = −R−122 B2 P2x , (2.13)
are Nash equilibrium strategies for players 1 and 2, respectively, and S∗ = {u∗1, u∗2} is a
Nash equilibrium solution for the non-cooperative differential game in Problem 1 with
dynamics (2.10) and cost functionals (2.11). 
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Proof: The proof then lies in showing that the strategies are consistent with (2.4) and (2.5)
and that the set of strategies S∗ = {u∗1, u∗2} is admissible. The Hamiltonians of player 1
and 2 are
H1(x, u1, u2, λ1) =
1
2x
Q1x+ 12u

1 R11u1 +
1
2u

2 R12u2 + λ

1 (Ax+B1u1 +B2u2) ,
H2(x, u1, u2, λ2) =
1
2x
Q2x+ 12u

1 R21u1 +
1
2u

2 R22u2 + λ

2 (Ax+B1u1 +B2u2) ,
respectively, and the control strategies u∗1, minimising H1
(
x, u1, u2,
∂V1
∂x
)
, and u∗2, min-
imising H2
(
x, u1, u2,
∂V2
∂x
)
, are
u∗1 = −R−111 B1
∂V1
∂x

, u∗2 = −R−122 B2
∂V2
∂x

.
Furthermore, it follows from (2.12) that the quadratic value functions V1 = 12x
P1x and
V2 =
1
2x
P2x satisfy the PDEs given by (2.5), i.e. the value functions satisfy
∂V1
∂x
Ax+
1
2
xQ1x− 1
2
∂V1
∂x
B1R
−1
11 B

1
∂V1
∂x

− ∂V1
∂x
B2R
−1
22 B

2
∂V2
∂x

+
1
2
∂V2
∂x
B2R
−1
22 B

2
∂V2
∂x

= 0 ,
∂V2
∂x
Ax+
1
2
xQ2x− 1
2
∂V2
∂x
B2R
−1
22 B

2
∂V2
∂x

− ∂V2
∂x
B1R
−1
11 B

1
∂V1
∂x

+
1
2
∂V1
∂x
B1R
−1
11 B

1
∂V1
∂x

= 0 .
By assumption P1 + P2 > 0, which implies that W = V1 + V2 > 0, for all x = 0, and the
above PDEs imply that W˙ < 0, for all x = 0. Thus, admissibility of the set of strategies
S∗ follows from standard Lyapunov arguments. It follows that the linear feedback strate-
gies (2.13) are Nash-equilibrium strategies for each of the two players and S∗ is a Nash
equilibrium solution for the differential game. 
2.3.2 N-player Linear-Quadratic Differential Games
We now focus our attention on N -player linear-quadratic nonzero-sum differential
games, which are a natural extension of the 2-player case.
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Consider the dynamical system
x˙ = Ax+
N∑
i=1
Biui , (2.14)
and the cost functionals
Ji =
1
2
∫ ∞
0
⎛
⎝x˜Qix+ ui Riiui + N∑
j=1,j =i
uj Rijuj
⎞
⎠ dt , (2.15)
where Rii ≥ 0 and i = 1, . . . N . As in the two-player case, the Nash equilibrium solu-
tion of this N -player differential game relies on the solution of the N coupled AREs as
speciﬁed in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. [32] Suppose Pi = Pi , i = 1, . . . , N are such that
∑N
i=1, Pi > 0 and satisfy
the coupled AREs
PiA+A
Pi +Qi −
N∑
i=1
(
PjBjR
−1
jj RijR
−1
jj B

j Pj − PiBjR−1jj Bj Pj − PjBjR−1jj Bj Pi
)
= 0 ,
(2.16)
for i = 1, . . . , N . Then, the feedback strategy
u∗i = R
−1
ii B

i Pix , (2.17)
is a Nash equilibrium strategy for player i, for i = 1, . . . , N , and the set of strategies
S∗ = {u∗1, . . . , u∗N} is a Nash equilibrium solution for the non-cooperative differential
game in Problem 2 with dynamics (2.14) and cost functionals (2.15). 
Proof: The proof follows the same steps as the proof of Theorem 1. Admissibility follows
from the ﬁrst part of the claim. Since equations (2.16) are satisﬁed, the quadratic value
functions Vi(x) = 12x
Pix satisfy the PDEs (2.9), i = 1, . . . N and it follows that (2.17)
yields a Nash equilibrium strategy for player i and S∗ is a Nash equilibrium solution for
the differential game. 
47 2.3 Linear-Quadratic Differential Games
2.3.3 Some Remarks Concerning Linear-Quadratic Differential Games
As seen in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, when limiting the class of possible Nash equilibrium
strategies for linear-quadratic differential games to the class of linear feedback strategies
the equilibrium strategies rely on solutions of coupled AREs. Even in this case obtain-
ing solutions is not straight-forward [66]. Linear-quadratic differential games and their
associated coupled AREs have been studied extensively in the literature, see for exam-
ple [66–70]. A comprehensive summary of results concerning solutions for both ﬁnite and
inﬁnite-horizon problems in terms of open- and closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategies
is given in [64].
For ﬁnite-horizon problems it has been shown that open-loop Nash equilibrium
strategies exist and are unique provided the time interval over which the game is played
is sufﬁciently small [64, 67]. Similarly closed-loop Nash equilibrium solutions for ﬁnite-
horizon differential games are studied in [71].
However, for inﬁnite-horizon differential games the situation is somewhat more
complicated. As seen in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, Nash equilibrium solutions can be found
only if symmetric solutions to coupled AREs exist. Furthermore, these solutions have to
be such that the zero equilibrium of the closed-loop system is stable. The existence of
linear Nash strategies for inﬁnite-horizon differential games is studied in [66], where it
is shown that solutions exist provided the matrix describing the open-loop dynamics
has a “sufﬁcient degree of stability”. However, in general, for inﬁnite-horizon problems,
the coupled AREs may be such that many, one or no linear feedback Nash equilibrium
solutions exist [64, 69]. For example, in [65, 72] a scalar, 2-player, inﬁnite-horizon linear-
quadratic game is considered and it is shown that even for this case solutions to the
coupled AREs may be non-unique. Similarly, it is shown in [73] that for scalar, N -player,
inﬁnite-horizon linear-quadratic differential games the coupled AREs may have several
solutions.
In [70] the computation of Nash equilibrium solutions for ﬁnite-horizon differen-
tial games is studied. Different iterative algorithms for computing stabilising solutions
for inﬁnite-horizon, linear-quadratic differential games exist, see for example [74]. How-
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ever, the convergence properties of these rely heavily on the initial conditions and fur-
thermore only provide one solution. In [73, 75] scalar linear quadratic differential games
are considered and in Chapter 8 of [64] an algorithm for computing all feedback Nash
equilibrium solutions for scalar linear-quadratic differential games is given.
From the above, it is clear that obtaining Nash equilibrium solutions, even for
linear-quadratic differential games, may be difﬁcult. Thus, it may in some cases be nec-
essary to consider somewhat more relaxed concepts than that of Nash equilibrium solu-
tions, which is introduced in the following section.
2.4 -Nash Equilibria
It is already apparent that obtaining solutions to differential games may be difﬁcult,
even for linear-quadratic differential games, and this will become even more apparent
in Chapter 3. In general it may not be feasible to obtain closed-form solutions to the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDEs, i.e. (2.5) in the 2-player case and (2.9), i = 1, . . . , N , in the
N -player case, and even when it is possible, the computational complexity may be high.
Thus, it is often of practical interest to consider a somewhat weaker solution concept,
namely the notion of -Nash equilibria. The set of strategies which constitute a -Nash
equilibrium can be interpreted as an approximation of a Nash equilibrium solution of a
differential game and is a standard deﬁnition appearing in the literature, see for example
Chapter 4 of [6].
For two-player differential games, the -equilibrium solution for a differential
game is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 5. The feedback strategies u∗1 and u∗2 are said to be -Nash equilibrium strate-
gies for players 1 and 2, respectively, for Problem 1, if the pair of strategies S∗ = {u∗1, u∗2}
is admissible and satisﬁes
J1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) ≤ J1(u1, u∗2) +  ,
J2(u
∗
1, u
∗
2) ≤ J2(u∗1, u2) +  ,
(2.18)
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for some  > 0, for all admissible pairs of feedback strategies S1 = {u1, u∗2} and S2 =
{u∗1, u2}, with u1 = u∗1 and u2 = u∗2. The pair of strategies S∗ is said to be an -Nash
equilibrium of the differential game.
ForN -player differential games -Nash equilibrium strategies are deﬁned in a sim-
ilar manner. Consider the N -player differential game in Problem 2.
Deﬁnition 6. The feedback strategies u∗1, . . . , u∗N are said to be -Nash equilibrium
strategies for players 1, . . . , N , respectively, for Problem 2 if the set of strategies S∗ =
{u∗1, . . . , u∗N} is admissible and satisﬁes
Ji(u
∗
1, , . . . , u
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
N ) ≤ Ji(u∗1, . . . , ui, . . . , u∗N ) +  , (2.19)
for some  > 0, and for any set of admissible strategies S = {u∗1, . . . , ui, . . . u∗N}, with
ui = u∗i , for i = 1, . . . , N . The set of strategies S∗ is said to be an -Nash equilibrium of
the differential game.
The sets of admissible strategies, S∗ satisfying (2.18), in the two-player case, or
(2.19), in the N -player case, are referred to as -Nash equilibrium solutions for Problems
1 and 2, respectively. Despite the fact that the concept of -Nash equilibrium clearly
represents a relaxation, i.e. an approximation, of the stricter notion of Nash equilibrium,
the former solution concept is of interest in practical cases since its computation may be
signiﬁcantly easier than that of a classical Nash equilibrium [6,76].
The notion of -Nash equilibrium solution can be extended to different notions of
solutions for differential games. In Chapter 4 it is extended to the case of Stackelberg
equilibrium solutions in Chapter 4.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter a brief introduction and some background material on differential game
theory have been given. It has been shown that obtaining feedback Nash equilibrium
solutions generally relies on solving a system of coupled PDEs of the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Isaacs type. For the class of linear-quadratic differential games, when considering linear
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feedback strategies only, solutions rely on coupled AREs in place of the PDEs encoun-
tered in the more general setting. Furthermore, -Nash equilibrium solutions, which are
a relaxation of Nash equilibrium solutions are deﬁned. Since closed-form solutions to the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDEs cannot in general be found, it is often necessary to solve
differential games approximately. Using the background presented in this chapter two
methods of constructing approximate solutions (in terms of feedback Nash equilibrium
solutions) are developed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Constructive -Nash Equilibrium
Solutions for Nonzero-Sum
Differential Games
3.1 Introduction
General (inﬁnite-horizon) nonzero-sum differential games and their solutions in terms of
feedback Nash equilibrium strategies have been introduced in Chapter 2. As discussed
therein, determining Nash equilibrium solutions for a differential game involves solving
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations, i.e. equations (2.5) , in the 2-player case, or equa-
tions (2.9) for i = 1, . . . , N , in theN -player case. As it is not, in general, possible to obtain
closed-form solutions to PDEs it is often necessary to seek approximate solutions [76].
In this chapter a class of inﬁnite-horizon, nonzero-sum differential games and their
Nash equilibria are studied. Extending the results of [63], in which a method of approx-
imately solving optimal control and robust control problems using a dynamic extension
and the notion of algebraic P¯ solution has been developed, a method of approximately
solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDEs is proposed. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equa-
tion consists of a system of coupled PDEs, in place of a single PDE encountered in optimal
control problems and in H∞ control [6, 32]. Thus, the results in this chapter rely on a
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notion somewhat different from the algebraic P¯ solution of [63], namely, we introduce al-
gebraic P¯ matrix solution. Using these, two ways of constructing dynamic control laws
satisfying partial differential inequalities are derived and it is demonstrated that these
dynamic control laws approximate the solution of the original differential game. The
problems considered are a subclass of the two-player differential games in Problem 1
and the N -player differential game in Problem 2, introduced in Chapter 2, namely, we
focus on the case in which the system can be described by input-afﬁne dynamics and the
running costs associated with each agent is of a particular structure. The properties of
the dynamics and running costs associated with the differential games considered herein
are deﬁned and for clarity the problems are stated again in this chapter.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we introduce
the class of nonlinear differential games studied and recall some properties of the clas-
sical solutions, introduced in Chapter 2, for these games. Additionally the notions of
α-admissible strategies and α-Nash equilibrium strategies are introduced. Some proper-
ties of linear-quadratic differential games are discussed in Section 3.3, in which additionally
solutions of speciﬁc matrix inequalities are related to the notion of α-Nash equilibria.
The aim of the remaining part of the chapter is then to extend the above results to the
nonlinear setting avoiding the need for explicit solutions of partial differential equations
or inequalities. Towards this end, in Section 3.4 we provide the notion of algebraic P¯ so-
lution that is instrumental for the construction of approximate solutions for the original
class of nonlinear differential games. An approach exploiting this notion to obtain ap-
proximate solutions is presented in Section 3.5, for systems satisfying certain structural
assumptions. In Section 3.6 another approach, which does not require these structural
assumptions, is presented. Three numerical examples illustrating the theory are consid-
ered in Section 3.7. In the ﬁrst example equilibrium strategies are known and it is demon-
strated that the approximate methods proposed in this chapter result in outcomes closer
to the Nash equilibrium outcomes than those resulting from solving the linear-quadratic
approximation of the problem. The second example uses a Lotka-Volterra model. As a
ﬁnal example, the theory is then applied to a problem involving a multi-agent system in
Section 3.8. In this section the problem of navigating a team of agents from given initial
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positions to a desired end conﬁguration while avoiding collisions is posed as a differen-
tial game. The problem is then solved using the results presented in 3.6. Finally, some
conclusions are drawn in Section 7.2.
3.2 Nash and -Nash Equilibria for Non-cooperative differential
games
Similarly to what has been done in Chapter 2, in this section we consider a dynamical
system, with state x, andN players seeking to optimise different objectives, which may be
conﬂicting, by selecting suitable control strategies, i.e. control actions [6]. The problem of
solving a differential game (in terms of feedback Nash equilibria) is deﬁned, as in Section
2.2, and properties of Nash equilibrium strategies and -Nash equilibrium strategies are
recalled before the notion of α-Nash equilibrium strategies is introduced. In particular,
we consider differential games in which the system has input-afﬁne dynamics and the
cost functionals of each player satisfy certain properties as detailed in the following.
Consider the input-afﬁne dynamics1
x˙ = f(x) +
N∑
i=1
gi(x)ui , (3.1)
and recall x, with x(t) ∈ Rn, denotes the state of the system, which is affected by the
actions of each player via the control input ui(t) ∈ Rmi associated to the ith player, for
i = 1, . . . , N .
Assumption 1. The origin of Rn is an equilibrium point of the vector ﬁeld f , i.e. f(0) = 0.
Since f(x) is smooth, Assumption 1 implies that there exists a continuous matrix-valued
function F : Rn → Rn×n such that f(x) = F (x)x for all x ∈ Rn. Although F (x) is
possibly non-unique, F (0) is unique. The above deﬁnition mimics the spirit of the so-
called apparent linearisation [77], which is pursued in the State Dependent Riccati Equation
(SDRE) approach to nonlinear optimal control problems [78]. Differently from the latter,
1All mappings are assumed to be sufﬁciently smooth.
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however, the methodology proposed herein yields a solution the performances of which –
in terms for instance of asymptotic stability – are not affected by the choice of the matrix-
valued function F .
Note that the system (3.1) may have several equilibria.
3.2.1 2-Player Problem Formulation
Consider ﬁrst the case in which N = 2, i.e. the 2-player case. In this case the system (3.1)
reduces to
x˙ = f(x) + g1(x)u1 + g2(x)u2 . (3.2)
The objectives of the two players are quantiﬁed by cost functionals, namely (2.2), which
they seek to minimise. Consider the case in which these cost functionals are of the form
Ji(x(0), ui, uj) 
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
qi(x) + ‖ui(t)‖2 − ‖uj(t)‖2
)
dt , (3.3)
for i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, j = i. Note that J1 and J2 are parameterised with respect to the
initial condition x(0), and qi ∈ Cr, with r ≥ 2, for i = 1, 2 are positive semideﬁnite
running costs of the form qi(x) = xQi(x)x, i = 1, 2, without loss of generality, where the
continuous matrix-valued functions Qi : Rn → Rn×n, i = 1, 2, are positive semideﬁnite
and symmetric for all x ∈ Rn.
We consider running costs which satisfy the following assumption. The assump-
tion is exploited later to ensure stability of the zero-equilibrium of the closed-loop system.
Assumption 2. The running costs qi : Rn → R are such that q1 + q2 is positive deﬁnite
around the origin in Rn.
Loosely speaking, each of the two players seeks to achieve a goal, quantiﬁed by
its running cost, while minimising its own control action and maximising the effort of
the other player. Before formally introducing the problem under investigation, it appears
reasonable to deﬁne the set of control inputs that are considered admissible, in line with
Deﬁnition 1, for the non-cooperative differential games dealt with in this section. As in
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the previous chapter, the input ui denotes the feedback strategy of player i, i.e. ui(t) =
ui(x(t)).
Deﬁnition 7. A pair of state feedback control strategies S = {u1, u2} is said to be admis-
sible for the non-cooperative differential game (3.2), (3.3), if the zero-equilibrium of the
system (3.2) in closed-loop with S is (locally) asymptotically stable .
We deﬁne a stronger notion of admissibility in the following.
Deﬁnition 8. A pair of state feedback control strategies S = {u1, u2} is said to be α-
admissible, with α > 0, for the non-cooperative differential game (3.2), (3.3), if the zero-
equilibrium of the system (3.2) in closed-loop with S is (locally) asymptotically stable and
σ(Acl + αI) ⊂ C−, where Acl is the matrix describing the linearisation of the closed-loop
system around the origin.
The notion of α-admissible strategies is related to the notion of discount factors, commonly
introduced in the context of inﬁnite-horizon differential games: both enforce a minimum
decay rate for the integrand function [45].
Problem 3. Consider the system (3.2) and the cost functionals (3.3). Solving the 2-player,
non-cooperative differential game consists in determining a pair of admissible feedback
strategies S∗ = {u∗1 u∗2} such that the inequalities J∗i  Ji(x(0), u∗i , u∗j ) ≤ Ji(x(0), ui, u∗j ),
i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, j = i, hold for all admissible pairs of feedback strategies S1 = {u1, u∗2}
and S2 = {u∗1, u2}, where u1 = u∗1 and u2 = u∗2.
The set of strategies S∗ constitutes a Nash equilibrium solution for the 2-player game,
whereas (J∗1 , J∗2 ) is the corresponding Nash equilibrium outcome, as remarked in Sec-
tion 2.2.1 [6]. Suppose we are able to solve the system of two coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-
Isaacs PDEs given by
∂Vi
∂x
f(x)− 1
2
∂Vi
∂x
gi(x)gi(x)
∂Vi
∂x

+
1
2
qi(x)− 1
2
∂Vj
∂x
gj(x)gj(x)
∂Vj
∂x

− ∂Vi
∂x
gj(x)gj(x)
∂Vj
∂x

= 0 ,
(3.4)
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i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, j = i, with V1(0) = 0, V2(0) = 0. The Nash equilibrium strategies for the
two players are then given by
u∗1 = −g1(x)
∂V1
∂x

, u∗2 = −g2(x)
∂V2
∂x

, (3.5)
provided the system system (3.2) in closed-loop with {u∗1, u∗2} is locally asymptotically
stable. Admissibility of the strategies in (3.5) is ensured if W = V1 + V2 > 0, for all x = 0.
Then
W˙ =
(
∂V1
∂x
+
∂V2
∂x
)
x˙ ,
and (3.2) and (3.4) imply that W˙ = −12(q1(x) + q2(x)) < 0 along the trajectories of the
closed-loop system. It follows that the pair of feedback strategies is admissible. Note that
(3.4), i = 1, 2, are precisely the PDEs resulting from (2.5) for the class of differential games
considered in this chapter.
For forward reference we introduce the linearised problem. The linearisation of
the system (3.2) around the origin is
x˙ = Ax+B1u1 +B2u2 , (3.6)
with
A  ∂f
∂x
∣∣∣
x=0
= F (0), Bi  gi(0) , (3.7)
where i = 1, 2. The running costs in (3.3) are replaced by the quadratic term xQ¯ix,
with Q¯i  Qi(0). The above describes a linear-quadratic differential game and determining
Nash equilibrium solutions is not trivial even for such games, which may in general
admit nonlinear feedback strategies. In the following, as in [64, 65] and as discussed in
Section 2.3, we focus on the class of linear feedback strategies in the context of linear-
quadratic differential games.
Among this class of strategies the Nash equilibrium strategies for the two players
are given by
u∗1 = −B1 P¯1x , u∗2 = −B2 P¯2x , (3.8)
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provided σ(A− B1B1 1¯ − B2B2 P¯2) ⊂ C−, where P¯i, i = 1, 2, are symmetric solutions of
the coupled AREs [6, 32, 67]
P¯iA+A
P¯i − P¯iBiBi P¯i − P¯iBjBj P¯j −
(
P¯jBjB

j P¯i + P¯jBjB

j P¯j
)
+ Q¯i = 0 , (3.9)
i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, j = i. The control strategies (3.8) are admissible if P¯1 + P¯2 is positive
deﬁnite. Then W = x(P¯1 + P¯2)x > 0, for all x = 0, and (3.9) and Assumption 2 imply
that W˙ = −12x(Q¯1 + Q¯2)x < 0, for all x = 0. It follows that the pair of strategies (3.8)
is admissible. The differential game deﬁned by the linearised system given by (3.6) and
(3.7), and the quadratic approximation of the costs is referred to as the linear-quadratic
approximation of the problem.
The coupled AREs (3.9) are consistent with those introduced in Chapter 2, i.e. the
equations are given by (2.12), with R11 = R22 = I and R12 = R21 = −I . As discussed in
Section 2.3.3, obtaining solutions for the coupled AREs (3.9) is generally not straightfor-
ward and consequently the (coupled) matrix equations (3.9) entail that a set of strategies
which constitutes a Nash equilibrium solution may be difﬁcult to determine even for lin-
ear time-invariant systems [66, 68–70, 79, 80]. Therefore, in the remainder of this section
we recall the weaker notion of solution of non-cooperative differential games, namely
the -Nash equilibrium strategies introduced in Deﬁnition 5. These partly motivate the
results of the following sections.
Deﬁnition 9. Admissible feedback strategies u∗1 and u∗2 are said to be -Nash equi-
librium strategies of players 1 and 2, respectively, of a 2-player, non-cooperative dif-
ferential game if for the pair of strategies S∗ = {u∗1, u∗2} there exists a non-negative
constant x0 , parameterised with respect to the initial condition x(0) = x0, such that
Ji(x0, u
∗
i , u
∗
j ) ≤ Ji(x0, ui, u∗j ) + x0 , for all admissible strategy pairs S1 = {u1, u∗2} and
S2 = {u∗1, u2} with u1 = u∗1 and u2 = u∗2. The pair of strategies S∗i is said to be an -Nash
equilibrium of the differential game.
Finally, another notion of solution is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 10. Admissible feedback strategies u∗1 and u∗2 are said to be α-Nash equilib-
rium strategies for players 1 and 2, respectively, of a 2-player, non-cooperative differen-
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tial game if for the pair of strategies S∗ = {u∗1, u∗2} there exists a non-negative constant
x0,α, parameterised with respect to the initial condition x(0) = x0 and α > 0, such that
Ji(x0, u
∗
i , u
∗
j ) ≤ Ji(x0, ui, u∗j )+ x0,α, for all α-admissible strategy pairs Si = {ui, u∗j}, with
ui = u∗i i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, j = i. The pair of strategies S∗i is said to be an α-Nash
equilibrium of the differential game.
Remark 1. Alternatively to the cost functionals (3.3) different weights on the control
inputs ui, i = 1, 2, can be considered, similarly to what has been done in [66]. In
this scenario, sufﬁcient conditions for admissibility of the Nash equilibrium solution,
S∗ = {u∗1, u∗2} are stated in the following result. 
Proposition 1. Consider system (3.2) and the 2-player differential game where the two
players seek to minimise the cost functionals
Ji 
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
qi(x(t)) + ui(t)
Riiui(t)− uj(t)Rijuj(t)
)
dt ,
with Rii > 0, i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, j = i. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations associated
with the differential game are
∂Vi
∂x
f(x)− 1
2
∂Vi
∂x
gi(x)R
−1
ii gi(x)
∂Vi
∂x

+
1
2
qi(x)− ∂Vi
∂x
gj(x)R
−1
jj gj(x)
∂Vj
∂x

− 1
2
∂Vj
∂x
gj(x)R
−1
jj RijR
−1
jj gj(x)
∂Vj
∂x

= 0
(3.10)
i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, j = i, with V1(0) = 0 and V2(0) = 0. Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then
the strategies (3.5) are admissible provided V1 + V2 > 0, for all x = 0, R11 ≥ R21 and
R22 ≥ R12. 
Proof: Taking W = V1 + V2 as a candidate Lyapunov function, it follows from (3.10) that
for all x = 0, W˙ ≤ −12(q1 + q2) < 0 holds provided R11 ≥ R21 and R22 ≥ R12. 
3.2.2 N -Player Problem Formulation
Consider now the general case in which the game involves N > 2 players. The notions
and deﬁnitions introduced for this scenario are direct extensions of those introduced for
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the case in which N = 2, but are presented for completeness. Similarly to the 2-player
case, the objectives of each of the players are quantiﬁed by cost functionals, namely (2.7),
i = 1, . . . , N , which the players seek to minimise. These cost functionals are of the form
Ji(x(0), u1, . . . , uN ) 
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
qi(x(t)) + ‖ui(t)‖2 −
N∑
j=1,j =i
‖uj(t)‖2
)
dt , (3.11)
parameterised with respect to the initial condition x(0) and the positive semideﬁnite run-
ning costs qi ∈ Cr, i = 1, . . . , N , of the form qi(x) = xQi(x)x ≥ 0, where the continuous
matrix-valued functions Qi : Rn → Rn×n, i = 1, . . . N , are positive semideﬁnite and
symmetric for all x ∈ Rn.
Assumption 3. The running costs qi : Rn → R are such that the function
∑N
i=1 qi(x) is
positive deﬁnite around the origin in Rn.
As in the 2-player case, Assumption 3 is exploited to ensure stability of the zero-
equilibrium of the closed-loop system.
Similarly to Deﬁnitions 7 and 8, in this setting the set of admissible and α-admissible control
strategies are deﬁned. Recall ﬁrst Deﬁnition 3, namely α-admissible strategies, for differ-
ential games described by the dynamics (3.1) and the cost functionals (3.11), i = 1, . . . , N .
Deﬁnition 11. The set of state feedback control strategies S = {u1, ..., uN} is said to be
admissible for the non-cooperative differential game if the zero-equilibrium of the system
(3.1) in closed-loop with S is (locally) asymptotically stable.
The stronger notion of α-admissible strategies is a direct extension of Deﬁnition 8.
Deﬁnition 12. The set of state feedback control strategies S = {u1, ..., uN} is said to be α-
admissible for the non-cooperative differential game if the zero-equilibrium of the system
(3.1) in closed-loop with S is (locally) asymptotically stable and σ(Acl+αI) ⊂ C−, where
Acl is the matrix describing the linearisation of the closed-loop system around the origin.
Problem 4. Consider the system (3.1) and the cost functionals (3.11), i = 1 . . . , N .
The problem of solving the N -player non-cooperative differential game consists in de-
termining a set of admissible feedback strategies S∗ = {u∗1, . . . , u∗N} such that J∗i 
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Ji(x(0), u
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
i , . . . , u
∗
N ) ≤ Ji(x(0), u∗1, . . . , ui, . . . u∗N ), for all admissible sets of feed-
back strategies Si = {u∗1, . . . , ui, . . . , u∗N}, where ui = u∗i and i = 1, . . . , N .
As in the 2-player case, it follows from Deﬁnition 4 that the set of strategies S∗ consti-
tutes a Nash equilibrium solution for the N -player game, whereas (J∗1 , . . . , J∗N ) is the
corresponding Nash equilibrium outcome. Suppose we are able to solve the system of
coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDEs given by
∂Vi
∂x
f(x)− 1
2
∂Vi
∂x
gi(x)gi(x)
∂Vi
∂x

+
1
2
qi(x)
− 1
2
N∑
j=1,j =i
∂Vj
∂x
gj(x)gj(x)
∂Vj
∂x

−
N∑
j=1,j =i
∂Vi
∂x
gj(x)gj(x)
∂Vj
∂x

= 0 ,
(3.12)
with Vi(0) = 0. Then the Nash equilibrium strategy for each player is provided by the
static state feedback
u∗i = −gi(x)
∂Vi
∂x

, (3.13)
for i = 1, . . . , N , provided the set of strategies S∗ = {u∗i , . . . , u∗N}is admissible. Similarly
to the 2-player case, suppose that W =
∑N
i=1 Vi > 0, for all x = 0. It follows from (3.1)
and (3.12), i = 1, . . . , N , that W˙ = −12
∑N
i=1 qi and, consequently, the set of strategies S∗
is admissible.
The linearised problem is deﬁned by the linear approximation of the system (3.1)
about the origin, i.e.
x˙ = Ax+
N∑
i=1
Biui , (3.14)
with A and B1, . . . , BN given by (3.7), with i = 1, . . . , N , and the quadratic approxima-
tions of the running costs, where the running costs in (3.11), i = 1, . . . , N , are replaced
by the quadratic term xQ¯ix, with Q¯i  Qi(0). Note that in the linearised case the set of
admissible strategies, for both the 2-player case and the N -player case, coincide with the
set of linear state feedbacks ui = Kix, i = 1, ..., N , which are such that all the eigenvalues
of the matrix A +
∑N
i=1BiKi have negative real parts. Within the class of linear feed-
back strategies the Nash equilibrium strategy for each player is provided by the static
state feedback u∗i = −Bi P¯ix, for i = 1, , . . . , N , where P¯i, i = 1, . . . , N , provided the
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set of strategies S∗ = {u∗1, . . . , u∗N} is admissible, where P¯i, i = 1, . . . , N , are symmetric
solutions of the N coupled AREs
P¯iA+A
P¯i − P¯iBiBi P¯i −
N∑
j=1,j =i
P¯iBjB

j P¯j −
N∑
j=1,j =i
P¯jBjB

j P¯i
−
N∑
j=1,j =i
P¯jBjB

j P¯j + Q¯i = 0 ,
(3.15)
for i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . N and j = i. As in the 2-player case, admissibility of the set of
feedback strategies S∗ follows ifW = x
(∑N
i=1 P¯i
)
x > 0 and W˙ = 12x

(∑N
i=1Qi
)
x < 0,
for all x = 0.
As discussed in the 2-player case, (3.15) is consistent with (2.17) with Rii = I and
Rij = −I , for i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , N , j = i, and solving coupled AREs of this form
is not generally straightforward. Thus, it is of interest to recall the deﬁnition of -Nash
equilibria once again, and extend the notion of α-Nash equilibria in Deﬁnition 10 to the
more general case in which N > 2.
Deﬁnition 13. Admissible feedback strategies u∗1, ..., u∗N are said to be -Nash equi-
librium strategies of players 1, . . . , N , respectively, of a non-cooperative differential
game if for the set of strategies S∗ = {u∗1, . . . , u∗N} there exists a non-negative con-
stant x0 , parameterised with respect to the initial condition x(0) = x0, such that
Ji(x0, u
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
i , . . . , u
∗
N ) ≤ Ji(x0, u∗1, . . . , ui, . . . u∗N ) + x0 , for all sets of admissible strate-
gies Si = {u∗1, . . . , ui, . . . , u∗N}, where ui = u∗i and i = 1, ..., N . The set of strategies S∗ is
said to be an -Nash equilibrium of the differential game.
Deﬁnition 14. Admissible feedback strategies u∗1, ..., u∗N are said to be α-Nash equilib-
rium strategies of players 1, . . . , N , respectively, of a non-cooperative differential game
if for the set of strategies S∗ = {u∗1, . . . , u∗N} there exists a non-negative constant x0,α,
parameterised with respect to the initial condition x(0) = x0 and α > 0, such that
Ji(x0, u
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
i , . . . , u
∗
N ) ≤ Ji(x0, u∗1, . . . , ui, . . . u∗N ) + x0,α, for all sets of α-admissible
strategies Si = {u∗1, . . . , ui, . . . , u∗N}, where ui = u∗i and i = 1, ..., N . The set of strategies
S∗ is said to be an α-Nash equilibrium of the differential game.
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3.3 Linear-Quadratic Non-Cooperative Differential Games
The objective of this section is to present results that relate solutions of speciﬁc (matrix)
inequalities to the concept of α-Nash equilibrium in the simpler, and explanatory, case
of linear-quadratic differential games2. These results are then extended to the nonlin-
ear setting by exploiting a tool introduced in Section 3.4 which allows to replace partial
differential inequalities with matrix algebraic inequalities.
Proposition 2. Consider the linear system (3.6) and the cost functionals (3.3), with qi(x) =
xQ¯ix, i = 1, 2. Consider the class of linear feedback strategies and suppose that P¯i =
P¯i , i = 1, 2, are such that P¯1 + P¯2 > 0 and satisfy the coupled Riccati inequalities
P¯iA+A
P¯i − P¯iBiBi P¯i − P¯iBjBj P¯j −
(
P¯jBjB

j P¯i + P¯jBjB

j P¯j
)
+ Q¯i ≤ 0 , (3.16)
i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, j = i. Then the pair of strategies S∗ = {u∗1, u∗2}, with u∗1 = −B1 P¯1x and
u∗2 = −B2 P¯2x, is admissible and yields an α-Nash equilibrium, for any α > 0, of the
non-cooperative differential game. 
Proof: If the matrices P¯1, P¯2 satisfy the inequalities (3.16), then there exist positive
semideﬁnite matrices Υi = Υi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, such that
P¯iA+A
P¯i − P¯iBiBi P¯i − P¯iBjBj P¯j −
(
P¯jBjB

j P¯i + P¯jBjB

j P¯j
)
+ Q¯i +Υi = 0 ,
(3.17)
i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, j = i. By the equations (3.17) and recalling the deﬁnition of the coupled
AREs (3.9), it follows that S∗ represents a Nash equilibrium for the system (3.6) with
respect to the modiﬁed cost functionals
J˜i(x0, ui, uj) 
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
x(t)
(
Q¯i +Υi
)
x(t) + ‖ui(t)‖2 − ‖uj(t)‖2
)
dt , (3.18)
i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, j = i, with x(0) = x0. Note that W = x(P¯1 + P¯2)x > 0, for all x = 0,
and W˙ = −12x(Q¯1 + Υ1 + Q¯2 + Υ2)x < 0, for all x = 0, hence the pair of strategies
2The results are stated and proved in the 2-player case: the extension to the case of N players is straight-
forward.
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S∗ is admissible. By deﬁnition of Nash equilibrium J˜i(x0, u∗i , u∗j ) ≤ J˜i(x0, uˆi, u∗j ) for any
admissible pair Sˆi = {uˆi, u∗j}, where uˆi = u∗i and u∗j , with i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, j = i.
Then, note that J˜i(x0, u∗i , u
∗
j ) =
1
2
∫∞
0
(
x∗(t)
(
Q¯i +Υi
)
x∗(t)+ ‖u∗i (t)‖2−‖u∗j (t)‖2
)
dt and
J˜i(x0, uˆi, u
∗
j ) =
1
2
∫∞
0
(
xˆ(t)
(
Q¯i +Υi
)
xˆ(t) + ‖uˆi(t)‖2 − ‖u∗j (t)‖2
)
dt, where x∗(t) is the
solution of system (3.6) in closed-loop with S∗ and x∗(0) = x0, whereas xˆ(t) denotes
the solution of the system ˙ˆx = (A − BjBj P¯j)xˆ + Biuˆi, xˆ(0) = x0, for any arbitrary α-
admissible pair Sˆi = {uˆi, u∗j}. Since the matricesΥi are positive semideﬁnite for i = 1, 2, it
follows that Ji(x0, uˆi, u∗j ) ≤ J˜i(x0, uˆi, u∗j ) and furthermore J˜i(x0, uˆi, u∗j ) = Ji(x0, uˆi, u∗j ) +
1
2
∫∞
0 xˆ(t)
Υixˆ(t)dt, hence
Ji(x0, u
∗
i , u
∗
j ) ≤ Ji(x0, uˆi, u∗j ) +
1
2
∫ ∞
0
xˆ(t)Υixˆ(t)dt , (3.19)
for any α-admissible pair Sˆi. Note that, by deﬁnition of α-admissible pairs, the second
term in the right-hand side of (3.19) can be upper-bounded, for any initial condition, by a
constant. Let Ki be such that Sˆi with uˆi = Kix is α-admissible and yields the maximum
value of the integral3. Then, the right-hand side of (3.19) can be written in the form
Ji(x0, uˆi, u
∗
j )+ εx0,α, where εx0,α ≥ 0 is parametrised in x0 and α, and it is independent of
the strategy uˆi. The second term of the right-hand side of inequality (3.19) can be written
as
1
2
∫ ∞
0
xˆ(t)Υixˆ(t)dt =
1
2
x0 Pi,x0 , (3.20)
where Pi, = Pi, > 0 solves Pi,AKi + A

Ki
Pi, + Υi = 0. In fact, consider the func-
tion V (x) = 12x
Pi,x the time derivative of which is given by V˙ (x) = 12x
Pi,AKix +
1
2x
AKiPi,x = −12xΥix, where AKi = (A−BjBj P¯j −BiKi). Integrating both sides of
the above equation from zero to inﬁnity yields −12
∫∞
0 x(t)
Υix(t)dt = 12
∫∞
0 V˙ (x(t))dt =
V (x(∞)) − V (x0), which proves the claim, since Sˆi is α-admissible, hence V (x(∞)) = 0.
The proof is concluded noting that, by (3.19), Ji(x0, u∗i , u
∗
j ) ≤ Ji(x0, uˆi, u∗j ) + 12x0 Pi,x0.
This implies Ji(x0, u∗i , u
∗
j ) ≤ Ji(x0, uˆi, u∗j ) + x0(α), where x0(α) = max
i
{x0 Pi,x0},
i = 1, 2. 
Proposition 2 implies that solving algebraic Riccati inequalities, which represents
3Such gain matrix Ki always exists by α-admissibility.
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a substantial simpliﬁcation with respect to the corresponding equations, yields a rea-
sonable approximation, as detailed in Deﬁnition 8, of the concept of Nash equilibrium.
In [81], for example, solvability criteria for algebraic Riccati equalities and inequalities,
which appear in H∞ optimal control, are discussed and it is shown that under some
conditions algebraic Riccati inequalities may be solvable even though the corresponding
AREs are not.
It might appear possible, in some circumstances, to render the second term of the
right-hand side of (3.19) arbitrarily small by selectingKi such that the eigenvalues ofAKi
have arbitrarily large, negative, real parts. However, the choice of the matrix Ki, hence
of the control input uˆi, affects also the ﬁrst term of the right-hand side of (3.19). Indeed,
there exists a minimum of the above trade-off, which is characterized in the following
proposition, in which Υi is given by (3.17).
Proposition 3. Among all admissible pairs Sˆi = {uˆi, u∗j} the minimum of the right-hand
side of inequality (3.19) is achieved for uˆi = −Bi P¯x, where P¯ = P¯ is the positive
deﬁnite solution of
(
A−BjBj P¯j
)
P¯ + P¯
(
A−BjBj P¯j
)
− P¯BiBi P¯ + Q¯i +Υi = 0,
and the minimum is equal to 12x

0 P¯x0 − 12
∫∞
0 ‖u∗j (t)‖2dt = 12x0 (P + Pj,Ki)x0, where
Pj,Ki satisﬁes Pj,KiAKi +A

Ki
Pj,Ki + P¯jBjBjP¯j = 0. 
Proof: The claim can be proved by applying standard arguments of optimal linear-
quadratic control, noting that the problem can be recast into a classical optimal control
problem with respect to the cost functional
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
xˆ(t)
(
Q¯i +Υi
)
xˆ(t) + ‖uˆi(t)‖2
)
dt , (3.21)
subject to the dynamical constraint ˙ˆx = (A − BjBj P¯j)xˆ + Biuˆi and the initial condition
xˆ(0) = x0. 
Remark 2. When the margin of stability, quantiﬁed in terms of the parameter α, is large
then x0,α is small. Conversely, when the margin of stability approaches zero, x0,α may
become unbounded. 
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3.4 Algebraic P¯ Matrix Solution
As mentioned in Chapter 2, ﬁnding closed-form solutions to the coupled PDE’s (3.12),
with i = 1, . . . , N (or (3.4) in the 2-player case) is not generally possible and it is therefore
often necessary to settle for approximate solutions. The approaches provided in this
chapter rely on the notion of algebraic P¯ matrix solution. As mentioned in the introduction,
a similar notion has been introduced in [63, 82] for optimal/robust control problems.
However, since differential games are inherently different from optimal control problems,
in that they involve coupled PDEs, a somewhat different notion is employed in this case.
This is explained in detail for the 2-player case and for the more general N -player case in
the following.
3.4.1 2-Player Algebraic P¯ Matrix Solution
We introduce ﬁrst the notion of algebraic P¯ matrix solution for the 2-player case, i.e. the
non-cooperative differential game with two players attempting to minimise individual
cost functionals subject to common state dynamics.
Deﬁnition 15. Consider the system (3.2) and the cost functionals (3.3). Let Σi : Rn →
R
n×n, Σi(0) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, be matrix-valued functions such that Σi(x) = Σi(x) > 0 for
all x ∈ Rn \ {0} and let Σ¯i = Σi(0). The C1 matrix-valued functions Pi : Rn → Rn×n,
Pi(x) = Pi(x)
, i = 1, 2, are said to be an X -algebraic P¯ matrix solution4 of the equations
(3.4) provided the following conditions hold5.
(i) For all x ∈ X ⊆ Rn, i = 1, 2, j = i,
Pi(x)F (x) + F (x)
Pi(x)− Pi(x)gi(x)gi(x)Pi(x) +Qi(x)
− (Pj(x) + Pi(x)) gj(x)gj(x)Pj(x)− Pj(x)gj(x)gj(x)Pi(x) + Σi(x) = 0 ,
(3.22)
(ii) Pi(0) = P¯i, such that P¯1 + P¯2 > 0, with P¯i, i = 1, 2, the symmetric solutions of the
4Provided the set X contains the origin.
5Recall that F (x) is a matrix-valued function which is such that f(x) = F (x)x.
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coupled Riccati equations
P¯iA+A
P¯i − P¯iBiBi P¯i − P¯iBjBj P¯j −
(
P¯jBjB

j P¯i + P¯jBjB

j P¯j
)
+ Q¯i + Σ¯i = 0 .
(3.23)
If X = Rn, then P1 and P2 are said to be an algebraic P¯ matrix solution.
3.4.2 N -Player Algebraic P¯ Matrix Solution
Consider now the general case in which the differential game consists of N participating
players. The notion of algebraic P¯ matrix solution for this setting is a natural extension of
the 2-player case as deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 16. Consider the system (3.1) and the cost functionals (3.11) with i = 1, . . . , N .
Let Σi : Rn → Rn×n, Σi(0) ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., N , be matrix-valued functions such that Σi(x) =
Σi(x)
 > 0 for all x ∈ Rn \ {0} and let Σ¯i = Σi(0). The C1 matrix-valued function
Pi : R
n → Rn×n, Pi(x) = Pi(x) i = 1, ..., N , are said to be an X -algebraic P¯ matrix
solution5 of the equations (3.4) provided the following conditions hold.
(i) For all x ∈ X ⊆ Rn and i = 1, ..., N ,
Pi(x)F (x) + F (x)
Pi(x)− Pi(x)gi(x)gi(x)Pi(x) +Qi(x)
− (Pj(x) + Pi(x)) gj(x)gj(x)Pj(x)− Pj(x)gj(x)gj(x)Pi(x) + Σi(x) = 0 ,
(3.24)
(ii) Pi(0) = P¯i, such that
N∑
i=1
P¯i > 0, with P¯i the symmetric solution of the coupled Riccati
equations
P¯iA+A
P¯i − P¯iBiBi P¯i −
N∑
j=1,j =i
P¯iBjB

j P¯j −
N∑
j=1,j =i
P¯jBjB

j P¯i
−
N∑
j=1,j =i
P¯jBjB

j P¯j + Q¯i + Σ¯i = 0 ,
(3.25)
for i = 1, ..., N .
If X = Rn, then Pi, i = 1, ..., N are said to be an algebraic P¯ solution.
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Remark 3. In what follows we assume the existence of a algebraic P¯ matrix solution, i.e.
we assume X = Rn. Note that all statements can be modiﬁed accordingly if X ⊂ Rn.
It is evident that any solution of the system of coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs partial
differential inequalities yields also a solution to the algebraic equations (3.24), for some
Σi. In addition, since the integrability requirement of the solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Isaacs partial differential inequalities is removed in (3.24), then the set of solutions of the
latter contains the set of solutions of the former system of inequalities. 
Remark 4. The system of algebraic equations (3.24), i = 1, . . . , N (or (3.22) in the 2-player
case) exhibits point-wise, namely for ﬁxed x ∈ Rn, a structure similar to the system
of equations (3.89), which resembles what happens in the SDRE approach to optimal
control problems. Therein, in fact, point-wise properties of the pairs (F (x), g(x)) and
(F (x), Q(x)1/2), namely controllability and observability, respectively, for all x ∈ Rn,
guarantees the existence of a matrix-valued function P (x) that solves the SDRE and it is
additionally positive deﬁnite for each ﬁxed x ∈ Rn [83, 84]. In the framework of linear-
quadratic differential games there are no such structural assumptions on the system that
guarantee the existence of solutions to the coupled AREs. Therefore, clearly also the
point-wise extension to the solution of (3.24) cannot be pursued in this context. 
In the following sections we show how the notion of algebraic P¯ matrix solution
can be exploited to determine an approximate solution – in the sense of α-Nash equi-
libria discussed for linear-quadratic differential games in Section 3.3 – to Problem 4 (and
hence Problem 3), without involving the solution of any partial differential equations or
inequalities.
3.5 Approximate Solutions Using Individual Dynamic Exten-
sions
In this section a method for solving the differential game deﬁned by the dynamics (3.1),
satisfying certain structural assumption, and the cost functionals (3.11) for i = 1, . . . , N
is presented. More speciﬁcally, the structural assumption is the following.
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Assumption 4. The mappings gi : Rn → Rn×mi are full row rank for all x ∈ Rn, implying
mi ≥ n.
The 2-player case is considered before the general N -player case.
3.5.1 2-Player Case: Approximate Solutions Using Two Individual Dynamic
Extensions
Consider the differential game introduced in Problem 4, with N = 2. We provide a solu-
tion for a modiﬁed problem, which approximates the non-cooperative differential game
introduced in Section 3.2. We ﬁrstly introduce an additional state, ξi(t) ∈ Rn, for each
individual player thus considering dynamic state feedback in place of the classical static
state feedback that constitutes the Nash equilibrium control strategy. Then we show
how to employ the notion of algebraic P¯ matrix solution for the construction of value func-
tions, one for each player, deﬁned in the extended state-space (x, ξi), that solve a system
of Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs partial differential inequalities, instead of partial differential
equations, associated to a speciﬁc auxiliary non-cooperative differential game. The above
discussion is summarised in the following.
In what follows we consider dynamic feedback strategies of the form
ui = βi(x, ξi) , ξ˙i = τi(x, ξi) , (3.26)
with ξi(t) ∈ Rν , for some ν > 0, τi(0, 0) = 0, βi(0, 0) = 0 and τi, βi smooth mappings.
Let ξ = (ξ1, ξ2). We deﬁne a set of α-admissible dynamic feedback strategies as follows.
Deﬁnition 17. A pair of dynamic feedback strategies S = {(u1, ξ˙1), (u2, ξ˙2)} is said to be
(α-admissible) if the zero-equilibrium of the closed-loop system (3.2)-(3.26), i = 1, 2, is
(locally) asymptotically stable (σ(Acl + αI) ⊂ C−, where Acl is the matrix describing the
linearisation of (3.2)-(3.26) around the origin).
Problem 5. Consider the system (3.2) and the cost functionals (3.3). The problem of solv-
ing the approximate dynamic non-cooperative differential game consists in determining a pair
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of admissible dynamic feedback strategies S = {S1, S2}, where the strategy Si, i = 1, 2, is
a dynamical system described by (3.26), with ν = n, i = 1, 2, and non-negative func-
tions ci : Rn × Rn → R such that for any admissible pairs S1 = {(u1, τ1), (β2, τ2)}
and S2 = {(β1, τ1), (u2, τ2)}, with u1 = β1 and u2 = β2, Jˆi((x(0), ξ(0)), βi, βj) ≤
Jˆi((x(0), ξ(0)), ui, βj), i = 1, 2, j = i, where the extended cost functionals Jˆi, i = 1, 2,
are deﬁned as
Jˆi(x(0), ξ(0), ui, uj) 
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
qi(x(t)) + ‖ui(t)‖2 − ‖uj(t)‖2 + ci(x(t), ξ(t))
)
dt . (3.27)
Making use of the notion of algebraic P¯ matrix solution, consider the extended value func-
tions
Vi(x, ξi) =
1
2
xPi(ξi)x+
1
2
‖x− ξi‖2Ri , (3.28)
with ξi ∈ Rn and Ri = Ri > 0, i = 1, 2. In addition, consider the continuous matrix-
valued functions Δi : Rn × Rn → Rn×n deﬁned as
Δi(x, ξi) = (Ri − Φi(x, ξi))R−1i Ψi(x, ξi) , (3.29)
where Φi : Rn × Rn → Rn×n is a continuous matrix-valued function satisfying
x (Pi(x)− Pi(ξi)) = (x − ξi)Φi(x, ξi). Furthermore, let Ψi : Rn × Rn → Rn×n de-
note the Jacobian matrix of the mapping 12Pi(ξi)x with respect to ξi and deﬁne
Acl(x)  F (x)− g1(x)g1(x)P1(x)− g2(x)g2(x)P2(x) . (3.30)
Note that the vector ﬁeld Acl(x)x describes the closed-loop nonlinear system when only
the algebraic inputs ui = −gi(x)Pi(x)x, i = 1, 2, are applied.
Theorem 3. Consider the system (3.2), the cost functionals (3.3) and suppose Assump-
tion 4 holds for i = 1, 2. Let Pi, i = 1, 2, be an algebraic P¯ matrix solution of the system
(3.4). Moreover, let Ri be such that
Υi  Σi − 1
2
Δi Acl −
1
2
AclΔi +
1
2
Δi gig

i Δi > 0 (3.31)
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gj (Pi + Pj +Δi)Υ
−1
i (Pi + Pj +Δi)
gj < 4I , (3.32)
i = 1, 2.6 Then there exist k¯1 ≥ 0 and k¯2 ≥ 0, and a set Ω ⊆ Rn × Rn × Rn such that the
functions V1 and V2 in (3.28) solve the system of extended partial differential inequalities
HJ i(x, ξ)  ∂Vi
∂x
f(x) +
∂Vi
∂ξi
ξ˙i − 1
2
∂Vi
∂x
gi(x)gi(x)
∂Vi
∂x

+
1
2
qi(x)− 1
2
∂Vj
∂x
gj(x)gj(x)
∂Vj
∂x

− ∂Vi
∂x
gj(x)gj(x)
∂Vj
∂x

≤ 0 ,
(3.33)
with ξ˙1 = −k1∂V1
∂ξ1

and ξ˙2 = −k2∂V2
∂ξ2

, for all k1 > k¯1 and k2 > k¯2, and for all
(x, ξ1, ξ2) ∈ Ω. It follows that the dynamical systems
ξ˙i = −ki
(
Ψi(x, ξi)
x−Ri(x− ξi)
)
,
ui = −gi(x) (Pi(x)x+ (Ri − Φi(x, ξi))(x− ξi)) ,
(3.34)
i = 1, 2, are such that S = {(u1, ξ˙1), (u2, ξ˙2)} is admissible and solves the approxi-
mate dynamic non-cooperative differential game deﬁned in Problem 5 with ci(x, ξi) =
−2HJ i(x, ξ), i = 1, 2. Moreover, there exists a neighbourhood of the origin in which
the set of dynamic feedback strategies S constitutes an α-Nash equilibrium solution for
Problem 3. 
Proof : The ﬁrst part of the claim is proved in two steps. First we show that the
functions V1 and V2, in (3.28) solve the system of extended partial differential inequalities
deﬁned in (3.33), provided k1 and k2 are sufﬁciently large. It follows that the dynamic
control laws (3.34) minimise the extended cost functionals introduced in (3.27). In par-
ticular the functions ci are given by the additional negativity of the inequalities (3.33),
namely the gap, or conﬁdence interval, between the inequalities, satisﬁed by V1 and V2, and
the corresponding equations. Then we show that the zero equilibrium of the closed-loop
6Note that Υi(0, 0) = Σi > 0, i = 1, 2.
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system
x˙ = f(x)− g1(x)g1(x)∂V1
∂x

− g2(x)g2(x)∂V2
∂x

,
ξ˙1 = −k1∂V1
∂ξ1

,
ξ˙2 = −k2∂V2
∂ξ2

,
(3.35)
is locally asymptotically stable, thus proving admissibility.
To begin with the partial derivatives of the functions Vi(x, ξi) with respect to x
and ξi are
∂Vi
∂x
= xPi(x) + (x− ξi)(Ri − Φi(x, ξi)) ,
∂Vi
∂ξi
= xΨi(x, ξi)− (x− ξi)Ri .
(3.36)
Therefore, the ith inequality of the system of partial differential inequalities (3.33), con-
sidering the partial derivatives of Vi as in (3.36), the dynamic control law as in (3.34) and
recalling that the matrix-valued functions Pi, i = 1, 2, constitute an algebraic P¯ matrix so-
lution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations (3.4) – rewritten as a quadratic form in x,
(x− ξi) and (x− ξj) – yields
−
[
x (x− ξi) (x− ξj)
](
Mi + kiC

i Ci
)
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
x
x− ξi
x− ξj
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≤ 0 , (3.37)
where the matrix-valued function Mi : Rn × Rn × Rn → R3n×3n is given by
Mi =⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Σi −1
2
Acl(Ri − Φi)
1
2
(Pi + P

j )gjg

j (Rj − Φj)
−1
2
(Ri − Φi)Acl 1
2
(Ri − Φi)gigi (Ri − Φi)
1
2
(Ri − Φi)gjgj (Rj − Φj)
1
2
(Rj − Φj)gjgj (Pi + Pj)
1
2
(Rj − Φj)gjgj (Ri − Φi) (Rj − Φj)gjgj (Rj − Φj)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
(3.38)
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whereas the matrix-valued function Ci : Rn → Rn×3n is deﬁned as
Ci(x, ξi) =
[
Ψi(x, ξi) −Ri 0
]
. (3.39)
Note that, since Ri is positive deﬁnite, the matrix Ci(x, ξi) has constant rank, equal to n,
for all ξi ∈ Rn, hence the kernel of Ci(x, ξi) has dimension 2n.
In particular, consider the matrix
Zi =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
I 0
R−1i Ψi(x, ξi) 0
0 I
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (3.40)
and note that the columns of the matrixZi(x, ξi) span the kernel ofCi(x, ξi) for all ξi ∈ Rn.
Following [85] we require Zi MiZi to be positive deﬁnite. Note that
Zi MiZi =
1
2
⎡
⎢⎣ 2Υi Γi1
Γi1 Γi2
⎤
⎥⎦ , (3.41)
where Γi1 = (Pi + Pj +Δi)gjgj (Rj −Φj) and Γi2 = 2(Rj −Φj)gjgj (Rj −Φj). The ﬁrst
part of the claim is then proved noting that – considering Assumption 4 and the Schur
complement of the element Υi in the matrix (3.41) – positive deﬁniteness of the matrix
Zi MiZi is equivalent to the conditions (3.31)-(3.32).
To conclude the proof we need to show that the closed-loop system (3.35) has
an asymptotically stable equilibrium point at the origin. Firstly, note that there exist a
neighbourhood Wi of the origin such that the function Vi as in (3.28) is positive deﬁnite
inWi. This can be seen recalling that, by deﬁnitionPi, is tangent at the origin to P¯i > 0. Let
W (x, ξ1, ξ2) = V1(x, ξ1)+V2(x, ξ2) be a candidate Lyapunov function. The time derivative
of the function W along the trajectories of the closed-loop system (3.35) is
W˙ = V˙1 + V˙2 ≤ −1
2
q1(x)− 1
2
q2(x) , (3.42)
for all x = 0 in a neighbourhood of the zero equilibrium. Hence, by Assumption 2,
73 3.5 Approximate Solutions Using Individual Dynamic Extensions
and exploiting LaSalle’s invariance principle, lim
t→∞x(t) = 0. Moreover, by (3.42), all the
trajectories of the system (3.35) belong to the compact set {(x, ξ1, ξ2) : W (x, ξ1, ξ2) ≤
W (x(0), ξ1(0), ξ2(0))}, hence are bounded. Finally, noting that the zero equilibrium of
the systems ξ˙i = −ki∂Vi
∂ξi
(0, ξi)
, i = 1, 2, are globally asymptotically stable, we prove
asymptotic stability of (x, ξ1, ξ2) = (0, 0, 0) and detectability for the system (3.35), by stan-
dard arguments on interconnected systems. For any α-admissible set of control strategies
the integral
∫∞
0 ci(x, ξ)dt, i = 1, 2, is bounded in a neighbourhood Ω¯, which may depend
on α, of the origin. Then, (3.33) and the results of Proposition 2 imply that in Ω¯ the set of
strategies S is an α-Nash equilibrium for Problem 3. 
Remark 5. From the arguments employed in the second part of the above proof it is
evident that Assumption 2 may be relaxed by assuming instead zero-state detectability of
the system (3.35) with respect to the output y = q1(x) + q2(x). 
Remark 6. Suppose that the matrices Σ¯i, i = 1, 2, are positive deﬁnite. Then there exist a
non-empty Ωˆ1 ⊆ Rn×Rn×Rn and matricesRi such that the conditions (3.31) are satisﬁed
for all (x, ξ1, ξ2) ∈ Ωˆ1. In fact note that Ri = Φi(0, 0) yields Υi(0, 0) = Σ¯i > 0 and the
existence of the set Ωˆ1 can be concluded by continuity of the functions in the left-hand
side of (3.31). 
Remark 7. Suppose that the matrices Σ¯i, i = 1, 2, are positive deﬁnite and that
Bj (P¯i + P¯j)Σ¯
−1
i (P¯i + P¯j)Bj < 4I , (3.43)
i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, i = j. Then there exist a non-empty Ωˆ2 ⊆ Rn ×Rn ×Rn and matrices Ri
such that the conditions (3.32) are satisﬁed for all (x, ξ1, ξ2) ∈ Ωˆ2. 
The structural properties in Assumption 4, i = 1, 2 can be removed, provided
certain conditions are satisﬁed, and it can be guaranteed that the inequalities (3.32) are
satisﬁed, at least locally around the origin of the extended state-space as detailed in the
following corollary.
Corollary 1. Consider the system (3.2) and the cost functionals (3.3). Suppose that x = 0
is a locally exponentially stable equilibrium of the system (3.2) and g1(0) = 0 and g2(0) =
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0. Let Pi, i = 1, 2, be an algebraic P¯ matrix solution of the system (3.4) with Σ¯i > 0. Let
Ri = Φi(0, 0). Then Mi ≥ 0 at least in a neighbourhood of the origin. In addition there
exist k¯i ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, and a set Ω such that the dynamical systems (3.34) are dynamic
strategies that solve Problem 5 for all ki ≥ k¯i, i = 1, 2, and all (x, ξ1, ξ2) ∈ Ω. 
Proof : The claim is proved by showing that, with these assumptions, the condi-
tions (3.31)-(3.32) are satisﬁed, for each player, at least locally. Since Σ¯i > 0, by Remark 6,
the conditions (3.31) hold for all (x, ξ1, ξ2) ∈ Ωˆ3, where Ωˆ3 is a neighbourhood of the
origin. Finally, note that, by assumption, gi(0) = 0 for i = 1, 2, hence the conditions (3.43)
are trivially satisﬁed. 
This section is concluded by showing an interesting result of the dynamic strategies
(3.34). Consider a given set of admissible strategies Sˆi = {(uˆi, ξˆ1), u∗j}, where S∗ =
{u∗1, u∗2} denotes the Nash equilibrium solution of the differential game and let xˆ(t) and
ξˆ(t) denote the trajectory of the extended state. The integral of the function ci(xˆ(t), ξˆ(t))
provides an upper bound for the excess of the cost Ji(u¯i, u∗j ) with respect to the Nash
equilibrium outcome Ji(u∗i , u
∗
j ). 
3.5.2 N -Player Case: Approximate Solutions Using N Individual Dynamic
Extensions
In this subsection we consider the general case in which the differential game has N
participants. Suppose that Assumption 4 is satisﬁed for i = 1, . . . , N . Similarly, the
deﬁnitions introduced in the 2-player differential game can be straight-forwardly ex-
tended to the N player case. For instance, the matrix valued function (3.30) becomes
Acl(x) = F (x)−
∑N
i=1 gi(x)gi(x)
Pi(x), ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξN ) and α-admissible dynamic feed-
back strategies are deﬁned as in the following statement.
Deﬁnition 18. The set of dynamic feedback strategies S = {(u1, ξ˙1), . . . , (uN , ξ˙N )} is said
to be admissible (α-admissible) if the zero-equilibrium of the closed-loop system (3.1)-
(3.26), i = 1, . . . , N , is (locally) asymptotically stable (σ(Acl + αI) ⊂ C−, where Acl is the
matrix describing the linearisation of (3.1)-(3.26) around the origin).
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Problem 6. Consider the system (3.1) and the cost functionals (3.11), with i = 1, . . . , N .
The problem of solving the approximate dynamic non-cooperative differential game consists
in determining a set of admissible dynamic feedback strategies S = {S1, . . . , SN}, where
the strategy Si, i = 1, . . . , N , is a dynamical system described by equations of the form
(3.26), with ν = n, i = 1, . . . , N , and non-negative functions ci : Rn × Rn → R such
that for any admissible set of dynamic strategies Si = {(β1, τ1), . . . , (ui, τi), . . . , (βN , τN )},
with ui = βi, the following holds for i = 1, . . . , N , Jˆi((x(0), ξ(0)), β1, . . . , βi, . . . , βN ) ≤
Jˆi((x(0), ξ(0)), β1, . . . , ui, . . . , βN ), where the extended cost functionals Jˆi, i = 1, . . . , N ,
are given by
Jˆi 
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
qi(x) + ‖ui‖2 −
N∑
j=1,j =i
‖uj‖2 + ci(x, ξ
)
dt . (3.44)
The following statement provides a solution to the approximate dynamic non-
cooperative differential game for N players, thus extending the result of Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. Consider the system (3.1) and the cost functionals (3.11), where i = 1, . . . , N .
Suppose that Assumption 4 holds. Let Pi, i = 1, ..., N , be solutions of the system (3.24)
and (3.89). Let Ri be such that
Υi  Σi − 1
2
Δi Acl −
1
2
AclΔi +
1
2
Δi gig

i Δi > 0 (3.45)
ΠiΥ
−1
i Π

i ≤ 4 blockdiag{I} , (3.46)
with
Πi 
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
g1(x)
 (P1(x) + Pi(x) + Δi)
...
gi−1(x) (Pi−1(x) + Pi(x) + Δi)
gi+1(x)
 (Pi+1(x) + Pi(x) + Δi)
...
gN (x)
 (PN (x) + Pi(x) + Δi)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (3.47)
and i = 1, ..., N .
Then there exist k¯i ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., N , and a set Ω ⊆ Rn × {Rn × . . .× Rn} such that
the functions Vi, i = 1, ..., N , as in (3.28) solve the system of extended partial differential
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inequalities
HJ i ∂Vi
∂x
f(x) +
∂Vi
∂ξi
ξ˙i − 1
2
∂Vi
∂x
gi(x)gi(x)
∂Vi
∂x

+
1
2
qi(x)
− 1
2
N∑
j=1,j =i
∂Vj
∂x
gj(x)gj(x)
∂Vj
∂x

−
N∑
j=1,j =i
∂Vi
∂x
gj(x)gj(x)
∂Vj
∂x

≤ 0 ,
(3.48)
with ξ˙i = −ki∂Vi
∂ξi

, i = 1, ..., N , for all ki > k¯i and for all (x, ξ) ∈ Ω. Suppose additionally
that
N∑
i=1
(
N − 2
2
∂Vi
∂x
gi(x)gi(x)
∂Vi
∂x
− ci(x, ξ)
)
≤ 0 , (3.49)
where ci(x, ξ) = −2HJ i(x, ξ), for all (x, ξi) ∈ Rn×Rn, i = 1, . . . , N . Then, the dynamical
systems, for i = 1, ..., N ,
ξ˙i = −ki
(
Ψi(x, ξi)
x−Ri(x− ξi)
)
,
ui = −gi(x) (Pi(x)x+ (Ri − Φi(x, ξi))(x− ξi)) ,
(3.50)
are such that S = {(u1, ξ˙1), . . . , (uN , ξ˙N )} is admissible and solves Problem 6. Moreover,
there exists a neighbourhood of the origin in which the set of dynamic feedback strategies
S constitutes an α-Nash equilibrium solution for Problem 4. 
Proof : The ﬁrst part of the claim is proved following the same steps as those in
the proof of Theorem 3. To prove stability of the origin, i.e. admissibility of the dynamic
strategies, for the closed-loop extended system
x˙ = f(x)−∑Ni=1 gi(x)gi(x)∂Vi∂x

, ξ˙i = −ki∂Vi
∂ξi

, i = 1, ..., N , (3.51)
let W (x, ξ1, . . . , ξN ) =
∑N
i=1 Vi(x, ξi) be a candidate Lyapunov function. The time deriva-
tive of W along the trajectories of the system (3.51) is, by (3.48), W˙ (x) =
∑N
i=1(−1/2qi +
(N − 2)/2(∂Vi/∂x)gigi (∂Vi/∂x) − ci(x, ξ)) ≤ −1/2
∑N
i=1 qi(x), where the last inequal-
ity follows from the condition (3.49). Hence the claim is proved by Assumption 2 and
LaSalle’s invariance principle. The last part of the claim is proved as in the proof of
Theorem 3. 
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Remark 8. The conditions (3.45) are identical to the conditions (3.31), namely they are
independent from the number of players. In fact, the condition (3.45) is related to the
individual optimality of each single player in the absence of competitors, see also [63] for
more details. Finally note that the conditions (3.46) represent the natural extension of the
conditions (3.32) to the N -player case. 
Remark 9. The condition (3.49) describes the fact that the function Vi must enforce a de-
sired margin of negativity in the extended partial differential inequalities (3.48) to guar-
antee asymptotic stability of the closed-loop system (3.51). 
3.6 Approximate Solutions Using a Shared Dynamic Extensions
In this section we relax the structural assumption on the mappings gi, i = 1, ..., N , namely
Assumption 4. The result is achieved by using a single dynamic extension that is shared
among the players and introducing additional assumptions on the algebraic P¯ matrix so-
lution in the N -player case. The 2-player case is considered ﬁrst.
3.6.1 2-Player Case: Approximate Solutions Using a Shared Dynamic Exten-
sion
Consider the differential game deﬁned in Problem 3. A modiﬁed problem which ap-
proximates this differential game can be formulated by introducing a dynamic extension
that is shared between the two players. With the exception that a shared dynamic exten-
sion is used in place of individual dynamic extensions, the modiﬁed problem is similar to
Problem 5.
We now consider dynamic feedback strategies of the form
ui = βi(x, ξ) , ξ˙ = τ(x, ξ) , (3.52)
with ξi(t) ∈ Rν , for some ν > 0, τ(0, 0) = 0, βi(0, 0) = 0 and τ , βi smooth mappings.
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Deﬁnition 19. The set of dynamic feedback strategies7 S = {u1, u2, ξ˙} is said to be admis-
sible (α-admissible) if the zero-equilibrium of the closed-loop system (3.2)-(3.52), i = 1, 2,
is (locally) asymptotically stable (σ(Acl + αI) ⊂ C−, where Acl is the matrix describing
the linearisation of (3.1)-(3.26) around the origin).
Problem 7. Consider the system (3.2) and the cost functionals (3.3). The problem of
solving the approximate dynamic non-cooperative differential game consists in determining a
pair of admissible dynamic feedback strategies S = {S1, S2}, where the strategy Si, i = 1, 2,
is a dynamical system described by equations of the form (3.52) with ν = n, i = 1, 2, and
non-negative functions ci : Rn × Rn → R such that for any admissible set of strategies
Si = {ui, βj , α}, with ui = βi, Jˆi((x(0), ξ(0)), βi, βj) ≤ Jˆi((x(0), ξ(0)), ui, βj), where the
extended cost functionals Jˆiare deﬁned as
Jˆi 
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
qi(x(t)) + ‖ui(t)‖2 − ‖uj(t)‖2 + ci(x(t), ξ(t))
)
dt . (3.53)
Theorem 5. Consider the system (3.2) and the cost functionals (3.3). Suppose Assump-
tion 2 is satisﬁed and let Pi, i = 1, 2, be an algebraic P¯ matrix solution of the equations (3.4)
satisfying Σ¯i > 0, i = 1, 2. LetR1 andR2 be positive deﬁnite and symmetric matrices and
such that
Ri (R1 +R2) + (R1 +R2)Ri > 0 , (3.54)
i = 1, 2. Then there exist a constant k¯ ≥ 0 and a set Ω ⊆ Rn × Rn such that the functions
Vi(x, ξ) =
1
2
xPi(ξ)x+
1
2
‖x− ξ‖2Ri , (3.55)
i = 1, 2, solve the system of partial differential inequalities
HJ si 
∂Vi
∂x
f(x) +
∂Vi
∂ξ
ξ˙ − 1
2
∂Vi
∂x
gi(x)gi(x)
∂Vi
∂x

+
1
2
qi(x)− 1
2
∂Vj
∂x
gj(x)gj(x)
∂Vj
∂x

− ∂Vi
∂x
gj(x)gj(x)
∂Vj
∂x

≤ 0 ,
(3.56)
7The dynamic strategy of player i is given by the tuple (ui, ξ˙). Since the dynamic extension is shared by
all players, with some abuse of notation, {u1, u2, ξ˙} is used to denote that both player 1 and player 2 adhere
to the strategies (u1, ξ˙) and (u2, ξ˙), respectively.
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i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, i = j, with ξ˙ = −k
(
∂V1
∂ξ
+
∂V2
∂ξ
)
, for all k > k¯ and for all (x, ξ) ∈ Ω.
Hence the dynamical system
ξ˙ = −k
2∑
i=1
(
Ψi(x, ξ)
x−Ri(x− ξ)
)
,
ui = −gi(x) (Pi(x)x+ (Ri − Φi(x, ξ))(x− ξ)) ,
(3.57)
i = 1, 2, is such that S is admissible and solves Problem 7 with ci(x, ξ) = −2HJ si (x, ξ), i =
1, 2. Moreover, there exists a a neighbourhood of the origin in which the set of dynamic
feedback strategies S constitutes an α-Nash equilibrium solution for Problem 3. 
Proof : The claim is proved in two steps following the same arguments as those
exploited in the proof of Theorem 3. Therefore, we ﬁrstly show that the functions Vi,
i = 1, 2, in (3.55) solve the system of extended partial differential inequalities deﬁned in
(3.56), provided k is sufﬁciently large, which implies that the dynamic control laws (3.57)
minimise the extended cost functionals introduced in (3.53). In particular the functions ci
are given by the negativity of the inequalities (3.56), namely the gap between the inequal-
ities, satisﬁed by the Vi, i = 1, 2, and the corresponding equalities. Then we show that
the zero equilibrium of the closed-loop system
x˙ = f(x)− g1(x)g1(x)∂V1
∂x

− g2(x)g2(x)∂V2
∂x

,
ξ˙ = −k
(
∂V1
∂ξ
+
∂V2
∂ξ
)
,
(3.58)
is locally asymptotically stable, thus proving admissibility of the dynamic strategies.
Mimicking the proof of Theorem 3, the ith inequality of the system of partial differential
inequalities (3.56), the dynamic control law as in (3.57) and recalling that the mappings
Pi, i = 1, 2, is an algebraic P¯ matrix solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations (3.4)
– rewritten as a quadratic form in x and (x− ξ) – yields
−
[
x (x− ξ)
]
(Mi + kDi)
⎡
⎢⎣ x
x− ξ
⎤
⎥⎦ , (3.59)
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where Mi : Rn × Rn → R2n×2n is a the matrix-valued function given by
Mi =
⎡
⎢⎣ Σi Γ12
Γ12 Γ22
⎤
⎥⎦ , (3.60)
with Γ12 = −12Acl(x)(Ri − Φi) + 12(P1 + P2)gjgj (Rj − Φj) and Γ22 =
1
2
∑2
l=1(Rl −
Φl)
glgl (Rl − Φl) + (Ri − Φi)gjgj (Rj − Φj) , and
Di =
1
2
⎡
⎢⎣ Λ11 Λ12
Λ12 Λ22
⎤
⎥⎦ , (3.61)
with Λ11 = Ψi (Ψ1 +Ψ2) + (Ψ1 +Ψ2)Ψi , Λ22 = Ri(R1 +R2) + (R1 +R2)Ri and Λ12 =
−Ψi(R1 + R2) − (Ψ1 + Ψ2)Ri. The inequality (3.59) is derived by noting that the partial
derivatives of the functions Vi, i = 1, 2, as in (3.55) are obtained similarly to (3.36) with
ξ1 = ξ2 = ξ and the matrix-valued function Φi(x, ξ) is such that x (Pi(x)− Pi(ξ)) =
(x− ξ)Φi(x, ξ).
Since Ψi(0, ξ) = 0, i = 1, 2, the inequality (3.54) ensure the existence of a neigh-
bourhood Wi of the origin of Rn × Rn in which the matrix Di is positive semideﬁnite.
Moreover, since the columns of the matrix Z = [I, 0] span the kernel of the matrix-
valued function Di evaluated at ξ = 0 and ZMi
∣∣∣
(0,0)
Z = Σ¯i, then, by [85], there exists
a non-empty open set Ω containing the origin and k¯ ≥ 0 such that the inequalities (3.56),
i = 1, 2, are satisﬁed for all k > k¯ and for all (x, ξ) ∈ Ω.
Finally, (local) asymptotic stability of the zero-equilibrium of the closed-loop
system (3.58) can be shown exactly as in the proof of Theorem 3, namely employing
W (x, ξ) = V1(x, ξ) + V2(x, ξ) as a Lyapunov function and relying on Assumption 2. The
last part of the claim is proved as in the proof of Theorem 3. 
Remark 10. Alternative conditions, which are stronger than those given in (3.54), for
ensuring the dynamic strategies (3.57), i = 1, 2, are admissible and solve Problem 7 are
(ΨiΨ

j +ΨjΨ

i ) > 0 , (3.62)
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and
(RiRj +RjRi)− 1
2
Ξ(ΨiΨj +ΨjΨ

i )
−1Ξ ≥ 0 , (3.63)
with Ξ = (ΨiRj + ΨjRi). These ensure that the cross terms ∂Vi∂ξ
∂Vj
∂ξ

, i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2,
j = i are non-negative. Note that the condition Λ11 > 0 in (3.61) is implied by (3.62) and
Di > 0 is implied by (3.63), in the case Ri = P¯i, i = 1, 2. The matrix
Zi =
⎛
⎝ I
R−1i Ψ

i
⎞
⎠
spans the kernel of Dˆi , where Dˆi satisﬁes ∂Vi∂ξ
∂Vi
∂ξ

=
(
x(x− ξ)
)
Dˆi
⎛
⎝ x
x− ξ
⎞
⎠, i = 1, 2.
It follows from [85] that provided Σi > 0 and
Σi +ΨiR
−1
i Γ

12 + Γ12R
−1
i Ψ

i +ΨiR
−1
i Γ22R
−1
i Ψ

i > 0 ,
there exists k¯ such that for all k > k¯, Mi + kDˆi > 0 and the cross terms ∂Vi∂ξ
∂Vj
∂ξ

provide
additional negativity to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs partial differential inequalities (3.56)
if conditions (3.62) and (3.63) are satisﬁed for i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2 and j = i.
Asymptotic stability of the origin can be proved along the same lines as in the proof of
Theorem 5. 
Remark 11. Although the conditions for Theorem 5 to hold, namely (3.54), are simpler
than those for Theorem 3 or the alternative conditions provided in Remark 10, the proof
of Theorem 5 relies on local properties of the matrices Di and Mi in (3.59), i = 1, 2.
Therefore, for some problems, in particular if the extended state is such that it is not in
one or both of the neibhbourhoods Wi, i = 1, 2, the alternative conditions of Remark 10,
or Theorem 3, when Assumption 4 is satisﬁed by all the players, may be more useful,
despite the more complicated conditions that must be satisﬁed by the algebraic P¯ matrix
solution. 
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3.6.2 N -Player Case: Approximate Solutions Using a Shared Dynamic Exten-
sion
Consider now the case in which there are N players. The modiﬁed problem is a natural
extension of Problem 7. The following theorem extends Theorem 5 to the case in which
an approximate solution of a nonzero-sum differential game with N players is sought.
Theorem 6. Consider the system (3.1) and the cost functionals (3.11), with i = 1, . . . , N
and suppose these satisfy Assumption 3. Let Pi, i = 1, . . . , N be an algebraic P¯ matrix
solution, satisfying Σ¯i > 0, i = 1, . . . , N . Suppose Ri = Ri > 0 is such that
Ri
⎛
⎝ N∑
l=1,l =i
Rl
⎞
⎠+
⎛
⎝ N∑
l=1,l =i
Rl
⎞
⎠Ri > 0 , (3.64)
for i = 1, . . . , N . Then there exists a constant k¯ > 0 and a set Ω ⊆ Rn × Rn such that
the functions Vi, i = 1, . . . , N , as in (3.55) solve the system of extended partial differential
inequalities
HJ si 
∂Vi
∂x
f(x) +
∂Vi
∂ξ
ξ˙ − 1
2
∂Vi
∂x
gi(x)gi(x)
∂Vi
∂x

+
1
2
qi(x)
−
N∑
j=1,j =i
1
2
∂Vj
∂x
gj(x)gj(x)
∂Vj
∂x

−
N∑
j=1,j =i
∂Vi
∂x
gj(x)gj(x)
∂Vj
∂x

≤ 0 ,
(3.65)
i = 1, . . . , N with ξ˙ = −k
N∑
i=1
∂Vi
∂ξ
, for all k > k¯ and for all (x, ξ) ∈ Ω. Suppose addition-
ally that
N∑
i=1
(
N − 2
2
∂Vi
∂x
gi(x)gi(x)
∂Vi
∂x

− ci(x, ξ)
)
≤ 0 , (3.66)
with ci(x, ξ) = −2HJ si (x, ξ), i = 1, . . . , N . Then the dynamical system
ξ˙ = −k
N∑
i=1
(
Ψi(x, ξ)
x−Ri(x− ξ)
)
,
ui = −gi(x) (Pi(x)x+ (Ri − Φi(x, ξ))(x− ξ)) ,
(3.67)
i = 1, . . . , N , is such that S = {u1, . . . , uN , ξ˙} is admissible and solves the approximate
dynamic non-cooperative differential game deﬁned by the dynamics (3.1) and the cost
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functionals (3.11). Moreover, there exists a neighbourhood of the origin in which the set
of dynamic feedback strategies S constitutes an α-Nash equilibrium solution for Prob-
lem 4. 
Proof: As in the 2-player case the inequalities (3.65) can be written in quadratic form in x
and x− ξ as in (3.59) with Mi and Di given by (3.60) and (3.61) with
Γ12 = −1
2
Acl(x)
(Ri − Φi(x, ξ)) + 1
2
N∑
j=1,j =i
(Pi(x) + Pj(x))
 gj(x)gj(x)(Rj − Φj(x, ξ)) ,
Γ22 =
1
2
N∑
l=1
(Rl − Φl(x, ξ))gl(x)gl(x)(Rl − Φl(x, ξ))
+
N∑
j=1,j =i
(Ri − Φi(x, ξ))gj(x)gj(x)(Rj − Φj(x, ξ))
andΛ11 = Ψi
∑N
l=1Ψ

l +
∑N
l=1Ψ

l Ψi,Λ22 = Ri
∑N
l=1Rl+
∑N
l=1RlRi,Λ12 = −Ψi
∑N
l=1Rl−∑N
l=1ΨlRi, with i = 1, . . . , N . Similarly to the 2-player case, since Ψi(0, ξ) = 0, i =
1, . . . , N , the inequality (3.64) ensure the existence of a neighbourhood Wi of the origin
where the matrix Di is positive semideﬁnite and the columns of the matrix Z = [I, I]
span the kernel of the matrix-valued function Di evaluated at ξ = 0. Since the matrices
Ri, i = 1, . . . N , satisfy (3.64) ZMi
∣∣∣
(0,0)
Z = Σ¯i and by the same arguments used in the
2-player case it can be concluded that there exists a non-empty open set Ω containing the
origin and k¯ ≥ 0 such that the inequality (3.56), i = 1, . . . , N , is satisﬁed for all k > k¯ and
for all (x, ξ) ∈ Ω.
Finally, consider the candidate Lyapunov function W (x, ξ) =
∑N
i=1 Vi(x, ξ) and
note that inequality (3.66) implies that W˙ ≤ −12
∑N
i=1 qi(x). Hence local asymptotic sta-
bility of the origin of the closed-loop system can be shown as in the proof of Theorem 5.
The last part of the claim is proved as in the proof of Theorem 3. 
Remark 12. Similarly to Remark 10, it is possible to derive alternative conditions to (3.64)
ensuring that the cross terms ∂Vi∂ξ
∂Vj
∂ξ

are non-negative. 
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3.7 Numerical Examples
Two numerical examples illustrating the methods for solving nonzero-sum differential
games approximately using dynamic state feedback are presented. The aim of this section
is to illustrate how the theory presented in this chapter can be used to obtain approximate
solutions to differential games and thus provide a qualitative insight to the theory. An aca-
demic example where the Nash equilibrium solution is known and used as a reference
for comparison between the dynamic approximations and the linear-quadratic approx-
imation of the problem is considered ﬁrst, followed by a second example involving a
competitive Lotka-Volterra model with two competing species.
3.7.1 Academic Example
Consider the input-afﬁne dynamical system
x˙ =
⎡
⎢⎣ a1x1 + 2a2 x1x
2
2
1+x22
a2x2
⎤
⎥⎦+
⎡
⎢⎣ m1(1 + x22) 2m2 x1x21+x22
0 m2
⎤
⎥⎦u1
+
⎡
⎢⎣ n1(1 + x22) 2n2 x1x21+x22
0 n2
⎤
⎥⎦u2 ,
(3.68)
where a1, a2, m1, m2 , n1 and n2 are constant parameters, and consider the two-player
nonzero-sum differential game, where the ﬁrst and the second players seek to minimise
the cost functionals (3.3), i = 1, 2, with the running costs
q1(x) = α1
x21
(1+x22)
2 + α2x
2
2 ,
q2(x) = β1
x21
(1+x22)
2 + β2x
2
2 ,
(3.69)
respectively, where α1 > 0, α2 > 0, β1 > 0 and β2 > 0 are scalar parameters.
Suppose the system parameters a1 and a2 are such that a1 < 0 and a2 < 0. An
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algebraic P¯ matrix solution for this nonzero-sum differential game is
P1(x) = −diag
(
αˆ1a1
(
1
(1 + x22)
2
+ c1x
2
1 + c2x
2
2
)
, αˆ2a2
(
1 + c3x
2
1 + c4x
2
2
))
, (3.70)
and
P2(x) = −diag
(
βˆ1a2
(
1
(1 + x22)
2
+ d1x
2
1 + d2x
2
2
)
, βˆ2a2(1 + d3x
2
1 + d4x
2
2)
)
, (3.71)
with ci ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 4, di ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 4, and with αˆi and βˆi, i = 1, 2 satisfying
αˆ1a
2
1 ≥ α1, αˆ2a22 ≥ α2, βˆ1a21 ≥ β1 and βˆ2a22 ≥ β2 such that Σ1 and Σ2 in (3.22) are positive
deﬁnite.
The linear-quadratic approximation of the problem is given by the linear system
(3.6) with
A = diag{a1, a2} ,B1 = diag{m1,m2} ,B2 = diag{n1, n2} (3.72)
and the quadratic approximation of the running costs,
ql1 = x
diag{α1, α2}x ,
ql2 = x
diag{β1, β2}x .
(3.73)
Note that by performing the nonlinear change of coordinates xˆ1 = x11+x22
, xˆ2 = x2 , the
new state xˆ = [xˆ1, xˆ2] satisﬁes the linear dynamics (3.6) with the matrices A, B1 and B2
in (3.72) and, additionally, in these coordinates the running costs are qˆ1 = α1xˆ21 + α2xˆ
2
2
and qˆ2 = β1xˆ21 + β2xˆ
2
2. Thus, the nonzero-sum differential game boils down to a linear-
quadratic game, the Nash equilibrium solution of which is given by the strategies (3.8)
and the solution to the coupled AREs (3.9) in the new coordinates xˆ.
Suppose now that the system parameters are a1 = a2 = −0.5,m1 = m2 = n2 = 0.1,
n1 = 0.2, α1 = 32, α2 = 0.5, β1 = 28 and β2 = 5.25. For this particular selection
the solution to the coupled AREs associated with the linear-quadratic game in the co-
ordinates xˆ are Pˆ1 = diag{10, 0} and Pˆ2 = diag{15, 5}, and it follows that the Nash
equilibrium strategies in the original coordinates are u∗1 = −B1 Pˆ1
[
x1
1 + x22
, x2
]
and
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u∗2 = −B2 Pˆ2
[
x1
1 + x22
, x2
]
, whereas the strategies resulting from the linear-quadratic
approximation of the problem are ul1 = −B1 Pˆ1x1 and ul2 = −B2 Pˆ2x2. Taking (3.70) and
(3.71) as an algebraic P¯ matrix solution, with c1 = c2 = c3 = 0, c4 = 0.2, d1 = d2 = d3 = 0,
d4 = 0.8, αˆ1 = 64, αˆ2 = 0.5, βˆ1 = 56 and βˆ2 = 10.5, consider ﬁrst the dynamic ap-
proximation in which each player is associated with an individual dynamic extension.
Let um1 and u
m
2 , given by (3.34), denote the dynamic feedback strategies of player 1 and
player 2, respectively. Similarly, using the same algebraic P¯ matrix solution, the dynamic
approximation using a shared dynamic extension, yields the strategies us1 and u
s
2, given
by (3.57), for player 1 and player 2, respectively. In summary, we have four different
pairs of strategies at our disposal, namely the Nash equilibrium strategies S∗ = {u∗1, u∗2},
the linear strategies S l = {ul1, ul2}, and the two dynamic strategies8 Sm = {um1 , um2 } and
Ss = {us1, us2}. Since u∗1 and u∗2 are Nash equilibrium strategies, Ji(u∗i , u∗j ) ≤ Ji(u•i , u∗j ),
where u•i denotes either u
l
i, u
m
i or u
s
i .
To compare the three approximate solutions of the differential game the quantities
Cd1 (x0) =
{
J1(u
d
1, u
∗
2)− J1(ul1, u∗2)
|J1(u∗1, , u∗2)|
, if J1(u∗1, u∗2) = 0
Cd2 (x0) =
{
J2(u
∗
1, u
d
2)− J2(u∗1, ul2)
|J2(u∗1, u∗2)|
, if J2(u∗1, u∗2) = 0
are introduced, where d denotes either of the dynamic strategies, i.e. d denotes either m
or s. Loosely speaking, Cdi quantiﬁes the difference between the outcomes when player
i adopts udi and u
l
i while assuming the opponent adheres to its Nash equilibrium strat-
egy. Thus, Cdi < 0 implies that the outcome Ji(u
d
i , u
∗
j ) is closer to the Nash equilibrium
outcome than the outcome Ji(uli, u
∗
j ), suggesting that the performance of the dynamic
strategy udi is closer to the Nash equilibrium strategy, u
∗
i , of player i than the linear strat-
egy uli. The converse is true if C
d
i > 0.
Simulations have been run for several initial conditions in the positive orthant: 25
8To aid the clarity of presentation the dynamics of the extensions ξ1 and ξ2, for the dynamic strategies us-
ing individual dynamic extensions, and the dynamics of ξ, for the dynamic strategies using a shared dynamic
extension, have not been included in the notation for the dynamic feedback strategies um1 , um2 , us1 and us2,
and the sets of dynamic strategies Sm and Ss.
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initial conditions have been selected such that they cover uniformly a square grid. Similar
considerations apply to the other quadrants. For the approximate dynamic solutions, umi
and usi , different control parameters have been adopted, i.e. in (3.34), different k1, k2, R1,
R2, ξm1 (0) and ξ
m
2 (0) have been selected for different x0. Similarly, in (3.57), different k,
R1, R2 and ξs(0) have been selected for each x0.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the values taken by Cm1 and C
m
2 , respectively, across the
grid of initial conditions x0 = [x1,0 , x2,0]. Similarly, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show Cs1 and
Cs2 , respectively, corresponding to the different initial conditions. Close to the origin the
linear system (3.6) with the matrices (3.72) is a close approximation of the nonlinear sys-
tem (3.68).Similarly, along the line x2 = 0, the system (3.68) and its linear approximation
are identical, and it follows that for initial conditions, x0, close to this line (3.6)-(3.72) is a
good approximation of (3.68). Consequently, in these regions it is expected that the linear
strategies ul1 and u
l
2 are similar to the Nash equilibrium strategies u
∗
1 and u
∗
2. The simu-
lations verify this, as J1(ul1, u
∗
2) and J1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2), and similarly J1(u
∗
1, u
l
2) andJ2(u
∗
1, u
∗
2), are
identical or very close to one another in these regions. Despite the linear strategies being
very close, or even identical, to the Nash equilibrium solution in these regions, the dy-
namic solutions yield comparable, in fact very similar, performances. From Figures 3.1,
3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 it is clear that both approximate dynamic strategies perform close to the
linear strategies in these regions, as Cm1 (x0), C
m
2 (x0), C
s
1(x0) and C
s
2(x0) are close to zero
for x0 close to the origin or close to the line x2 = 0. Across the grid, the largest values
taken by Cm1 , C
m
2 , C
s
1 and C
s
2 are 0.0142, 0.0269, 0.0160, 0.0270 and these all correspond to
the initial condition x0 = [2, 0.5]. Thus, this result demonstrates that even in this region
the dynamic strategies umi and u
s
i , i = 1, 2, perform relatively well. Moreover, the ﬁgures
show that relatively far from the origin and the line x2 = 0 both Cmi < 0 and C
s
i < 0,
indicating that the approximate dynamic strategies result in performances closer to the
Nash equilibrium outcomes than the linear strategies in this region.
Figure 3.5 shows the trajectories of the state x for a small selection of x0, when the
players adopt the strategy pairs S∗ (solid, gray line), Sl (solid, black line), Sm (dashed
line) and Ss (dotted line). The solid circles denote the initial conditions x0. Interestingly,
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for the selection of initial conditions shown, the trajectories corresponding to both players
adopting Sm and Ss are closer to the trajectories when the players adopt S∗ than when
the set of linear strategies Sl is selected.
Figure 3.6 shows the regions in which each of the approximate strategies of
player 1, namely ul1, u
m
1 and u
s
1, yields the outcomes closest to the Nash equilibrium
outcome, J1(u∗1, u∗2), when player 2 adheres to u∗2, i.e it shows which of the approximate
strategies minimises the difference J1(u•1, u∗2) − J1(u∗1, u∗2) for the different initial condi-
tions. Black, blue or red dots indicate that the strategies that achieve the minimum dif-
ference is ul1, u
m
1 or u
s
1, respectively. For initial conditions where more than one strat-
egy gives similar outcomes for player 1, in particular when the strategies result in the
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Figure 3.5: Trajectories of the state, x, when the players adopt the strategy pairs S∗ (solid, gray
line), Sl (solid, black line), Sm (dashed line) and Ss (dotted line) for three different x0 (denoted
by the solid circles).
outcomes differing by less than 0.0005, this is indicated by several dots around the cor-
responding initial conditions. Similarly, Figure 3.6 shows the regions in which each of
the approximate strategies of player 2, i.e. ul2 (black dots), u
m
2 (blue dots) and u
s
2 (red
dots), yield the closest outcome to the Nash equilibrium outcome when player 1 adopts
its Nash equilibrium strategy.
In all cases the state of the dynamic extensions ξm1 , ξ
m
2 and ξ
s converge to zero,
as expected. For completeness the time histories of the state of the dynamic extensions
ξm1 (top) and ξ
m
2 (middle) and ξ
s (bottom) for one of the the initial condition, namely
x0 = (0, 2)
, are shown in Figure 3.8.
The results indicate that when in the regions where the linear-quadratic approxi-
mation of the differential game is good, both dynamic strategies perform relatively well
compared to the linear strategies. Outside this regions, the simulations indicate that any
one of the two players loses less by deviating from its Nash equilibrium strategy to one
of the dynamic strategies than what is the case when it adopts the linear strategy instead.
Note that these simulations are provided to give a qualititative illustration of the
theory. Thus, it is possible that the performance of the dynamic feedback strategies can
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strategies ul2 (black dots), um2 (blue dots) and
us2 (red dots) result in outcomes closest to
the Nash equilibrium outcome for player 1,
when player 2 adheres to u∗2.
be further improved by selecting the control parameters to optimise the performance for
each initial condition.
3.7.2 Application to Lotka-Volterra Models
In this section a second numerical example illustrating the proposed methods is pre-
sented. A two-player differential game where the dynamical system satisﬁes the struc-
tural assumptions of Theorem 5 is studied. An algebraic P¯ matrix solution is found and
simulations with the dynamic controllers resulting from (3.34) with i = 1, 2, and (3.67)
with i = 1, 2, are presented.
Consider the dynamical system
x˙1 = b1x1 − a11x21 − a21x1x2 ,
x˙2 = b2x2 − a12x1x2 − a22x22 ,
(3.74)
where x1(t) ∈ R, x2(t) ∈ R, and bi and aij , i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2 are positive parameters. These
are the so-called competitive Lotka-Volterra equations and are commonly used to model sys-
tems consisting of competing species, including predator-prey systems [86]. The param-
eters b1 and b2 are the birth rates of the two species whereas aij , i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, are
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Figure 3.8: Time histories of states of the dynamic extensions ξm1 , ξm2 and ξs corresponding to
the simulations for the initial condition x0 = (0, 2). The solid and dashed lines denote the
ﬁrst and second components of the dynamic extensions, respectively.
predation efﬁciencies. The scalar parameters in (3.74) are typically assumed to be con-
stants. We consider the somewhat different scenario in which the parameters aii and aji
can be controlled around certain nominal values by player i, i.e the predation efﬁciencies
in (3.74) are given by aij = a∗ij+uij , where a
∗
ij are strictly positive constants, with i = 1, 2,
j = 1, 2, and the vectors u1 = (u11, u12) and u2 = (u21, u22) are the control variables of
players 1 and 2, respectively. In this case, the dynamical system (3.74) can be represented
as an input-afﬁne dynamical system (3.1) with N = 2, namely
x˙ =
⎡
⎢⎣ b1x1 − a∗11x21 − a∗21x1x2
b2x2 − a∗21x1x2 − a∗22x22
⎤
⎥⎦+
⎡
⎢⎣ −x21 0
0 −x1x2
⎤
⎥⎦u1 +
⎡
⎢⎣ −x1x2 0
0 −x22
⎤
⎥⎦u2 , (3.75)
where f(x) has the equilibria
[
0 0
]
,
[
0
b2
a∗22
]
,
[
b1
a∗11
0
]
,
[
b1a
∗
22 − b2a∗21
−a∗12a∗21 + a∗22a∗11
b2a
∗
11 − b1a∗12
−a∗12a∗21 + a∗22a∗11
]
.
Suppose that both species strive to drive the population to the latter of these equilibria,
denoted by x∗ = [x∗1, x∗2]
, while minimising its own control effort and maximising the
efforts of the other species, i.e. each species attempts to minimise the cost functionals
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(3.3), with running costs
q1(x) = (x2 − x∗2)2 , q2(x) = (x1 − x∗1)2 . (3.76)
Solving the differential game boils down to determining the Nash equilibrium strategies for
the two players subject to the dynamics (3.75) and the cost functionals (3.3), with running
costs (3.76).
Note that both g1(x) and g2(x) in (3.75) are full rank for all x = 0 and thus satisfy
the structural assumptions of Theorem 5 and, as a result, dynamic approximations using
either two individual dynamic extensions or a shared dynamic extension can be sought.
Furthermore, the matrix-valued functions
P1(xˆ) = α
⎡
⎢⎣ 2 + 6xˆ1 + 3xˆ2 1
1 2 + 3xˆ1 + 6xˆ2
⎤
⎥⎦ , (3.77)
P2(xˆ) = β
⎡
⎢⎣ 2 + 6xˆ1 + 3xˆ2 1
1 2 + 3xˆ1 + 6xˆ2
⎤
⎥⎦ , (3.78)
where xˆ = [x1 − x∗1, x2 − x∗2], constitute an algebraic P¯ matrix solution to the problem for
α > 0 and β > 0 sufﬁciently large to ensure Σ1 and Σ2 in (3.22) are positive semideﬁnite.
Consider the case in which b1 = 1, b2 = 1, a∗11 = 2, a∗22 = 2, a∗12 = 1 and a∗21 = 1,
yielding x∗ =
[
1
3
,
1
3
]
. Any selection of α ≥ 310 and β ≥ 310 ensures the mappings (3.77)
and (3.78) is an algebraic P¯ matrix solution with Σ1 > 0 and Σ2 > 0. The system linearised
about x∗ is described by the matrices
A =
⎡
⎢⎣ −
2
3 −13
−13 −23
⎤
⎥⎦ , B1 = B2 = diag(− 19 ,−19) , (3.79)
and the solution to the corresponding coupled AREs (3.9) are
P¯ l1 =
⎡
⎢⎣ 0.105 −0.232
−0.232 0.855
⎤
⎥⎦ , P¯ l2 =
⎡
⎢⎣ 0.855 −0.232
−0.232 0.105
⎤
⎥⎦ . (3.80)
93 3.7 Numerical Examples
Note that P1 + P2 > 0. It follows that the Nash equilibrium strategies for the linearised
system with the quadratic costs (3.76) are uli = −Bi P lix, for i = 1, 2. The pair of strategies
S l = {ul1, ul2} is admissible and constitute the Nash equilibrium solution to the linear-
quadratic approximation of the differential game.
In what follows dynamic approximations, using the two methods of Theorem 3
and Theorem 5 are found utilising (3.77) and (3.78), with α = 310 and β =
3
10 , as an
algebraic P¯ matrix solution. Finally, simulations for the two dynamic approximations, as
well as the linear-quadratic approximation of the problem.
Let Sm = {um1 , um2 } denote9 the approximate dynamic solution which relies on the
introduction of individual dynamic extensions, with dynamics given by (3.34). Consider
next the case in which an approximate dynamic solution is sought using a shared dynamic
extension, in accordance with Theorem 5. Note that the alternative conditions in Remark
10 are satisﬁed byΨ1 andΨ2. Let Ss = {us1, us2} denote the approximate dynamic solution
using a shared extension, where the dynamic control laws are given by (3.57).
Simulations have been run using the solutions to the linear-quadratic approxi-
mation, namely S l, and using the two approximate dynamic solutions Sm and Ss, for
different initial conditions xˆ(0) = xˆ0. As in the previous example different parameters
for the dynamic controllers have been used for the different initial conditions.
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show the difference between the outcomes for player 1 and
player, respectively, when the players adopt the set of dynamic strategies Sm and when
the set of the linear strategies S l is adopted, i.e. it shows dmi = Ji(um1 , um2 ) − Ji(ul1, ul2),
i = 1, 2, for different initial conditions. Similarly, Figures 3.11 and 3.12 shows dsi =
Ji(u
s
1, u
s
2) − Ji(ul1, ul2) for i = 1 and i = 2, respectively. Let udi , i = 1, 2, denote either one
of the dynamic strategies and note that for all initial conditions both players obtain a more
favourable outcome by adhering to the dynamic strategies, that is Ji(ud1, u
d
2)−Ji(ul1, ul2) ≤
0, i = 1, 2, holds for all xˆ0 = (xˆ0,1, xˆ0,2) considered in these simulations.
Figure 3.13 shows the trajectories of the state, x, when the players adopt the
9Again, for clarity of presentation the dynamic extensions are not included in the notation describing the
dynamic feedback strategies.
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Figure 3.12: The values of ds2,corresponding
to the different initial conditions, xˆ0.
strategy pairs S l (solid line), Sm (dashed line) and Ss (dotted line) for the initial con-
dition xˆ0 = (5, 10), which corresponds to the initial condition x0 = (5.33, 10.33) in
the original coordinates. The solid circle and square denote the initial and ﬁnal values
of the state x, respectively. For this particular initial condition, R1 = diag{0.3, 0.2},
R2 = diag{0.1, 0.1}, k1 = k2 = 0.5, ξm1 (0) = [−0.1,−0.2] and ξm2 (0) = [0.08, 0.08]
have been selected for the dynamic strategies um1 and u
m
2 . For the dynamic strategies
us1 and u
s
2, on the other hand, R1 = diag
(
0.05, 0.1
)
, R2 = diag
(
0.7, 0.8
)
, k = 0.5 and
ξm1 (0) = [0.15, 0.1]
 have been chosen. As can be seen, the state x converges to the equi-
librium x∗ in all three cases. Note that both the dynamic approximate solutions Sm and
Ss result in very similar trajectories.
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Figure 3.13: Trajectories of the state x when the players adopt the strategy pairs Sl (solid line),
Sm (dashed line) and Ss (dotted line) for the initial condition x0 = (10.33, 5.33) (denoted by
the solid circle). The solid square denotes the ﬁnal value of the state.
3.8 Applications to Multi-Agent Systems
In this Chapter a class of inﬁnite-horizon nonzero-sum differential games has been dis-
cussed. For an N -player differential game within this class of problems, two ways of
constructing dynamic strategies, using eitherN dynamic extensions or a shared dynamic
extension have been presented. Furthermore, it has been shown that the dynamic strate-
gies constitute local α-Nash equilibrium strategies for the differential game and the two
methods have been illustrated on two examples of differential games in Section 3.7.
As mentioned in Section 1.1 the agents in a multi-agent system can be thought
of as players participating in a differential game, in which their goals may, or may not,
be conﬂicting. In this section a differential game involving multi-agent systems is intro-
duced and approximate solutions using the results of Section 3.6 are proposed. This work
is motivated by three main factors. Firstly, along with the examples in Section 3.7 it serves
to illustrate the theory discussed in Section 3.6. Furthermore, the cost functionals of the
agents are not of the form (3.11) (or (3.3) in the 2-player case). Thus the problem illus-
trates the claims in Remark 1 and Proposition 1, i.e. it is demonstrated that the developed
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theory can easily be adopted to problems with cost functionals different from (3.11) (or
(3.3) in the 2-player case), provided certain conditions, stated in Proposition 1, are satis-
ﬁed. Finally, the multi-agent collision avoidance problem highlights multi-agent systems
as a possible application domain for the theory concerning differential games. This will
be further developed in Chapter 5, in which the problem of continuously monitoring a
region using a team of agents is discussed.
The problem of steering a team of agents from their initial positions to a prede-
ﬁned end-conﬁguration while avoiding collisions is formulated as a differential game.
This is referred to as the multi-agent collision avoidance problem. A method for obtaining
approxime solutions for the differential game is then presented. This relies upon the con-
ceptual results developed in Section 3.6, which provide α-Nash strategies for general
nonzero-sum differential games. Using this methods the multi-agent collision avoidance
problem is solved. It is shown that approximate solutions guarantee that the task of reach-
ing the ﬁnal conﬁguration while avoiding collisions is achieved. The theory is illustrated
by simulations.
The remainder of the section is organised as follows. The problem is formulated in
Section 3.8.1 and its solution is given in Sections 3.8.2 and 3.8.3. Simulations are presented
in Section 3.8.4. Finally, some conclusions are drawn and directions for future work are
identiﬁed in Section 7.2.
3.8.1 Problem Formulation
In this section we introduce and discuss the multi-agent collision avoidance problem, which
consists in controlling a multi-agent system in such a way that each agent reaches a de-
sired target position while simultaneously avoiding collisions between the other agents.
Towards this end, consider a team of N agents moving in the plane, which are described
by single-integrators, i.e.
x˙i = ui , (3.81)
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for i = 1, ..., N , with xi(t) ∈ R2 and ui(t) ∈ R2. The vectors xi and ui describe the position
and the velocity of the i-th agent on the Cartesian plane, respectively.
Suppose that desired target positions x∗i , i = 1, ..., N , are assigned to each agent
and let x˜i = xi − x∗i denote the error variable with respect to the desired conﬁguration.
In the following we assume that sufﬁcient time is provided to accomplish the task of
steering each agent from its initial condition, xi(0), to its target position, x∗i . The above
objective should be achieved while avoiding collisions between agents.
In particular, each agent is to maintain a certain distance between itself and the
other members of the team. Thus, we deﬁne the avoidance region of the i-th agent as
follows.
Deﬁnition 20. Given ri > 0 and a time instant t¯ ≥ 0, deﬁne the set Rt¯i ={
x : ‖xi(t¯)− x‖2 < r2i
}
, where x ∈ R2. The avoidance region of the i-th agent at t¯, de-
noted Ωt¯i, is deﬁned as Ω
t¯
i = ∪
j=1,...,N ,j =i
Rj .
The parameter ri plays the role of a safety radius for the i-th agent. Note that, since the
team may consists of agents that differ in some way, e.g. they may have different sizes,
different values of safety radius may be associated to each agent. Let Ω¯t¯i denote the com-
plement of the set Ωt¯i. Then, a collision between the i-th and the j-th agent is deﬁned as
follows.
Deﬁnition 21. Given ri > 0, the i-th agent is said to collide with the j-th agent if there
exists a time instant t¯ ≥ 0 such that ‖xi(t¯)− xj(t¯)‖2 < max{r2i , r2j}.
Finally, a collision-free trajectory for the agent i is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 22. The i-th agent is said to be collision free if for all t¯ ≥ 0, xi(t¯) ∈ Ωt¯i, or
equivalently for all t¯ ≥ 0, xi(t¯) ∈ Ω¯t¯i.
Remark 13. In the above deﬁnition a circular “geometry” is adopted, namely the set
Rt¯i is a circular region centered at xi. However, different geometries can easily be ac-
counted for by modifying Deﬁnitions 20 and 21. In particular, the alternative deﬁnition
Rt¯i =
{
x : ‖xi(t¯)− x‖2Mi < r2i , j = 1, . . . , N , j = i
}
, where the positive-deﬁnite ma-
trix Mi ∈ R2×2 allows for “non-circular” geometries. 
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Using the above discussion the multi-agent collision avoidance problem can be
formulated as a non-cooperative differential game, as detailed in the following deﬁnition.
Problem 8. Consider a multi-agent system consisting of N > 1 agents with dynam-
ics (3.81), for i = 1, . . . N , and let x˜ =
[
x˜1 , . . . , x˜N
]. The multi-agent collision avoidance
problem consists in steering each agent from its initial position to the predeﬁned target
position while avoiding inter-agent collisions and minimising its own effort. Thus, each
agent attempts to minimise the cost-functional
Ji(u1, . . . , uN ) =
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
qi(x˜) + ‖ui(t)‖2
)
dt , (3.82)
where qi(x˜) > 0, with qi(0) = 0, is a running cost given by
qi(x˜) =
(
αi + βigi(x˜)
)
x˜i x˜i , (3.83)
with constants αi > 0, βi > 0 and where gi(x˜) ≥ 0 is a barrier function penalising the
i-th agent from approaching within a distance ri of any other agent, namely such that
lim
xi(t¯)→Ωt¯i
gi(x˜) = +∞.
Solving the multi-agent collision avoidance problem then boils down to determin-
ing the Nash strategies for each player, namely the set of strategies S∗ = {u∗1, . . . , u∗N}
satisfying
Ji(u
∗
1, . . . , u
∗
i , . . . , u
∗
N ) ≤ Ji(u∗1, . . . , ui, . . . , u∗N ) , (3.84)
for all ui = u∗i , i = 1, . . . , N , and rendering the zero-equilibrium of the system locally
asymptotically stable: each agent reaches its target position without entering its avoidance
region.
In what follows an inverse barrier function, i.e.
gi(x˜) =
N∑
j=1,j =i
1(‖(x˜i + x∗i )− (x˜j + x∗j )‖2 − r2i )c , (3.85)
where c > 0 is considered, although alternative deﬁnitions are possible.
In [87, 88] the problem of obtaining coverage of a region using a team of agents
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while avoiding collisions has been solved by formulating the coverage problem as an
optimal control problem and adding a posteriori a barrier function, penalising collisions,
to the value functions corresponding to each agent. In contrast, we here include the
collision avoidance in the formulation of the differential game.
Note that, as far as their primary objective of reaching x∗i is concerned, the agents
may be cooperating, e.g. for monitoring and surveillance, or competing.
3.8.2 Solving the Multi-Agent Collision Avoidance Problem
To solve Problem 8, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations associated with the differ-
ential game characterised by the cost functionals (3.82) and the dynamics (3.81), for
i = 1, . . . , N , must be solved, namely
−1
2
∂Vi
∂xi
∂Vi
∂xi

+
1
2
qi(x)−
N∑
j=1,j =i
∂Vi
∂xi
∂Vj
∂xj

= 0 , (3.86)
with Vi > 0 and Vi(0) = 0, i = 1, . . . , N , [6, 10, 32]. Provided a solution to the system of
PDEs can be found, the Nash equilibrium strategy of the i-th agent is given by
u∗i = −
∂Vi(x˜1, . . . , x˜N )
∂x˜i

. (3.87)
However, closed-form solutions to (3.86), i = 1, . . . , N , cannot be found and it is neces-
sary to settle for an approximate solution of the differential game.
Earlier in this chapter two methods for solving approximately nonzero-sum dif-
ferential games have been presented. In what follows the approximate dynamic solution
relying on the introduction of a shared dynamic extension and the notion of algebraic P¯
matrix solution is used to solve the multi-agent collision avoidance problem, i.e. Prob-
lem 8.
Since this problem deals with agents with single-integrator dynamics and cost
functionals which are not of the form (3.11), an algebraic P¯ matrix solution for Problem
8 is deﬁned again for this particular differential game. This illustrates, as speciﬁed in
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Remark 1, that the notion of Algebraic P¯ matrix solution and the proposed methods of
constructing dynamic strategies that constitute local α-Nash equilibrium strategies for
the differential game can be easily extended to differential games with cost functionals
that are not of the form (3.11), or (3.3) in the 2-player case.
Using the machinery introduced in Section 3.4, and letting Σi : R2N → R2N×2N
such that Σi(x˜) = Σi(x˜) ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N , for all x˜ ∈ R2N , the matrix-valued functions
Pi(x˜) = Pi(x˜)
, i = 1, . . . , N , are said to constitute an algebraic P¯ matrix solution for the
differential game with Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations (3.86), for i = 1. . . . , N , if the
following conditions hold.
(i) For all x ∈ Rn and i = 1, ..., N ,
−Pi(x˜)Pi(x˜) +Qi(x˜)−
N∑
j=1,j =i
2Pi(x˜)Pj(x˜) + Σi(x˜) = 0 . (3.88)
(ii) For i = 1, ..., N , Pi(0) = P¯i, where P¯i denotes the symmetric positive deﬁnite solu-
tion of the coupled Riccati equations
−P¯iP¯i −
N∑
j=1,j =i
(
P¯iP¯j + P¯jP¯i
)
+ Q¯i + Σ¯i = 0 , (3.89)
where Qi(x˜) is such that qi(x˜) = x˜Qi(x˜)x˜ and Q¯i = Qi(0).
Using the algebraic P¯ matrix solution, deﬁne the value functions as in (3.55), with ξ ∈ R2N ,
where Ri = Ri > 0, i = 1, . . . , N . Furthermore, let ξ = (ξ

1 , . . . , ξ

N )
, where ξi ∈ R2,
i = 1, . . . , N . Recall that the partial derivatives of Vi(x˜, ξ) are given by
∂Vi(x)
∂x
= x˜Pi(x˜) + (x˜− ξ)(Ri − Φi(x˜, ξ)) ,
∂Vi(x)
∂ξ
= x˜Ψi(x˜, ξ)x˜− (x˜− ξ)Ri ,
(3.90)
where Φi(x˜, ξ) is such that Pi(x˜) − Pi(ξ) = (x˜ − ξ)Φi(x˜, ξ) and Ψi(x˜, ξ) is the Jacobian
matrix of the mapping 12Pi(ξ)x˜ with respect to ξ. It follows fromTheorem 6 (or Theorem
5 in the 2-player case), that there exists k > 0 and Ri, i = 1, . . . , N such that the set of
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dynamic strategies given by
ui = −Pi(x˜)x˜+ (R− Φi(x˜, ξ))(x˜− ξ) ,
ξ˙ = −k
N∑
i=1
(
Ψi(x˜, ξ)
x˜−Ri(x˜− ξ)
)
,
(3.91)
constitute α-Nash solutions for the differential game described by the cost-functionals
(3.82) and the dynamics (3.81), i = 1, . . . , N . Thus, obtaining an approximate solution
of the multi-agent collision avoidance problem that ensures all agents reach their targets
without collisions occurring boils down to determining the algebraic P¯ matrix solution,
i.e. matrix-valued functions satisfying (3.88).
3.8.3 Multi-Agent Collision Avoidance
Approximate feedback solutions for the multi-agent collision avoidance problem are con-
structed here. It is assumed that the following conditions are satisﬁed by the initial and
target conﬁgurations of the agents.
Assumption 5. The initial positions of the agents respect the safety radius of each agent,
i.e.
‖xi(0)− xj(0)‖ > ri ,
for all i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , N , j = i.
Assumption 6. The target positions for each agent respect the safety radius of each agent,
i.e.
‖x∗i − x∗j‖ > ri .
for all i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , N , j = i,
In what follows the notation A = [aij ] is used as a shorthand for the matrix
A =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
a11 . . . , a1N
...
. . .
...
aN1
... aNN
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
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Consider the dynamic extension ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξN ) ∈ R2N and the matrix-valued functions
P1(x) ∈ R2N×2N , . . . , PN (x) ∈ R2N×2N given by
Pi(x˜) =
[
P iij(x)
]
+ γiI , (3.92)
where P iij ∈ R2×2, i = 1, . . . N , j = 1, . . . , N and γi > 0 is a constant parameter. Further-
more, P iij = 0 for j = i whereas
P iii(x˜) =
[√
αi + βiqi(x˜)I
]
.
To clarify the notation, P1(x˜) and P2(x˜) are given in (3.93) and (3.94).
P1 = diag
(√
α1 + β1g1(x˜) + γ1)I, γ1I
)
, (3.93)
P2 = diag
(
γ2I, (
√
α2 + β2g2(x˜) + γ2)I, γ2I
)
. (3.94)
Finally, Ri =
[
N iij
]
, where N iij ∈ R2×2, i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , N . Using this notation the
following theorem holds true.
Theorem 7. Consider Problem 8 and the algebraic P¯ solution (3.92), i = 1, . . . , N , and
suppose Assumptions 5 and 6 are satisﬁed. Then there exist Ri and ki > 0, i = 1, . . . , N ,
such that the dynamic strategy
ui = −x˜i
(√
αi + βigi(ξ) + γi
)
−
N∑
p=1
N iip(x˜p − ξp)
ξ˙ = −k
(
βix˜

i x˜i
2
√
αi + βigi(ξ)
∇ξgi(ξ) −Ri(x˜− ξ)
)
,
(3.95)
with i = 1, . . . , N , is such that lim
t→∞ x˜i(t) = 0, xi(t) ∈ Ω¯
t
i, for all t ≥ 0 and limt→∞ ξ(t) = 0.
Furthermore, the set of strategies (3.95), i = 1, . . . , N , constitutes an -Nash equilibrium
for the differential game deﬁned by the cost-functionals (3.82) and the system (3.81), i =
1, . . . , N . 
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Proof: The proof consists of two steps, the ﬁrst one to show that the Pi(x˜), i = 1, . . . , N ,
give an algebraic P¯ matrix solution for the differential game associated to Problem 8. It then
follows from Theorem 6 (or Theorem 5 in the 2-player case), that the dynamic control
strategies (3.95), i = 1, . . . , N , solve the problem approximately. Secondly, it is shown
that provided Assumptions 5 and 6 are satisﬁed, the agents converge to the desired target
points and collision avoidance is guaranteed along the trajectories of the agents.
First, note that it follows from (5.12) that Qi(x˜) = [aij ], where aij ∈ R2, is such that
aij = 0 for all j = i and aii =
(
αi + βigi(x˜)
)
I2. Then, clearly
Pˆi(x˜) = diag{0, . . . , 0,
√
αi + βigi(x˜)I, 0, . . . , 0} ,
i = 1, . . . N , satisfy (3.24) with Σi(x˜) = 0 for i = 1, . . . N . Similarly, P1(x˜), . . . , PN (x˜), as
deﬁned in (3.92), satisfy (3.88) with
Σi(x˜) = diag{σ11, σ22, . . . , σNN}+
N∑
p=1
γiγpI ,
where
σii = 2γi
√
αi + βigi(x˜) +
N∑
j=1,j =i
γj
√
αi + βigi(x˜) ,
σjj = γi
√
αj + βjgj(x˜) .
A direct substitution shows that the equations (3.89) are satisﬁed by (3.92), i = 1, . . . , N .
It follows that the matrix-valued functions P1(x˜), . . . , PN (x˜) give an algebraic P¯ matrix
solution for the differential game associated to Problem 8. Furthermore, using (3.92), i =
1, . . . , N , as an algebraic solution, the dynamic strategies (3.67) are given by (3.95), i =
1, . . . , N .
It now remains to show that the resulting closed-loop trajectories are collision-free.
The dynamic strategies (3.91) are the Nash-equilibrium strategies of a differential game
with dynamics (3.81) and cost-functionals
Ji(u1, . . . , uN ) =
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
qi(x˜) + ‖ui(t)‖2 + ci(x˜, ξ)
)
dt ,
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where ci(x˜, ξ) ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N . The value functions V1, . . . , VN are such that
Vi(x˜(0)) =
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
qi(x˜) + ‖ui(t)‖2 + ci(x˜, ξ)
)
dt .
Provided Assumption 5 is satisﬁed, qi(x˜) is bounded and it follows that Vi(x˜(0)) is
bounded as well. Since an inﬁnite-horizon problem is considered, it is necessary that
qi(0) = 0, i = 1, . . . , N , for the problem to be well-posed. This can only be the case
provided Assumption 6 is satisﬁed.
Finally, taking W (x˜) = V1(x˜) + . . . VN (x˜) as a candidate Lyapunov function yields
W˙ ≤ −12
∑N
i=1 qi(x˜). It follows that provided Assumption 5 is satisﬁed, hence W (x˜(0))
is bounded, and Assumption 6 is also satisﬁed, hence the problem is well-posed, the
zero equilibrium of the closed-loop system is locally asymptotically stable: the agents
converge to their target position. Furthermore, since W˙ ≤ 0 and Assumption 5 holds, it
follows that the agents reach their targets without entering their avoidance region. 
Remark 14. The initial condition of the dynamic extension variable, ξ(0), is of importance
for the solution of the differential game: it must be selected so that gi(ξ(0)) is bounded
for all i = 1, . . . , N . 
Remark 15. The algebraic P¯ matrix solutions (3.92), i = 1, . . . , N can be modiﬁed such
that Σi(x˜) contains the barrier function gi(x˜). This may be useful to satisfy technical
assumptions discussed in Remark 6. 
3.8.4 Simulations
In this section simulations to illustrate the theory are presented. While the function (3.85)
ideally behaves as a barrier function, in a discrete-step implementation - intrinsically re-
quired by numerical integration - the agents may miss, and consequently cross, the bar-
rier due to the time discretization. Therefore, to render the implementation robust, the
following alternative deﬁnition of the barrier function is used
gi(x˜) =
1(
max{0, ‖(x˜i + x∗i )− (x˜j + x∗j )‖2 − r2i }
)c . (3.96)
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Figure 3.14: Trajectories of the ﬁrst (dark line) and second (gray line) agent with x1(0) =
[−5,−5], x2(0) = [5, 5], x∗1 = [5, 5] and x∗2 = [−5,−5]. The square and circular markers
indicate the initial conditions of x1(0) and x2(0), respectively.
Simulations have been run for different scenarios. First, two cases withN = 2 are consid-
ered. Then a case in which there are three agents that need to be coordinated on the plane
is considered. Identical agents, with ri = 1 = rs, γi = 1, αi = 1, βi = 0.1, i = 1, . . . , N , are
considered in all simulations. For the barrier functions (3.96), the value c = 1 is used.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which N = 2, x1(0) = [−5,−5], x2(0) = [5, 5], x∗1 =
x2(0) and x∗2 = x1(0). Both agents apply the dynamic strategies (3.95), i = 1, 2, with
k = 1, R1 = R2 = I and ξ(0) = [8,−3,−3, 8]. Figure 3.14 shows the trajectories of the
ﬁrst (dark line) and second (gray line) agents. The arrows indicate the direction of travel.
The square and circular markers denote the initial positions of the ﬁrst and second agent,
respectively. The dotted lines denote the circumferences of the regions Ri of each agent
at the time instant tc ≥ 0 in which the agents are closest to each other. The crosses
indicate where this occurs on the trajectories of the agents. Note that these regions are
not intersecting. Figure 3.15 shows the time history of ‖x1(t)−x2(t)‖ (dark line) together
with the value rs (dashed line). As can be seen from Figure 3.14 both agents reach their
targets and Figure 3.15 shows that the avoidance regions of the two agents never overlap
while doing so. The middle and bottom graphs of Figure 3.15 display the time histories
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Figure 3.15: Top graph: time history of the Euclidean distance between the two agents, i.e.
‖x1(t)− x2(t)‖, (solid line), together with rs (dashed line). Middle graph: time histories of the
components of the dynamic extension ξ1(t), with ξ1(0) = [8,−3]. Bottom graph: time histories
of the components of the dynamic extension ξ2(t), with ξ2(0) = [−3, 8].
of the components of the dynamic extensions ξ1(t) and ξ2(t), respectively. Figure 3.16
shows the time histories of the control strategies u1 (top) and u2 (bottom) adopted by
agents 1 and 2, respectively. In both cases the solid line denotes the component of the
strategies along the x-axis, whereas the dashed line denotes the components along the
y-axis.
Consider a similar situation with two agents, this time with initial positions
x1(0) = [−5,−5] and x2(0) = [5, 5] with target positions x∗1 = [3, 2] and x∗2 = [−1, 1].
In this case k = 1, R1 = R2 = I and ξ(0) = [−20, 20, 20,−20]. Figure 3.17 shows the
trajectories of the agents (black and gray lines, respectively). In this ﬁgure circular mark-
ers are used to denote the initial positions of the agents whereas the squares denote their
target position, x∗i , i = 1, 2. As in the previous example both agents reach the desired
ﬁnal destinations without colliding. The top graph of Figure 3.18 shows the time history
of ‖x1(t)− x2(t)‖, whereas the middle and bottom graphs show the time histories of the
components of ξ1(t) and ξ2(t), respectively. Figure 3.19 displays the time histories of the
components of the strategies u1 (top) and u2 (bottom) of agents 1 and 2, respectively.
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Figure 3.16: Time histories of the control strategies adopted by agents 1 (top) and 2 (bottom).
Solid and dashed lines indicate the components of the strategies along the x-axis and
y-axis, respectively.
Finally, consider the scenario in which three agents are to be coordinated in the
plane. More speciﬁcally, the primary deployment task consists in steering the agents
from the vertexes of the triangle plotted with the dotted line in Figure 3.20 towards the
vertices of the, smaller, triangle plotted with the dash-dotted line. The initial conditions
are x1(0) = [−2, 0], x2(0) = [−1, 4] and x3(0) = [3, 3], whereas the targets are x∗1 =
[−1, 3], x∗2 = [1, 1.5] and x∗3 = [−1, 0]. In this simulation k = 12, R1 = R2 = I
and ξ(0) = [40,−40,−40, 40, 40, 40]. Figure 3.20 shows the trajectories of the ﬁrst (dark
line), second (dark-gray line) and third (light-gray line) agent, together with the triangles
describing the initial (dotted line) and ﬁnal conﬁgurations (dash-dotted line). Figure 3.21
displays the time histories of the distances between each pair of agents, namely dij(t) 
‖xi(t) − xj(t)‖. Figure 3.19 shows the time histories of the control strategies u1 (top), u2
(middle) and u3 (bottom) adopted by agents 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Solid and dashed
lines indicate the components of the strategies along the x-axis and y-axis, respectively.
The three scenarios considered here show that the agents reach their target positions
while avoiding collisions.
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Figure 3.17: Trajectories of the ﬁrst (dark line) and second (gray line) agent with x1(0) =
[−5,−5] and x2(0) = [5, 5]. The circular and square markers indicate the initial and target
positions, x∗1 = [3, 2] and x∗2 = [−1, 1], of the agents, respectively.
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Figure 3.18: Top graph: time history of the Euclidean distance between the two agents (solid
line) together with rs (dashed line). Middle graph: time histories of the components of the dy-
namic extension ξ1(t), with ξ1(0) = [20,−20]. Bottom graph: time histories of the components
of the dynamic extension ξ2(t), with ξ2(0) = [−20, 20].
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Figure 3.19: Time histories of the control strategies adopted by agents 1 (top) and 2 (bottom).
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Figure 3.20: Trajectories of the ﬁrst (dark line), second (dark gray line) and third (light gray
line) agent, together with the triangles describing the initial (dotted line) and ﬁnal, desired,
conﬁgurations (dot-dashed line).
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Figure 3.21: Time histories of the Euclidean distances d12(t) (solid line), d13(t) (dotted line) and
d23(t) (dashed line) with dij(t)  ‖xi(t)− xj(t)‖.
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Figure 3.22: Time histories of the control strategies adopted by agents 1 (top) and 2 (middle)
and 3 (bottom).
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3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter classes of nonlinear, nonzero-sum differential games with input-afﬁne dy-
namics are studied, with focus on feedback Nash equilibria. The notions of α-admissible
strategies and α-Nash equilibrium strategies are introduced and it is shown that for
linear-quadratic differential games solving matrix inequalities in place of the algebraic
Riccati equations yields α-Nash equilibrium solutions. This observation is then ex-
tended to the nonlinear setting. Without solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDEs asso-
ciated with the differential games directly, dynamic strategies that instead satisfy partial
differential inequalities are identiﬁed, yielding local α-Nash equilibrium solutions. The
proposed method relies on dynamic state feedback and the notion of algebraic P¯ matrix
solution. Either several or a single, shared dynamic extension can be used, depending on
the structural properties of the dynamic system.
The proposed methods are applied to two illustrative examples of nonzero-sum
differential games. The ﬁrst example is one for which the Nash equilibrium solution is
known and it is shown that both approximate dynamic solutions result in an outcome
closer to the Nash equilibrium outcome for both the players than the linear-quadratic
approximation of the problem does. Then a Lotka-Volterra model with two competing
species is presented. Simulations indicate that both approximate dynamic solutions, us-
ing several and a shared dynamic extensions, result in an improvement compared to the
performance resulting from the linear-quadratic approximation of the problem. Finally,
the problem of steering a team of N agents from their initial position to a desired end-
conﬁguration while avoiding collisions, i.e. the multi-agent collision avoidance problem, is
considered. The problem is formulated as a differential game which is solved using the
approximate methods presented earlier in the chapter: an algebraic P¯ matrix solution for
the multi-agent collision avoidance problem is identiﬁed and used to design dynamic control
laws that guarantee that each agent reaches its ﬁnal destination while avoiding collisions
with other agents, provided the initial and ﬁnal conﬁgurations satisfy certain conditions.
The theory is supported by simulations.
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Chapter 4
2-Player Stackelberg Differential
Games
4.1 Introduction
One of the most common solution concepts associated with game theoretic problems is
that of Nash equilibrium solutions, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, whereby it is assumed
that all players are rational and announce their strategies simultaneously [6, 10, 70]. A
different solution concept was introduced by Stackelberg in 1934 [89]. In Stackelberg dif-
ferential games some decision makers are able to act prior to the other players which
then react in a rational manner, i.e. the players act in a speciﬁc order [6]. Thus, unlike
Nash equilibria, Stackelberg equilibria introduce a hierarchy between the players. Some
simple examples of the different types of games are the game of “rock-paper-scissor”,
where all players act simultaneously (Nash), and “tic-tac-toe” or chess, where the play-
ers act in a speciﬁc order (Stackelberg). In some cases the order in which the players
act is irrelevant, in which case the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are equivalent. This
is, however, not generally the case. As mentioned in Chapter 2 the concepts introduced
when focusing on feedback Nash equilibrium strategies can be extended to different so-
lution concepts related to differential games as well. In this chapter a simple 2-player
differential game is considered for which Stackelberg equilibrium strategies are deﬁned and
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Stackelberg equilibrium solutions are sought. Different solution concepts for Stackelberg
differential games exist, namely open-loop, closed-loop and feedback Stackelberg solutions.
These solution concepts are discussed in [90]. Unlike closed-loop Stackelberg solutions,
feedback Stackelberg solutions can be found via dynamic programming, and these are
studied in this chapter.
In [89] feedback Stackelberg solutions of an inﬁnite-horizon stochastic differential
game are considered. In this chapter a similar 2-player deterministic differential game is
introduced. As when determining Nash equilibrium solutions, obtaining feedback Stack-
elberg equilibrium solutions for a given differential game relies on the solution of a sys-
tem of coupled PDEs. The Stackelberg equilibrium solution to a linear-quadratic differ-
ential game, similar to the linear-quadratic differential game introduced in Section 2.3.1,
relies on solutions of coupled algebraic Riccati equations. In Chapter 3 two methods
of obtaining strategies that constitute local α-Nash equilibrium strategies for a class of
nonzero-sum differential games have been introduced. In what follows, the method de-
veloped in Section 3.6, namely the approach which relies on a dynamic extension which
is shared among the players, is extended to the case in which feedback Stackelberg so-
lutions are sought. In particular a two-player nonzero-sum differential game, with cost
functionals similar to those considered in [89] is considered. The results can easily be
extended to problems with more general cost functionals, similar to those considered in
Chapter 3, and to problems with N > 2 players.
The motivation behind this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it demonstrates that the
methods introduced in Chapter 3 are applicable to solution concepts other than Nash
equilibrium solutions. Secondly, it is the ﬁrst step towards considering differential games
with more complicated information patterns. For example, such a non-standard informa-
tion pattern would occur in the situation in which a group of players has information
about the strategies of a second group of players whereas the second group do not have
acces to similar information regarding the actions of the ﬁrst group of players.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2 a formal deﬁ-
nition of the problem and its solution is given. An algebraic P¯ matrix Stackelberg solution,
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which is similar in spirit to the algebraic P¯ matrix solution deﬁned in Chapter 3, is de-
ﬁned in Section 4.3. A method for constructing approximate solutions is presented in
Section 4.4, in which also the notion of the approximation is made precise. Simulations
illustrating the method are then given in Section 4.5. Finally, some concluding remarks
are given in Section 4.6.
4.2 The Two-Player Stackelberg Differential Game
Consider the input-afﬁne dynamical system
x˙ = f(x) + g1(x)u1 + g2(x)u2 , (4.1)
where x(t) ∈ Rn, with n > 0, is the state of the system, f(x) : Rn → Rn, g1(x) ∈ Rn×m
and g2(x) ∈ Rn×m, with m > 0, are smooth mappings and u1(t) ∈ Rm and u2(t) ∈ Rm are
the control signals of player 1 and 2, respectively.
Assumption 7. The origin ofRn is an equilibrium point of the vector ﬁeld f(x), i.e. f(0) =
0.
Recall, as remarked in Section 3.2, that a consequence of Assumption 7 is that we can
write f(x) = F (x)x, for some (not unique) matrix-valued function F (x) : Rn → Rn×n.
Suppose the game is such that the players announce their strategies in a pre-
deﬁned order. In particular suppose that player 1 acts before player 2: in this case player
1 is referred to as the leader, whereas player 2 is referred to as the follower. Similarly to [91],
the leader seeks to minimise a cost functional of the form
J1(x(0), u1, u2) 
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
q1(x(t)) + 2θu1(t)
u2(t) + ‖u1(t)‖2
)
dt , (4.2)
whereas the follower seeks to minimise a cost functional of the form
J2(x(0), u1, u2) 
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
q2(x(t)) + 2θu2(t)
u1(t) + ‖u2(t)‖2
)
dt , (4.3)
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where θ ∈ R, and the running costs are such that q1(x) = xQ1(x)x ≥ 0, q2(x) =
xQ2(x)x ≥ 0, where Q1 ∈ Rn×n and Q2 ∈ Rn×n, and q1(x) + q2(x) > 0 for all x = 0.
The cost functionals (4.2) and (4.3) are such that the agents seek to minimise their own
running costs and control efforts. In addition, if θ > 0, the players seek to minimise the
cross-product between their control strategies (or maximise the product if instead θ < 0).
The cost functionals remain bounded if J1 + λJ2 ≥ 0 for some λ ∈ R+. This is
guaranteed provided θ and λ are such that λ − θ2(1 + λ)2 ≥ 0. The range of allowable
θ is maximised by the selection λ = 1 and the resulting bound is given in the following
statement, which is assumed to hold in the remainder of the paper.
Assumption 8. The parameter θ, weighting the cross-product between the two control
inputs, is such that |θ| ≤ 12 .
Remark 16. The range of θ in Assumption 8 is more restrictive than that in [91]. We
consider this range of θ to ensure boundedness of J1 + J2. However, in [91] a discount
factor is included in the running cost, which eliminates the “problem” of boundedness,
hence allowing for a larger range of θ. 
Remark 17. Cost functionals different from (4.2) and (4.3) can be considered, provided
they are such that there exists λ > 0 such that J1 + λJ2 is bounded. The cost functionals
(4.2) and (4.3) have been selected to allow for a straight-forward comparison with the
results in [91]. 
In what follows feedback Stackelberg equilibria for the differential game are considered. Ad-
missible strategies are deﬁned similarly to what has been done in Deﬁnition 7 as follows.
Deﬁnition 23. A pair of state feedback strategies S = {u1, u2(u1)} is said to be admissible
for the non-cooperative Stackelberg differential game if it renders the zero equilibrium of
the closed-loop system (locally) asymptotically stable.
Problem 9. Consider the system (4.1) and the cost functionals of the leader and the fol-
lower, namely (4.2) and (4.3), respectively. The 2-player Stackelberg differential game
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consists in determining a pair of admissible feedback strategies, S∗ = {u∗1, u∗2(u∗1)} satis-
fying
J1(x(0), u
∗
1, u
∗
2(u
∗
1)) ≤ J1(x(0), u1, u∗2(u1)) ,
J2(x(0), u
∗
1, u
∗
2(u
∗
1)) ≤ J2(x(0), u∗1, u2(u∗1)) ,
(4.4)
for all admissible S1 = {u1, u∗2(u1)} and S2 = {u∗1, u2(u∗1)}, with u1 = u∗1 and u2(u∗1) =
u∗2(u∗1).
The pair of strategies S∗ is said to be a Stackelberg equilibrium solution of the two-player
Stackelberg differential game.
Remark 18. Since there is an ordering between the two players, the Stackelberg strategy
of the follower, i.e. u2(u•1), depends on the strategy of the leader, i.e. u•1. This is not the
case when solving for Nash equilibria, where both players act simultaneously. 
The Hamiltonians associated with players 1 and 2 are
H1(x, u1, u2, λ1) =
1
2
(
q1(x) + 2θu

1 u2 + ‖u1‖2
)
+ λ1 (f(x) + g1(x)u1 + g2(x)u2) ,
H2(x, u1, u2, λ1) =
1
2
(
q2(x) + 2θu

2 u1 + ‖u2‖2
)
+ λ2 (f(x) + g1(x)u1 + g2(x)u2) ,
where λ1 and λ2 are the co-states. Feedback Stackelberg equilibria are such that the
Hamiltonians are minimised [91]. Knowing the action of the leader, the follower’s re-
sponse is
u∗2(u1) = arg minu2
H2(x, u1, u2, λ2) = −g2 λ2 − θu1 . (4.5)
Anticipating this behaviour, the leader should select its strategy according to
u∗1 = argminu1
H1(x, u1, u
∗
2, λ1) = −
1
1− 2θ2
(
(g1(x)− θg2(x))λ1 − θg2(x)λ2
)
. (4.6)
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Let Δg(x) = g1(x)− θg2(x) and consider the PDEs
∂V1
∂x
f(x) +
1
2
q1(x)− ∂V1
∂x
g2(x)g2(x)
∂V2
∂x

− 1
2
1
1− 2θ2
∥∥∥∂V1
∂x
Δg(x)− θ∂V2
∂x
g2(x)
∥∥∥2 = 0 ,
∂V2
∂x
f(x) +
1
2
q2(x) +
1
1− 2θ2 θ
∂V2
∂x
g2(x)g2(x)
∂V2
∂x

− 1
1− 2θ2
∂V2
∂x
g1(x)Δg(x)
∂V1
∂x

− 1
2
1
(1− 2θ2)2
∥∥∥(1− θ2)∂V2
∂x
g2(x)− θ∂V1
∂x
Δg(x)
∥∥∥2 = 0 ,
(4.7)
with solutions Vi such that Vi(0) = 0, for i = 1, 2, for all x = 0. Then, the Stackelberg
equilibrium solution for the game deﬁned by the dynamics (4.1) and the cost functionals
(4.2) and (4.3) with player 1 as leader and player 2 as follower, i.e. Problem 9, is S∗ =
{u∗1, u∗2(u∗1)} , where the strategies of each player are given by
u∗1 =
−1
1− 2θ2
(
Δg(x)
∂V1
∂x

− θg2(x)∂V2
∂x
)
,
u∗2(u
∗
1) = −g2(x)
∂V2
∂x

− θu∗1 ,
(4.8)
provided the set of strategies S∗ is admissible.
Note that admissibility of S∗ follows if W = V1(x) + V2(x) > 0, for all x = 0. Moreover,
W˙ < 0, for all x = 0, is then implied by the PDEs (4.7). Thus, it follows from standard
Lyapunov arguments that the feedback strategies (4.8) are admissible if the solution of
(4.7) is such that W > 0.
Consider now the linear-quadratic approximation of the problem. Recall that in a
neighbourhood of the origin the system (4.1) can be approximated by a linear system (3.6)
with matrices A, B1 and B2 given by (3.7), and the running costs qi(x) can be approxi-
mated as quadratic costs, namely xQ¯ix, where Q¯i = Qi(0), for i = 1, 2. As seen in
Section 3.2.1 for the resulting linear-quadratic differential game, when focusing on linear
feedback strategies only, the PDEs (4.7), reduce to coupled AREs. For the Stackelberg
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differential game considered here the coupled AREs are
P1A+A
P1 + Q¯1 − P1B2B2 P2 − P2B2B2 P1
− 1
1− 2θ2 (P1ΔB − θP2B2)(Δ

BP1 − θB2 P2) = 0 ,
P2A+A
P2 +Q2 +
1
1− 2θ2
(
2θP2B2B

2 P2 − P1ΔBB1 P2 − P2B1ΔBP1
)
− 1
(1− 2θ2)2
(
(1− θ2)P2B2 − θP1ΔB)((1− θ2)B2 P2 − θΔBP1
)
= 0 ,
(4.9)
where ΔB = (B1 − θB2). Suppose P1 = P1 and P2 = P2 , such that P1 + P2 > 0,
solve (4.9). Then, the Stackelberg equilibrium solution for the linear-quadratic differential
game is S∗ = {u∗1, u∗2(u∗1)}, where
u∗1 =
−1
1− 2θ2
(
ΔBP¯1 − θB2 P¯2
)
x ,
u∗2(u∗1) = −B2 P¯2x− θu∗1 .
Note that the by assumption W = 12x
(P1+P2)x > 0, for all x = 0. Furthermore, W˙ < 0,
for all x = 0, are implied by (4.9). It follows that the pair of strategies S∗ is admissible.
Remark 19. In [91] a stochastic linear-quadratic differential game with B1 = B2 = I has
been considered. The above results are consistent with [91]. 
Remark 20. When θ = 0, the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium strategies and the feed-
back Nash equilibrium strategies coincide, i.e. in this case the order in which the players
act is irrelevant to the corresponding outcomes [91, 92]. 
To conclude this section deﬁne the notions of α-admissible strategies and α-Stackelberg
equilibrium solutions, similarly to what has been done in Chapter 3.
Deﬁnition 24. The pair of strategies S = {u1, u2(u1)} is said to be α-admissible for the
non-cooperative Stackelberg differential game if the zero equilibrium of the system (4.1)
in closed-loop with S is (locally) asymptotically stable and σ(Acl + αI) ⊂ C−, where Acl
is the matrix describing the linearisation of the closed-loop system around the origin.
120 4.3 Algebraic P¯ Matrix Stackelberg Solution
Deﬁnition 25. Admissible strategies u∗1 and u∗2(u∗1) are said to be α-Stackelberg equilib-
rium strategies for player 1 and 2, respectively, of the Stackelberg differential game with
dynamics (4.1) and cost functionals (4.2) and (4.3), with player 1 as leader and player 2 as
follower, if for the pair of strategies S∗ = {u∗1, u∗2(u∗1)} there exists a non-negative constant
x0,α, parametrised with respect to x(0) = x0, and α > 0 such that
J1(x0, u
∗
1, u
∗
2(u
∗
1)) ≤ J1(x0, u1, u∗2(u1)) + x0,α ,
J2(x0, u
∗
1, u
∗
2(u
∗
1)) ≤ J2(x0, u∗1, u2(u∗1)) + x0,α ,
for all α-admissible strategy pairs S1 = {u1, u∗2(u1)} and S2 = {u∗1, u2(u∗1)}, with u1 = u∗1
and u2(u∗1) = u∗2(u∗1).
A method for obtaining approximate solutions to the Stackelberg differential game is
presented in what follows. The approach is similar in spirit to the approximate dynamic
solution using a shared dynamic extension and the notion of algebraic P¯ matrix solutions
introduced in Section 3.6.2 for Nash differential games
4.3 Algebraic P¯ Matrix Stackelberg Solution
The method for obtaining approximate solutions to the Stackelberg differential game in
Problem 9 relies on the notion of algebraic P¯ matrix Stackelberg solution, which is deﬁned,
similarly to the algebraic P¯ matrix solution introduced in Deﬁnition 15, in this section.
Deﬁnition 26. Consider the system (4.1), the cost functionals (4.2) and (4.3) and the re-
sulting Stackelberg differential game, with player 1 as leader and player 2 as follower.
Let Σ1(x) : Rn → Rn×n and Σ2(x) : Rn → Rn×n be matrix-valued functions satisfying
Σi(x) > 0, for all x ∈ Rn\{0}, andΣi(0) = Σ¯i, for i = 1, 2. The C1 matrix-valued functions
Pi : R
n → Rn×n, Pi(x) = Pi(x), i = 1, 2, are said to be an X -algebraic P¯ matrix solution1
of the equations (4.7), if the following conditions are satisﬁed.
1Provided the set X contains the origin.
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i) For all x ∈ X
P1(x)F (x) + F (x)
P1(x) +Q1(x)− 1
1− 2θ2
∥∥∥P1(x)Δg(x)− θP2(x)g2(x)∥∥∥2
− 2P1(x)g2(x)g2(x)P2(x) + Σ1(x) = 0 ,
(4.10)
and
P2(x)F (x) + F (x)
P2(x) +Q2(x)− 1
(1− 2θ2)2
∥∥∥(1− θ2)P2(x)g2(x)− θP1(x)Δg(x)∥∥∥2
+
2
1 + 2θ2
(
θP2(x)g2(x)g2(x)P2(x)
)
− 1
1 + 2θ2
(
P2(x)g1(x)Δg(x)
P1(x)
)
− 1
1 + 2θ2
(
P1(x)Δg(x)g1(x)
P2(x)
)
+Σ2(x) = 0 .
(4.11)
ii) P1(0) = P¯1 and P2(0) = P¯2, where P¯1 and P¯2 are symmetric matrices, such that
P¯1 + P¯2 > 0, and satisfy the coupled AREs
P¯1A+A
P¯1 + Q¯1 − P¯1B2B2 − P¯2B2B2 P¯2
− 1
1− 2θ2 (P¯1ΔB − θP¯2B2)(Δ

BP¯1 − θB2 P¯2) + Σ¯1 = 0 ,
P¯2A+A
P¯2 + Q¯2 +
1
1− 2θ2
(
2θP¯2B2B

2 P¯2 − P¯1ΔBB1 P¯2− P¯2B1ΔBP¯1
)
− 1
(1− 2θ2)2
(
(1− θ2)P¯2B2 − θP¯1ΔB)((1− θ2)B2 − θΔBP¯1
)
+ Σ¯2 = 0 .
(4.12)
If X = Rn, P1(x) and P2(x) are said to be an algebraic P¯ matrix Stackelberg solution.
In what follows it assumed that algebraic P¯ matrix Stackelberg solutions exist.
4.4 Approximate Solutions Using a Shared Dynamic Extension
Consider the Stackelberg differential game in Problem 9. Similar to what has been done in
Section 3.6.2 a modiﬁed problem which approximates the differential game is formulated
by introducing a dynamic extension, ξ(t), which is shared by the two players. The notion
of algebraic P¯ matrix Stackelberg solutions is used to deﬁne, in the extended state-space,
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functions which satisfy Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs partial differential inequalities. These
functions functions are used to design dynamic feedback strategies that constitute (lo-
cal) α-Stackelberg equilibrium strategies.
In what follows we consider dynamic feedback strategies of the form
u1 = β1(x, ξ) , u2 = β2(x, ξ, β1(x, ξ)) , ξ˙ = τ(x, ξ) , (4.13)
with ξ(t) ∈ Rν , for some ν > 0, where τ , β1 and β2 are smooth mappings with τ(0, 0) = 0,
β1(0, 0) = 0 and β2(0, 0, 0) = 0.
Deﬁnition 27. The pair of dynamic feedback strategies S = {u1, u2(u1), ξ˙} is said to be
admissible (α-admissible) if the zero equilibrium of the closed-loop system (4.1)-(4.13) is
(locally) asymptotically stable (σ(Acl + αI) ⊂ C−, where Acl is the matrix describing the
linearisation of (3.1)-(3.26) around the origin).
Problem 10. Consider the system (4.1) and the cost functionals of the leader and the
follower, i.e. (4.2) and (4.3). The approximate dynamic Stackelberg differential game consists in
determining a pair of dynamic feedback strategies S = {u1, u2(u1), ξ˙} of the form (4.13),
with ξ(t) ∈ Rn, and non-negative functions c1 : Rn × Rn → R and c2 : Rn × Rn → R,
such that, for any x(0), ξ(0) and for any admissible S1 = {u1, β2(u1), ξ˙}, with u1 = β1,
and S2 = {β1, u2(β1), ξ˙}, with u2 = β2,
J˜1(x(0), β1, β2(β1)) ≤ J˜1(x(0), u1, β2(u1)) ,
J˜2(x(0), β1, β2(β1)) ≤ J˜2(x(0), β1, u2(β1)) ,
where the modiﬁed cost functionals Jˆ1 and Jˆ2 are given by
J˜i 
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
qi(x(t)) + 2θu1(t)
u2(t) + ‖ui(t)‖2 + ci(x(t), ξ(t))
)
dt , (4.14)
for i = 1, 2.
Suppose P1(x) and P2(x) constitute an algebraic P¯ matrix Stackelberg solution and deﬁne
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the functions
V1(x, ξ) =
1
2x
P1(ξ)x+ 12‖x− ξ‖2R1 ,
V2(x, ξ) =
1
2x
P2(ξ)x+ 12‖x− ξ‖2R2 ,
(4.15)
where R1 ∈ Rn×n and R2 ∈ Rn×n are symmetric and positive-deﬁnite matrices, i.e. R1 =
R1 > 0 and R2 = R2 > 0.
Notation similar to that introduced in Chapter 3 is used here, and is stated at this
stage for clarity. LetΦ1(x) ∈ Rn×n be such that x(P1(x)−P1(ξ)) = (x−ξ)Φ1(x, ξ) and
similarly let Φ2(x) ∈ Rn×n be such that x(P2(x) − P2(ξ)) = (x − ξ)Φ2(x, ξ). Further-
more let Ψ1(x, ξ) and Ψ2(x, ξ) denote the Jacobian matrices, with respect to ξ, of 12P1(ξ)x
and 12P2(ξ)x, respectively. The next statement provides a method for constructing a solu-
tion for Problem 10.
Theorem 8. Consider the system (4.1) and the cost functionals (4.2) and (4.3) with θ ∈(−12 , 12). Let P1(x) and P2(x) be an algebraic P¯ matrix Stackelberg solution, satisfying Σ¯1 > 0
and Σ¯2 > 0, and let R1 and R2 be such that
Ri(R1 +R2) + (R1 +R2)Ri ≥ 0 , (4.16)
for i = 1, 2. Then there exist k¯ ≥ 0 and a neighbourhood of the origin Ω ⊂ Rn × Rn such
that, for all k ≥ k¯, the functions (4.15) solve the system of partial differential inequalities
HJ 1 =∂V1
∂x
f(x) +
1
2
q1(x) +
∂V1
∂ξ
ξ˙ − ∂V1
x
g2(x)g2(x)
∂V2
∂x

− 1
2
1
1− 2θ2
∥∥∥∂V1
∂x
Δg(x)− θ∂V2
∂x
g2(x)
∥∥∥2 ≤ 0 ,
(4.17)
and
HJ 2 =∂V2
∂x
f(x) +
1
2
q2(x) +
1
1− 2θ2 θ
∂V2
∂x
g2(x)g2(x)
∂V2
∂x

− 1
1− 2θ2
∂V2
∂x
g1(x)Δg(x)
∂V1
∂x

+
∂V2
∂ξ
ξ˙ − 1
2
1
(1− 2θ2)2
∥∥∥(1− θ2)∂V2
∂x
g2(x)− θ∂V1
∂x
Δg(x)
∥∥∥2 ≤ 0 ,
(4.18)
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with ξ˙ = −k
(
∂V1
∂ξ
+
∂V2
∂ξ
)
and for all (x, ξ) ∈ Ω. Furthermore, the dynamical system
u1 =− Δg(x)

1− 2θ2
(
P1(x)x+ (R1 − Φ1(x, ξ))(x− ξ)
)
+
θg2(x)

1− 2θ2
(
P2(x)x+ (R2 − Φ2(x, ξ))(x− ξ)
)
,
u2(u1) =− g2(x)
(
P2(x)x+ (R2 − Φ2(x, ξ))(x− ξ)
) − θu1 ,
ξ˙ = −k
(
∂V1
∂ξ
+
∂V2
∂ξ
)
,
(4.19)
is such that the set of dynamic feedback strategies S = {u1, u2(u1), ξ˙} is admissible and
solves Problem 10, with c1(x, ξ) = −2HJ 1(x, ξ) and c2(x, ξ) = −2HJ 2(x, ξ). Finally,
there exists a neighbourhood of the origin in which the set of dynamic feedback strategies
S = {u1, u2(u1), ξ˙} constitutes an α-Stackelberg equilibrium solution of Problem 9 for all
α > 0. 
Proof: The proof consists of three parts. First it is shown that the functions (4.15) satisfy
the partial differential inequalities (4.17) and (4.18). It is then demonstrated that the zero-
equilibrium of the closed-loop system (4.1)-(4.19) is (locally) asymptotically stable and
solves Problem 10. The ﬁnal part of the claim is then proved exploiting Deﬁnitions 24
and 25.
The partial derivatives of the functions deﬁned in (4.15) with respect to x and ξ are
∂V1
∂x
= xP1(x) + (x− ξ)(R1 − Φ1(x, ξ)) ,
∂V1
∂ξ
= xΨ1(x, ξ)− (x− ξ)R1 ,
∂V2
∂x
= xP2(x) + (x− ξ)(R2 − Φ2(x, ξ)) ,
∂V2
∂ξ
= xΨ2(x, ξ)− (x− ξ)R2 .
Let Υ1 = Δg (R1 − Φ1) − θg2(R2 − Φ2). Using the properties of algebraic P¯ Stackelberg
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solutions, the inequality (4.17) can be written as a quadratic form
−
[
x (x− ξ)
]
(M1 + kD1)
⎡
⎢⎣ x
(x− ξ)
⎤
⎥⎦ ≤ 0 . (4.20)
The matrix M1 is given by
M1 =
⎡
⎢⎣
1
2Σ1 Γ
1
1
Γ11 Γ
1
2
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
where
Γ11 =
1
2
(
(P2g2g

2 − F)(R1 − Φ1) + P1g2g2 (R2 − Φ2) +
1
1− 2θ2 (P1Δg − θP2g2)Υ1
)
,
and Γ12 = (R1 − Φ1g2g2 (R2 − Φ2) + 12 11−2θ2Υ1 Υ1 , whereas the matrix D1 is given by
D1(x, ξ) =
⎡
⎢⎣ Λ111 Λ112
Λ112

Λ122
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
where Λ111 = Ψ1(Ψ1+Ψ2)
+(Ψ1+Ψ2)Ψ1 , Λ112 = −Ψ1(R1+R2)−(Ψ1+Ψ2)R1 and Λ122 =
R1(R1 +R2) + (R1 +R2)R1. Since Ψ1(0, ξ) = 0 and Ψ2(0, ξ) = 0 it follows that D1
∣∣
(0,ξ)
=
diag{0 ,Λ122}, namely the inequalities (4.16), i = 1, 2, are such that D1
∣∣
(0,ξ)
is positive
semideﬁnite. Furthermore, Z1 = [I , 0] spans the kernel of D1
∣∣
(0,ξ)
and Z1 M1
∣∣
(0,0)
Z1 =
Σ¯1 > 0 and by continuity this product is positive deﬁnite in a neighbourhood of the
origin. By [85] it follows that there exists k¯1 > 0 and a non-empty set Ω1 containing the
origin such that the inequality (4.17) is satisﬁed for all k > k¯1 and (x, ξ) ∈ Ω1.
Similary, the second inequality (4.18) can be written as
−
[
x (x− ξ)
]
(M2 + kD2)
⎡
⎢⎣ x
(x− ξ)
⎤
⎥⎦ ≤ 0 , (4.21)
where
M2 =
⎡
⎢⎣
1
2Σ2 Γ
2
1
Γ21 Γ
2
2
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
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with
Γ21 =
1
2
(
1
1− 2θ2 (P1Δgg

1 − 2θP2g2g2 )− F
)
(R2 − Φ2)
+
1
2
(
1
1− 2θ2P2g1Δ

g (R1 − Φ1) + Υ2 Υ2
)
,
and
Γ22 =
1
2
Υ2 Υ2 + (R2 − Φ1 )
( 1
1− 2θ2 g1Δ

g (R1 − Φ1)− g2g2 (R1 − Φ2)
)
,
where Υ2 = 11−2θ2
(
(1− θ2)g2(R2 − Φ2)− θΔg (R1 − Φ1 )
)
, and
D2(x, ξ) =
⎡
⎢⎣ Λ211 Λ212
Λ212

Λ222
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
with Λ211 = Ψ2(Ψ1 + Ψ2)
 + (Ψ1 + Ψ2)Ψ2 , Λ212 = −Ψ2(R1 + R2) − (Ψ1 + Ψ2)R2 and
Λ222 = R2(R1 +R2) + (R1 +R2)R2. As with D1(x, ξ), D2
∣∣
(0,ξ)
= diag{0 ,Λ122}, Z2 = [I, 0]
spans the kernel of D2
∣∣
(0,ξ)
and Z2 M2
∣∣
(0,0
Z2 = Σ¯2 > 0. By continuity Z2 M2
∣∣
(0,0)
Z2 > 0
in a neighbourhood of the origin, which implies that there exists k¯2 > 0 and a set Ω2
containing the origin such that for all k ≥ k¯2 and all (x, ξ) ∈ Ω2 the inequality (4.18) is
satisﬁed.
Let k¯ = max{k¯1, k¯2} and Ω = Ω1 ∩ Ω2. The above implies that the inequalities
(4.17) and (4.18) are satisﬁed for all k ≥ k¯ and all (x, ξ) ∈ Ω, proving the ﬁrst part of the
statement.
Let W = V1 + λV2 for some λ > 0 and note that (at least in a neighbourhood of the
origin) W > 0, for all (x, ξ) = 0, by deﬁnition of algebraic P¯ matrix Stackelberg solutions. It
follows from the inequalities (4.17) and (4.18) that, for all (x, ξ) ∈ Ω,
W˙ ≤ −1
2
(
q1(x) + λq2(x)
)
− 1
2
[
Ξ1 Ξ2
]⎡⎢⎣ 1 −(1 + λ)θ
−(1 + λ)θ λ
⎤
⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎣ Ξ1
Ξ2
⎤
⎥⎦ , (4.22)
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where
Ξ1 =
1
1− 2θ2
(
Δg
∂V1
∂x
− θg2
∂V2
∂x
)
and
Ξ2 =
θ
1− 2θ2Δ

g
∂V1
∂x
− (1 + θ)g2
∂V2
∂x
.
Thus, for all (x, ξ) ∈ Ω \ {0}, W˙ ≤ 0 by Assumption 8. By standard Lyapunov arguments
and by Lasalle’s invariance principle, it follows that lim
t→∞x(t) = 0. Furthermore, local
asymptotic stability of the zero equilibrium of the system ξ˙ = −k
(
∂V1
∂x

+
∂V2
∂x
)∣∣∣∣
x=0
follows from (4.16). Consequently, local asymptotic stability of the zero equilibrium,
i.e. (x, ξ) = (0, 0) follows by standard arguments on interconnected systems. As a
result the dynamic feedback strategies solve Problem 10 with c1(x, ξ) = −2HJ 1 and
c2(x, ξ) = −2HJ 2. Finally, similarly to what has been shown in Chapter 3, for any α-
admissible control strategy the integrals
∫∞
0 ci(x(t), ξ(t))dt, i = 1, 2 are bounded in a
neighbourhood Ω¯, which may depend on α, of the origin. It follows that S is an α-
Stackelberg equilibrium solution for Problem 9. 
4.5 Simulations
In this section a numerical example illustrating the theory is presented. Consider the
dynamical system
x˙ =
⎡
⎢⎣ (1 + x22) 2
x1x2
1 + x22
0 1
⎤
⎥⎦ (u1 + u2) , (4.23)
and suppose player 1 is the leader and player 2 is the follower, seeking to minimise the
cost functionals (4.2) and (4.3), respectively, where the running costs are given by
q1(x) = a1
x21
1 + x22
+ a2x
2
2 ,
q2(x) = b1
x21
1 + x22
+ b2x
2
2 ,
with ai ≥ 0 and bi ≥ 0, for i = 1, 2. Suppose a1 = 18, a2 = 8, b1 = 9, b2 = 4 and θ = 0.5.
128 4.5 Simulations
The matrix-valued functions
P1(x) = diag
(
α1
(1 + x22)
2
, α2(1 + c1x
2
1 + c2x
2
2)
)
,
and
P2(x) = diag
(
β1
(1 + x22)
2
, β2(1 + c3x
2
1 + c4x
2
2)
)
,
with ci ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 4, α1β1 ≥ max
{
1
2a1, β
2
1 +
1
2b1
}
and α2β2 ≥ max
{
1
2a2, β
2
2 +
1
2b2
}
,
β1 ≤ α1 and β2 ≤ α2, constitute an algebraic P¯ matrix Stackelberg solution, with Σ1(x) > 0
and Σ2(x) > 0, for the differential game. Let α1 = 4.5, α2 = 3, β1 = 2.5, β2 = 2, ci = 0,
i = 1, . . . , 4 and let ud1 and u
d
2(u
d
1) denote
2 the corresponding dynamic feedback strategies
given by (4.19).
By performing the change of coordinates xˆ1 = x1(1+x2)2 and xˆ2 = x2, the problem
can be transformed into a linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game, with A = 0,
B1 = B2 = I , Q¯1 = diag (18, 8) and Q¯2 = diag (9, 4), for which Pˆ1 = diag (4, 2) and
Pˆ2 = diag (2, 2) solve the coupled AREs (4.9). It follows that the Stackelberg equilibrium
strategies (in the original coordinates) are
u∗1 = −
[
6x1
1 + x22
, 2x2
]
,
u∗2(u∗1) = −
[
2
x1
1 + x22
, 2x2
]
− θu∗1 ,
(4.24)
whereas the linear-quadratic approximation of the problem yields the strategies
ulq1 = − [6x1, 2x2] ,
ulq2 (u
lq
1 ) = − [2x1, 2x2] − θulq1 .
(4.25)
Simulations have been run for the system with different combinations of the three control
strategies for 25 initial conditions, x0 = [x1,0, x2,0]. These initial conditions are such that
2For clarity of presentation the dynamics of ξ is not explicitly stated in the dynamic strategies, i.e. ud1 is
used to denote the tuple (ud1, ξ˙) and similarly ud2(u1) denotes (ud2(u1), ξ˙).
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they form a uniform square grid in the positive orthant, with x1,0 and x2,0 ranging from
0 to 4. Different values of the parameters k, R1, R2 and ξ(0) have been selected for the
different initial conditions.
To compare the dynamic strategies resulting from (4.19) with the linear strategies
(4.25) consider the quantities
C1(x0) =
J1(u
d
1, u
∗
2(u
d
1))− J1(ul1, u∗2(ulq1 )
|J1(u∗1, u∗2(u∗1))|
, if J1(u∗1, u
∗
2(u
∗
1)) = 0 ,
C2(x0) =
J2(u
d
1, u
∗
2(u
d
1))− J2(ul1, u∗2(ulq1 )
|J2(u∗1, u∗2(u∗1))|
, if J2(u∗1, u
∗
2(u
∗
1)) = 0 .
(4.26)
Since J1(u∗1, u∗2(u∗1)) ≤ J1(u•1, u∗2(u•1)) and J2(u∗1, u∗2(u∗1)) ≤ J2(u∗1, u•2(u∗1)), (4.26) quantiﬁes
the loss suffered by each player when either of the players deviate from its Stackelberg
strategy to the dynamic or linear strategy. More precisely, C1(x0) < 0 indicates that
player 1 loses less by deviating from u∗1 to ud1 than it does by deviating from u∗1 to u
lq
1 .
Similarly C2(x0) < 0 indicates that player 2 loses less by deviating from u∗2(u∗1) to ud1(u∗1)
than it does by deviating from u∗2(u∗1) to u
lq
2 (u
∗
1).
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the quantities C1(x0) and C2(x0), respectively, for the
different initial conditions. Close to the origin and along the line x2,0 = 0 the linear
strategies perform better than the dynamic ones. However, both C1(x0) and C2(x0) are
small in this region. Further from the origin and the x2,0 = 0 line, along which (4.25)
and (4.24) are identical, C1(x0) < 0 and C2(x0) < 0. These observations indicate that the
dynamic strategies offer a good approximation of the Stackelberg equilibrium strategies
in such a region. In Figures 4.1 and 4.2 dark shades indicate small values ofCi, for i = 1, 2,
i.e. the dynamic strategies perform better than the linear strategies for player i, whereas
light shades indicate the opposite.
Figure 4.3 shows the trajectories of the state x for the three different strategy pairs,
namely the dynamic strategies Sd = {ud1, ud2(ud1)} (solid line), the linear strategies S l =
{ulq1 , ulq2 (ulq1 )} (dashed line) and the Stackelberg equilibrium strategies Ss = {u∗1, u∗2(u∗1)}
(dotted line) for the initial condition x0 = [4, 4], which is indicated by solid dots in
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Figures 4.1 and 4.2. In Figure 4.3 the square and circular markers denote the initial and
the ﬁnal value of the state, respectively. Table 4.5 shows the outcomes J1 and J2 corre-
sponding to the strategies Ss, S l and Sd for the same initial condition. Note that both
outcomes corresponding to the players adhering to the dynamic strategies are closer to
the Stackelberg equilibrium outcomes than those corresponding to the players adopting
the linear strategies. Furthermore, the trajectory of the state corresponding to the players
adopting the dynamic strategies is signiﬁcantly closer to the trajectory corresponding to
the players adhering to the Stackelberg equilibrium strategies than the trajectory result-
ing from the players adopting the linear strategies. Finally note that both C1(x0) < 0 and
C2(x0) < 0 for this initial condition. These observations indicate that for the initial condi-
tion x0 = [4, 4] the dynamic strategies provide a better approximation of the Stackelberg
equilibrium solution than the linear strategies do.
Ss S l Sd
J1 16.1100 16.4576 16.0721
J2 16.0546 16.2284 16.0354
Table 4.1: The outcomes J1 and J2 corresponding to different strategies for the initial condition
x0 = [4, 4].
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Figure 4.3: The trajectories of the state x corresponding to the control strategies Sd (solid line),
Sl (dashed line) and Ss (dotted line). The square and circular markers denote the initial and
ﬁnal values of the state, respectively.
4.6 Conclusion
Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium solutions for a class of nonlinear nonzero-sum differ-
ential games with two players have been studied. The notion of α-Stackelberg equilib-
ria and algebraic P¯ matrix Stackelberg solution have been introduced. Similarly to what
has been done in Section 3.6, these notions are used to construct a method for design-
ing dynamic feedback strategies that satisfy partial differential inequalities in place of
the partial differential equations associated with the differential game. These strategies
constitute local α-Stackelberg equilibrium solutions for such games. The theory is illus-
trated by a simple numerical example for which the Stackelberg equilibrium strategies
are known and it is demonstrated that the dynamic approximate solution yields a better
approximation than the linear-quadratic approximation of the problem.
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Chapter 5
Optimal Monitoring
5.1 Introduction
Multi-agent systems have a wide range of applications, such as monitoring and surveil-
lance for search and rescue missions. In this chapter we consider the problem of contin-
uously monitoring a region using a team of mobile agents equipped with sensors. These
could, for example, be UAVs equipped with cameras. It is also shown that a game theo-
retic framework is useful for the formulation of problems involving multi-agent systems,
as discussed in Section 5.3.
The problem of continuously monitoring a region using a team of agents is for-
mulated as a differential game. One of the advantages of this problem formulation lies
in that no assumptions are made on the agents, thus allowing for heterogeneous agents,
in contrast to other approaches in which the agents are assumed to be homogeneous.
The differential games considered in this chapter are somewhat different in nature to
the ones studied in Chapter 3. Therefore, the framework provided by differential game
theory, considered in Chapters 2 and 3, is used to formulate the problem, before an ad
hoc solution to the differential game is found. More speciﬁcally, the differential game is
approximated as a sequence of optimal control problems. This approach is somewhat
similar to what is done in model predictive control (MPC), see for example [93, 94].
The solution of each optimal control problem relies on the solution of its cor-
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responding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDE. When the monitoring is performed by one
agent with single-integrator dynamics, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDEs associated
with the optimal control problems can be solved analytically. However, when the mon-
itoring task is performed by more than one agent this is not the case, i.e. closed-form
solutions to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDE are not available, and it is necessary to
solve the optimal control problems approximately, even when the agents have simple,
single-integrator dynamics. In this chapter approximate solutions are found for the case
in which there are N ≥ 1 agents. The method of obtaining approximate solutions has
been discussed in [63] and is the precursor to the methods developed for differential
games in Chapter 3. It relies on the use of dynamic feedback and an algebraic P¯ solu-
tion. To solve the problem of monitoring a region a general form for algebraic P¯ matrix
solution1 is presented, assuming the agents have single-integrator dynamics, and used to
obtain approximate solutions for each optimal control problem. Furthermore, the prob-
lem of ensuring no collisions between agents occur is considered directly in the problem
formulation.
Real UAVs do not satisfy single-integrator dynamics. A more accurate model of
UAV dynamics is given by a unicycle model, see for example [95, 96]. The proposed
method of optimal monitoring is general and could be used with different dynamics.
However, for the unicycle case, a positive deﬁnite solution to the algebraic Riccati equa-
tions associated with the problem does not exist. Therefore the solution of the optimal
control problem solved assuming single-integrator dynamics is used as a trajectory plan
and a method of ensuring the UAVs with unicycle dynamics track the trajectories is pro-
posed.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. A literature review on this
topic is given in Section 5.2, before focusing on approaches that make us of the framework
provided by game theory. The monitoring problem is then formulated as a differential
game and approximated as a sequence of inﬁnite-horizon optimal control problems in
1Note that we use the terminology algebraic P¯ matrix solution instead of algebraic P¯ solution as in [63]. This
is because a deﬁnition of such a solution, which involves matrix-valued mappings, different from that used
in [63] is used herein.
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Section 5.4. The problem of ensuring collision avoidance is included in the formulation
of each optimal control problem at this stage. To motivate the problem formulation a
special case in which one agent monitors a one dimensional segment is considered in
Section 5.5. Returning to the general problem, a method for solving each of the optimal
control problems approximately, based on the the results presented in [63], is presented in
Section 5.6. The case in which the agents have more general dynamics is then considered
in Section 5.7. Simulations illustrating the results of Sections 5.6 and 5.7 are presented in
Section 5.8. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in Section 5.9.
5.2 Multi-Agent Systems and Monitoring Tasks
Consider the problem of continuously monitoring a region using a team of autonomous
agents equipped with sensors, similar to what has been considered in [21, 87, 97]. The
team of agents could, for example, be unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with on-board
cameras. The task of the agents is to cooperatively monitor an area. The data gathered by
the agents could provide useful information increasing both efﬁciency and safety during
a search and rescue mission.
Various approaches for solving problems of coverage and monitoring have been
studied in the literature. Most of the problems that have already been studied consider
either the case in which a large number of agents survey a relatively small area, so that
the problem becomes one of determining the optimal static sensor locations, or the case
in which a few agents search a large area more or less randomly. In scenarios where the
region to be monitored is relatively small and there exists static sensor conﬁgurations
from which the entire region can be observed, the problem can be solved using localisa-
tional optimisation, where the optimal sensor placement achieving maximum coverage is
sought [21,98]. When the region is large, on the other hand, dynamic sensors are needed
to cover the entire area.
The problem which we consider deals with the situation in which there does not
necessarily exist a static conﬁguration that guarantees full coverage of the region, which
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is also referred to as the search space, and the number of agents is sufﬁciently large for a
random approach to result in sub-optimal performance. It is then necessary to determine
the optimal trajectories of the agents while ensuring collision avoidance and respecting
constraints imposed by the agent dynamics. Similar problems have been studied in the
literature, some of which are brought to light here.
The authors of [99] solve the problem of determining the best strategies to search
an area using a game theoretic approach based on Nash equilibria. In particular, the
search space is divided into identical hexagonal cells, each of which is associated with
an uncertainty level, which together form an uncertainty map over the search space. An
agent can either stay in its current cell or move to one of the neighbouring cells. The
uncertainty level of a cell is reduced when an agent spends time in it and the aim is to
minimise the uncertainty across the entire search space. Consequently the future actions
of the agents are determined to maximise their uncertainty reduction, i.e. the agents seek
to maximise their individual payoffs. These are expressed by means of search effective-
ness matrices which contain all possible payoffs an agent can obtain when moving from
one cell to another and a strategy is then found by looking for the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium of the matrix game deﬁned by the search effectiveness matrices of all the
participating agents. For the case in which there are two agents this becomes a sequential
bimatrix games for which solutions and simulations have been presented in [99].
In [87,88] a similar problem is solved by specifying a desired coverage level across
a particular planar region and a gradient-type kinematic control is developed to ensure
coverage and guarantee collision-avoidance between agents. In particular the authors
consider an unknown domain and deﬁne a minimum level of effective coverage. They
then deﬁne an effective coverage function which quantiﬁes how well each point of the
search space has been covered over the search period. With the aim being to guarantee
that the minimum effective coverage is reached across the entire search space, an error
function satisfying certain conditions is deﬁned and used to formulate a Lyapunov-like
function which guarantees the convergence of a proposed control law. After discussing
the need for a symmetry-breaking controller, the method is extended to include collision
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avoidance.
Various other approaches are present in the literature. Some methods and ex-
amples have been presented in [100], which includes a discussion of consensus or dis-
tributed agreement. Another topic that has received a fair amount of attention recently
is known as simultaneous localisation and mapping (SLAM), see for example [101, 102]
and references therein.
Note that in [87, 88] there is no guarantee of optimality. In addition, some of the
methods are fairly computationally expensive and result in a nonuniform coverage across
the search space. Additionally, most of the coverage problems considered in the literature
assume that the agents are homogeneous. In many scenarios the use of heterogeneous
agents may be useful. It may, for example, be of interest to make use of both aerial and
ground vehicles. In the case of a system of systems, it is evident that the individual
systems are not, generally speaking, homogeneous. Thus, there is still room for further
developments and different ways of addressing the problem.
Although our work is motivated by its application to search and rescue missions,
several possible applications exist. In essence the problem is one of using a team of
mobile sensors (which may be heterogeneous) to observe or explore some environment.
In [103] drones with cameras are used for polar exploration. Similar systems can be used
for structural or habitat monitoring [104, 105]. The latter could be of use for conserva-
tional projects. By monitoring certain regions useful information regarding an area and
its biodiversity can be used to protect, possibly endangered, wildlife as discussed in [105],
where the term conservational drones is used to describe the “agents”. Thus, continuously
monitoring an area, in addition to being theoretically interesting, is a problem that could
have a signiﬁcant social impact.
5.3 Multi-Agent problems Formulated as Differential Games
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4 differential games and their solutions in terms of feedback Nash
and Stackelberg equilibria have been considered. In Section 3.8.3 the multi-agent collision
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avoidance problem is posed as a differential game and approximate solutions are obtained
using the theory developed in Section 3.6. Thus, it has already been seen that differential
games may be useful when formulating problems involving several agents. In this sec-
tion the application of game theoretic tools to problems involving multi-agent systems
(or a system of systems) is discussed further.
Recall that differential games is the study of problems in which there are several
players each attempting to optimise its own cost functional and in the case of nonzero-
sum differential games the cost functionals may be such that the players are either col-
laborating or competing. Typically multi-agent systems (or systems of systems) are such
that agents (or individual systems) solve a task collaboratively, although there may also
be some competition between agents as seen in [106]. Simply replacing the word “agent”
with “player” in the the term multi-agent systems, it appears natural that the differential
game framework may be well-suited to deal with problems involving multi-agent sys-
tems. Namely, each agent in a multi-agent system can be considered as a player and their
tasks can be described by suitable cost functionals which they seek to optimise subject to
dynamics which describe their collective behaviour. The multi-agent collision avoidance
problem in Section 3.8.3 is one example of this.
There are other examples available in the literature where game theoretical ap-
proaches have been taken to solve problems involving multi-agent systems. Two exam-
ples of this, which have already been mentioned, are the problems considered in [106]
and [99]. In [106] a team of agents pursue a team of evaders in an unknown environ-
ment and the problem is formulated as a probabilistic pursuit-evasion game, whereas
in [99] the problem of covering an unknown region is formulated as a sequence of bima-
trix games. There are several other examples of problems involving a multi-agent system
or a system of systems that suggest that the framework provided by differential games
may provide a suitable way of formulating and solving the problems. In [25] the problem
of detecting a threat in an unknown environment, known as security monitoring is consid-
ered. The task is performed by three systems, namely a master robot, a sensor network
and a swarm of robots, which together form a system of systems. These heterogeneous
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systems seek to achieve a common goal, however the requirements for each system are
not identical and may be conﬂicting. The objectives of each system are described by ap-
propriate cost functionals and a linear combination of these is considered as an overall
cost functional, resulting in a (static) optimisation problem. However, the nature of the
problem suggests that an alternative approach may be possible using the tools provided
by a game theoretical framework. Similarly, in [107] the problem of planning the paths of
mobile robots in an environment with sensor nodes subject to different objectives, such
as minimising power consumption and maximising data collection, is studied. The prob-
lem is solved using a fuzzy logic approach to solve discrete decision problems, referred to
as multi-criteria decision making. An alternative (continuous-time) problem formulation
could be possible by posing the problem as a differential game.
5.4 Problem Formulation
We now return our focus to the problem of optimally monitoring a region using a team
of agents.
Consider the problem of monitoring a region, Ω ⊂ Rn, where n > 0, using N agents,
each equipped with a sensor. Let qi(t) ∈ Rn denote the position of agent i at time t
and suppose its sensor can be modeled by a function, Si(qi(t), q) ≥ 0, where q ∈ Ω and
i = 1, . . . , N . In what follows, unless otherwise stated, it is assumed that n = 2, i.e. the
region to be monitored is two dimensional. The coverage map
J(q, T ) =
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
Si(qi(t)− q)dt , (5.1)
quantiﬁes the coverage level of a point q ∈ Ω after the agents have been monitoring the
area over the period [0, T ] along qi(t), i = 1, . . . , N . This function is equivalent to the
coverage function considered in [87, 88].
Assumption 9. The sensor model of agent i is locally quadratic, i.e.
S(qi − q) = Ai − (qi − q)Q¯i(qi − q) + h.o.t ,
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where q ∈ Ω, Ai > 0 and the matrix Q¯i ∈ R2×2 is positive deﬁnite. In broad terms
this implies that the coverage of agent i has a maximum at the agent’s position, qi, and
exhibits a quadratic decay close to this point.
In what follows it is assumed that Assumption 9 is satisﬁed for i = 1, . . . , N , i.e. all agents
are equipped with sensors with models that are at least locally quadratic. Note, however,
that the sensor models Si(qi, q) need not be identical for all i = 1, . . . , N . This allows for
the use of heterogeneous agents, differently from [87,88].
Remark 21. Figure 5.1 shows the coverage provided by three different sensor models
satisfying Assumption 9 for an agent positioned at qi = [0, 0]. In particular Figure 5.1
(a) shows a locally quadratic model given by
S1(qi − q) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1
24
(‖qi − q‖2 − 4) if ‖qi − q‖ ≥ 2 ,
0 otherwise ,
(5.2)
similar to what has been used in [87,88], whereas (b) shows an exponential sensor model
as used in [41], i.e.
S2(qi − q) = e−0.8(qi(t)−q)2 , (5.3)
and (c) shows a model given by
S3(qi − q) = 1− 5‖q1 − q‖
2
1 + 5‖q1 − q‖2 . (5.4)
In Figure 5.1 the plots of the sensor models have been normalised so that the peak cover-
age is 1 for all three cases (dark colours indicate a low level of coverage). 
Note that S1(qi − q) has compact support, whereas the other two models do not.
Intuitively, monitoring the region Ω can be achieved by continuously attempting
to maximise the coverage of the points q ∈ Ω where the coverage is low. With this in
mind, virtual players, q˜i, i = 1, . . . , N , with relatively fast dynamics are introduced. One
virtual player is introduced for each agent and the idea behind this is that the virtual
players should “identify” points where the coverage is low. It is assumed that the agents
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Figure 5.1: Three sensor models (normalised such that the peak value is 1) satisfying Assump-
tion 9: (a) S1(q), (b) S2(q) and (c) S3(q).
satisfy the single-integrator dynamics
q˙i = ui , (5.5)
with qi(t) ∈ R2 the state of agent i and ui(t) ∈ R2 the control action of agent i. Similarly,
the virtual players are attributed the dynamics2
˙˜qi = wi , (5.6)
with q˜i ∈ R2, i = 1, . . . , N , the states of the virtual players. Furthermore, the control
efforts of the agents are such that ‖ui‖2 ≤ U and ‖wi‖2 ≤ W , where W  U .
Remark 22. Although it is assumed here that the dynamics of all agents are subject to the
same constraints, different bounds can easily be attributed to each agent and the same
holds for the virtual players. 
The problem of continuously monitoring a region can then be formulated as follows.
Problem 11. The problem of monitoring the region consists in determining strategies ui
and wi, for i = 1, . . . , N , such that the set of strategies S = {u1, w1, . . . , uN , wN} consti-
tutes a Nash equilibrium strategy for differential game with cost functional3
min
u1,...,uN
max
w1,...,wN
−1
2
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
Si (qi(t)− q˜i(t)) dt , (5.7)
2Since these players are virtual, they can be attributed arbitrary dynamics.
3Note that the integral in (5.7) is the coverage map (5.1).
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and constrained dynamics (5.5) and (5.6), i = 1, . . . , N . Furthermore the strategies should
be such that qi ∈ Ω and q˜i ∈ Ω for all i = 1, . . . , N .
The cost functional (5.7) is such that the virtual players seek to move towards regions
with low coverage, whereas each agent seeks to minimise the distance between itself and
its corresponding virtual player.
Remark 23. Problem 11 is somewhat different in nature from the differential games con-
sidered in Chapter 3. One of the main differences is that in Problems 3 and 4 inﬁnite hori-
zon differential games are considered and these are such that all players “agree” on the
equilibrium of the dynamic system, namely the cost functionals are such that qi(0) = 0 for
all i = 1, . . . , N and as a consequence the players drive the states to the zero-equilibrium
while attempting to minimise their individual cost functionals. This is not the case in
Problem 11 in which the players seek to reach different positions within the region Ω.
Additionally the differential game in Problem 11 does not terminate as the monitoring
should be continuous. Extensions of the results in Chapter 3 for ﬁnite-horizon differen-
tial games may be useful to deal with differential games of this kind. 
To solve the differential game described by equations (5.5), (5.6), i = 1 . . . , N , and
(5.7), the fast dynamics of the virtual players are taken advantage of. In particular it
is assumed that the virtual players dynamics are sufﬁciently fast such that they can be
approximated as instantaneous players. The interval [0, T ] is split into smaller intervals of
length τ , such that each of the optimal control problems is taken to be of duration τ and
the agents seek to minimise the cost functional
1
2
∫ t0+τ
t0
(
−
N∑
i=1
Si(qi − q˜i) +
N∑
i=1
αi‖ui‖2
)
dt , (5.8)
where αi > 0 are weights penalising the control efforts of the agents and t0 denotes the
beginning of each optimal control problem. The instantaneous players are updated be-
tween successive optimal control problems. Note that the constraints on ui are translated
into soft constraints by adding a term to the cost functional which penalises the control
effort. Different bounds on the control efforts can be “enforced” by tuning αi.
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Provided τ is sufﬁciently large4, each of the optimal control problems deﬁned by
the cost functional (5.8) and the agent dynamics (5.5) can be further approximated to
have an inﬁnite-horizon. Each of the inﬁnite-horizon optimal control problems is then
characterised by the agent dynamics (5.5) and the cost functional which each of the agents
attempts to minimise, i.e.
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(
C −
N∑
i=1
Si(qi − q˜i) +
N∑
i=1
αi‖ui‖2
)
dt , (5.9)
where C =
∑N
i=1Ai ≥ 0 is a constant ensuring the integrand is zero at the minimiser of
the integrand, namely when qi = q˜i, for i = 1, . . . , N .
Note that when N > 1, additional care must be taken to ensure that inter-agent
collisions do not occur. In particular, suppose each agent i, for i = 1, . . . , N , seeks to
maintain a minimum safety distance ri > 0 between itself and the other agents and that
collisions are only considered a risk when the distance between itself and another agent
is below a risk distance, Ri > ri. Given Ri and ri, for i = 1, . . . , N , suppose the follow-
ing assumptions, similar to Assumptions 5 and 6 introduced for the multi-agent collision
avoidance problem, are satisﬁed.
Assumption 10. The initial conditions q1(0), . . . , qN (0) are such that ‖qi(0)−qj(0)‖2 > R2i
for all i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , N and j = i.
Assumption 11. The values taken by the virtual players, namely the q˜1, . . . , q˜N , are such
that ‖q˜i − q˜j‖2 > R2i for all i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , N and j = i.
Let q =
[
q1 , . . . , qN
] ∈ R2N , q˜ = [q˜1 , . . . , q˜N] ∈ R2N and x = q − q˜, and deﬁne the
collision avoidance function
vi(q) =
⎛
⎝min
⎛
⎝0, N∑
j=1,j =i
‖qi − qj‖2 −R2i
‖qi − qj)‖2 − r2i
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠
2
. (5.10)
In [87,88] this function has been used as a barrier Lyapunov functions to ensure collision
4In this case, τ sufﬁciently large means that the agents have enough time to reach the ”minimisers”
of (5.8).
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avoidance. Herein, similarly to what has been done in Section 3.8.3, collision avoidance
is included directly in the formulation of the optimal control problem. Then the problem
of collision avoidance can be dealt with by adding the collision avoidance function (5.10) to
the integrand of (5.9) and deﬁning the optimal control problem as follows.
Let u =
[
u1 , . . . , uN
] and assume without loss of generality, that αi = 1, for
i = 1, . . . , N . Then each optimal control problem is deﬁned by the cost functional
1
2
∫ ∞
0
q(x) + ‖u‖2dt , (5.11)
which the agents seek to minimise, where
q(x) = qcov(x) + βqcol(x, q˜) , (5.12)
with qcov(x) = C−
∑N
i=1 Si(qi− q˜i), qcol(x) = xdiag{v1(x− q˜), . . . , vN (x− q˜)}x and β > 0,
and the dynamics
x˙ = u . (5.13)
Note that if the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDE associated with the problem, namely5
−1
2
∂V
∂x
∂V
∂x

+
1
2
q(x) = 0 , (5.14)
with V (0) = 0, can be solved, the optimal control actions are given by
u∗ = −∂V
∂x

(5.15)
Remark 24. It follows from Assumption 9 that the part of the running cost (5.12) relating
to the coverage can be written in the form qcov(x) = xQcov(x)x. Thus, the whole running
cost can be written as q(x) = xQ(x)x, whereQ(x) = Qcov(x)+diag{v1(x+q˜), . . . , vN (x+
q˜)}. In a neighbourhood of the origin the remaining cost can be approximated as6 q(x) =
xQ¯x, where Q¯ = Q(0) = diag{Q¯1, . . . , Q¯N}. 
5Fr is used to denote the gradient of F (·) with respect to r, i.e. Fr = ∇rF .
6Note that vi(x+ q˜)
∣
∣
x=0
= 0 for i = 1, . . . , N , which follows from (5.10) and Assumption 11.
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The virtual player, q˜i, which is taken to act instantaneously, is updated between
successive optimal control problems according to
q˜i = argmin
p
J(p, t0 + τ) , (5.16)
where J(p, t) is the coverage map introduced in (5.1), p ∈{
Ω : ‖qi − p‖2 < R2d,i, ‖q˜i − q˜j‖2 > max{Ri, Rj}2
}
, and Rd,i ≥ 0. Loosely speaking,
this means that the virtual player, q˜i moves to the least covered point in Ω which is
within a radius Rd,i from its current position, while ensuring the selection is such that
Assumption 11 holds7.
Remark 25. Since the virtual players q˜i, i = 1, . . . , N have fast dynamics and are approx-
imated to act instantaneously between successive optimal control problems according to
(5.16), during each optimal control problem the variables q˜i, i = 1, . . . , N are constant
and it therefore follows that x˙ =
[
q˙1 , . . . , q˙N
]. The actions of the virtual players are
represented by the instantaneous updates (5.16). 
Remark 26. Agent dynamics different from (5.5) can be considered in this problem for-
mulation provided the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDE is appropriately
modiﬁed. 
5.5 Special case: Single Agent on a Segment
In this section a special case in which one agent equipped with a sensor modeled by (5.3)
is considered: in this case closed-form solutions the (5.14) can be found. Furthermore,
we focus on the problem in which the agent monitors a one-dimensional (1D) segment,
i.e. the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDE (5.14) boils down to a simple ordinary differential
equation (ODE). The results discussed in this section are consistent with what one would
intuitively expect for this simple problem, thus suggesting that the problem formulation
and the approach taken to obtain an approximate solution for Problem 11 is reasonable.
7Note that the allocation of q˜1, . . . , q˜N may be non-unique.
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Consider the optimal monitoring problem for a single agent on a segment, i.e.
consider the case in which N = 1 and Ω ⊂ R.
Proposition 4. Let n = 1, N = 1, C = 1 and let S1 be given by (5.3). Consider the optimal
control problem with cost functional (5.9) and agent dynamics (5.13). Then, the optimal
control is given by
u∗i =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
−
√
1− eA1(q1(t)−q˜1)2
αi
if q1 ≥ q˜1,
+
√
1− eA1(q1(t)−q˜1)2
αi
if q1 ≤ q˜1.
(5.17)

Proof: The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (5.14) for this problem is
1
2
− 1
2
eA1(q1(t)−q˜1)
2 − Vq1
2
2α1
= 0, (5.18)
which can be trivially integrated to yield the solution
Vq1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
+
√
1− eA1(q1(t)−q˜1)2
α1
if q1 ≥ q˜1,
−
√
1− eA1(q1(t)−q˜1)2
α1
if q1 ≤ q˜1,
(5.19)
where the signs are chosen to ensure that V is positive deﬁnite. The optimal control
follows from (5.15). 
The value taken by the virtual player, i.e. q˜1 is updated between successive optimal con-
trol problems according to (5.16).
To illustrate the results, consider a 1D region deﬁned as Ω = {q : −10 ≤ q ≤ 10}.
Simulations have been run for 20 iterations with A1 = 1, τ = 30, α1 = 1, q1(0) = −5,
Rd,1 = 20 and the ﬁrst choice of q˜1 = −5. Figure 5.2 shows the time history of the position
of the agent, q1. The coverage levels at each point, as given by (5.1) , are initially zero
and their time-evolution, along with the evolution of the static minimiser, q˜, is shown
in Figure 5.3. It can be observed that the minimiser moves towards regions that have
relatively low coverage levels. The minimum and maximum coverage levels across the
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Figure 5.2: The time history of the position of the agent, q1, with q1(0) = −5 and q˜1(0) = −5 for
t ∈ [0, 600].
entire region are shown as a function of time in Figure 5.4, which shows that both values
are monotonically increasing with time, thus indicating that the information gathered
by the agent is increasing with time, i.e. the agent is indeed continuously monitoring
the search space. Since the simulations have been run by solving the optimal control
problems over a ﬁxed time horizon, the time parametrization is not signiﬁcant and it
should be noted that the overall behaviour is a sweeping motion as one would expect.
5.6 Approximate Solutions to the Optimal Control Problems
In the special case considered in Section 5.5 closed-form solutions to equation (5.14) are
found and the simulations show that the results are consistent with expectations. We
now focus our attention on the general problem discussed in Section 5.4. In general,
closed-form solutions to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDEs associated with the optimal
control problem deﬁned by (5.9) and the agent dynamics cannot be found. It is therefore
necessary to seek approximate solutions. This can be done using the method presented
in [37, 63], namely by introducing a dynamic extension and using the notion of algebraic
P¯ matrix solution.
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Figure 5.3: Values of q˜1 ( solid dots). The colour map illustrates the coverage levels of Ω at each
time (blue: low coverage level, red: high coverage level).
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Figure 5.4: Time history of minimum (dotted line) and maximum (solid line) coverage levels
in Ω.
149 5.6 Approximate Solutions to the Optimal Control Problems
To streamline the presentation of the following proposition, the main results of [63]
are specialised to the current problem. Let σ(x) = xΣ(x)x ≥ 0. A mapping P (x) =
P (x) ∈ R2 satisfying
−P (x)P (x) +Q(x) + Σ(x) = 0 , (5.20)
where Q(x) is as deﬁned in Remark 25, and P (0) = P¯ is the positive deﬁnite solution of
the continuous time ARE
−P¯ P¯ + Q¯+ Σ¯ = 0 , (5.21)
where Σ¯ = Σ(0), is said to be an algebraic P¯ matrix solution of the optimal control prob-
lem with cost functional (5.11) and dynamics (5.13). Let P (x) denote such a solution,
introduce a dynamic extension ξ ∈ R2N and deﬁne
V (x, ξ) =
1
2
xP (ξ)x+
1
2
‖x− ξ‖2R , (5.22)
where R = R > 0 ∈ R2N×2N . It can then be shown that the dynamic strategies
u(x, ξ) = −∂V
∂x

ξ˙(x, ξ) = −k∂V
∂ξ

,
(5.23)
provide an ”approximate” solution of the optimal control problem [63]. More precisely,
the dynamic control (5.23) is such that the partial differential inequality
−1
2
∂V
∂x
∂V
∂x

+
1
2
q(x) +
∂V
∂ξ
ξ˙ ≤ 0 , (5.24)
is satisﬁed along closed-loop trajectories of the system. This implies that the control
(5.23) is the solution of a modiﬁed optimal control problem with dynamics (5.13) and
cost functional
1
2
∫ ∞
0
q(x) + ‖u‖2 + c(x, ξ)dt ,
where the function c(x, ξ) ≥ 0 can be interpreted as a conﬁdence interval and 12
∫∞
0 c(x, ξ)dt
is the cost incurred by the approximation.
With this in mind, consider the extended system with state
[
x, ξ
], with ξ ∈
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R
2N . In particular, let ξ =
[
ξ1 , . . . , ξN
] where ξi ∈ R2 for i = 1, . . . , N . Let Σ(x) =
βqcol(x, q˜) + γI , where β > 0 and γ ≥ 0. Suppose P¯ is the symmetric, positive deﬁnite
solution to the ARE corresponding to the linear-quadratic approximation of the inﬁnite-
horizon optimal control problem with an additional running cost σ(x), namely P¯ is the
positive deﬁnite solution of the ARE (5.21), where Q¯ is as deﬁned in Remark 24 and
Assumption 11 implies qcol(0, q˜) = 0 and therefore Σ¯ = γI . Suppose we can ﬁnd a
matrix-valued function, Δ(x) = Δ(x), such that
P¯Δ(x)Δ(x)P¯ =Q(x) + Σ(x) , (5.25)
where Q(x) is as deﬁned in Remark 24, and
Δ(0) = I . (5.26)
Deﬁne the matrix-valued function
P (x) = P¯Δ(x) , (5.27)
and letΨ(ξ, x) denote the Jacobian matrix of 12P (ξ)xwith respect to ξ. Then the following
proposition holds.
Proposition 5. There exists k > 0, R = R > 0 and ξ(0) satisfying ‖ξi(0) + q˜i‖2 > r2i ,
i = 1, . . . , N , such that the dynamic control law
u = − (Δ(ξ)P¯ x+R(x− ξ)) ,
ξ˙ = −k
(
Ψ(ξ, x)x−R(x− ξ)
)
,
(5.28)
solves the optimal control problem described by (5.11), (5.12) and (5.13) approximately,
in the sense that the partial differential inequality (5.24) is satisﬁed, and guarantees that
lim
t→+∞ qi(t) = q˜i , (5.29)
for i = 1, . . . , N , i.e. each agent reaches the position of the corresponding virtual player.
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Furthermore, ‖qi(t¯) − qj(t¯)‖2 > (max{ri, rj})2 for all t¯ > 0, i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , N ,
j = i. 
Proof: The proof boils down to showing that (5.27) is an algebraic P¯ matrix solution of the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (5.14). The rest follows from [63].
Note that P (0) = P¯ follows directly from (5.27) and (5.26) and a direct substitu-
tion of x = 0 in (5.25) shows that (5.21) is satisﬁed. Furthermore (5.20) is implied by
(5.25). This in turn implies that P (x) is indeed an algebraic P¯ matrix solution of (5.14).
The dynamic controller (5.28) is given by equations (5.23) and it follows from [63] that
(5.28) solves the partial differential inequality (5.24) and thus solves the optimal control
problem approximately. Thus, the origin of the extended state space
[
x, ξ
] is asymp-
totically stable. The latter implies that (5.29) is satisﬁed for i = 1, . . . , N . In addition the
function (5.22) is such that V (x(0), ξ(0)) = 12
∫∞
0 q(x)+ ‖u‖2+ c(x, ξ)dt, where c(x, ξ) ≥ 0,
and V˙ (x, ξ) ≤ −12q(x) ≤ 0. By Assumption 10 and since ‖ξi(0)+q˜i‖2 > r2i for i = 1, . . . , N ,
it follows that V (x(0, ξ(0)) is bounded and by Assumption 11 it follows that the optimal
control problem is well-posed. Then, it follows from standard Lyapunov arguments that
‖qi(t¯)− qj(t¯)‖2 > (max{ri, rj})2 for all t¯ > 0, i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , N , j = i [38]. 
At the beginning of each optimal control problem the dynamic extension ξ must be ini-
tialised. This selection of ξ(0) has an impact on the performance of the approximate so-
lution to the optimal control problem. The instantaneous players are updated according
to (5.16) at the end of each optimal control problem.
5.7 Unicycle Agent Dynamics
Real UAVs do not have single-integrator dynamics. However taking into consideration
more complicated dynamics closed-form solutions to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDEs
cannot generally be found. Thus, it becomes necessary to settle for approximate solutions
as in the previous section. UAVs are often modeled by unicycle dynamics [95,96]. In this
case, however, not even a solution to the ARE (5.21) exists. Hence an alternative method
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has to be developed. To this end the trajectories resulting from the single-integrator dy-
namics is interpreted as a trajectory plan and the actual controllers are designed to track
this trajectory plan assuming that each agent has unicycle dynamics, namely
x˙i = vi cos θi ,
y˙i = vi sin θi ,
θ˙i = ωi ,
(5.30)
i = 1, . . . , N , where pi(t) = [xi(t), yi(t)] ∈ R2 denotes the position and θi(t) ∈ R denotes
the orientation of agent i. The variables vi(t) ∈ R and ωi(t) ∈ R are the control inputs of
the system determining the forward speed and the angular velocity of the agent, respec-
tively. One of the challenges in this approach lies in that the trajectory plan may generate
trajectories that cannot be tracked with zero error.
Assuming the actual UAVs satisfy the dynamics (5.30), it is desired that pi(t) tracks
qi(t) = [qi,x(t), qi,y(t)]
 given by the solution of the sequence of optimal control problems
deﬁned by (5.11) and (5.13). Let ei(t) = pi(t)−qi(t) and deﬁne ρ2i = (xi−qi,x)2+(yi−qi,y)2
and φi = arctan (yi − qi,y, xi − qi,x).8 The motivation behind the change of coordinates
is that the zero equilibrium of the error variable is stabilisable in the polar representa-
tion.Since it is desired that the agents with unicycle dynamics track the trajectory plan it
is of interest to ensure the error remains bounded and converges to zero.
The signal q˙i is known from the solution of the optimal control problem (5.11),
(5.13) and can be considered as an external signal or disturbance. Thus, let δi = [q˙i,x, q˙i,y]
and consider the following assumption.
Assumption 12. The signal δi decays exponentially and furthermore δi(t) converges to
zero faster than ρi(t) so that
[ − sin(φi)
ρi
cos(φi)
ρi
]
δi(t) can be bounded from above by
a constant M > 0.
Remark 27. It follows from Proposition 5 that the zero equilibrium of the closed-loop
system (5.13) with controllers (5.28) is locally asymptotically stable. This in turn implies
8The four-quadrant version of the arctangent is used to distinguish between opposite directions.
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that δi decays exponentially, i.e. Assumption 12 is reasonable. 
Proposition 6. Consider the dynamics (5.30) and the trajectories generated by the algo-
rithm in Section 5.6. Suppose Assumption 12 is satisﬁed. The controller
vi = −kv cos(φi − θi)ρi ,
ωi = −kω(θi − φi) + kv sin(φi − θi) cos(φi − θi) ,
(5.31)
with kv > 0, kω > 0, is such that
lim
t→∞ ei(t) = 0 . (5.32)

Proof: First, note that
⎡
⎢⎣ ρ˙i
φ˙i
⎤
⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
cos(φi − θi)
− sin(φi − θi)
ρi
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ vi −
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
cos(φi) sin(φi)
−sin(φi)
ρi
cos(φi)
ρi
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ δi . (5.33)
Then, with vi and ωi as deﬁned in (5.31),
ρ˙i = −kv cos(φi − θi)2ρi −
[
cos(φi) sin(φi)
]
δi ,
and by Assumption 12 the last term of φ˙i satisﬁes
θ˙i − φ˙i ≤ −kω
[
(θi − φi)− M
kω
]
.
It follows that lim
t→∞ ρi(t) = 0, which implies that limt→∞ ei(t) = 0. Furthermore provided δi
converges to zero faster than ρi, θi − φi remains bounded. 
Remark 28. The trajectory plan may provide trajectories that are not feasible for the
agents with unicycle dynamics to follow. Therefore, it is not possible to guarantee that
lim
t→∞ θi(t)−φi(t) = 0. Nevertheless Proposition 6 implies that the error variable converges
to zero. 
Remark 29. Although collision avoidance is guaranteed for the agents with single-
integrator dynamics by Proposition 5, this can no longer be guaranteed for the agents
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with unicycle dynamics, since the trajectory plan may contain infeasible trajectories. How-
ever, an upper bound for ρi can be found as a function of kv and kω and thus through the
selection of these control parameters, and R1, . . . , RN and r1, . . . , rN , it is possible to en-
sure that collisions do not occur between the agents with unicycle dynamics. 
5.8 Simulations
In this section we present simulation results for the case in which N = 2 and
Ω =
{(
x , y
)
: −10 ≤ x ≤ 10, − 10 ≤ y ≤ 10
}
,
i.e. two agents monitor a square region centred at the origin. Suppose the agents are
equipped with sensors modeled by
S1(q1 − q) = a1
a3
− a1‖q1 − q‖
2
a2 + a3‖q1 − q‖2 ,
S2(q2 − q) = b1
b3
− b1‖q2 − q‖
2
b2 + b3‖q2 − q‖2 ,
where ai > 0, bi > 0, i = 1, 2, 3. It follows that
P (x) = diag
(√
a1
a2 + a3‖q1 − q‖2 + (γ + β)v1 + γI2,√
b1
b2 + b3‖q2 − q‖2 + (γ + β)v2 + γI2
)
,
with γ ≥ 0, is an algebraic P¯ matrix solution of the corresponding optimal control problem.
Let a1 = 5, a2 = 0.5, a3 = 10, b1 = 2, b2 = 1 and b3 = 10. For the case in which
the agents are assumed to have single-integrator dynamics, the dynamic controller (5.28)
with k = 2, R = 0.5I , γ = 20, r1 = r2 = r = 1, R1 = R2 = R = 2, β = 0.1, γ = 1
and ξ(0) = [−20, 20, 20,−20] has been used. As discussed in Section 5.7, the trajectories
resulting from the assumption that the agents have single-integrator dynamics are inter-
preted as trajectory plans and the controllers (5.31), i = 1, 2, are adopted by the agents,
with kv = 1, kω = 10.
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Figure 5.5: Trajectories of agents 1 and 2 (black and gray lines, respectively) with single-
integrator dynamics and controllers (5.28) (solid lines) and unicycle dynamics with controllers
(5.31) (dashed lines). Square markers indicate the initial positions of the two agents, whereas
circular markers indicate the points along the trajectories where the distance between the
agents is at a minimum. Arrows indicate the direction of travel.
In what follows the solution to one optimal control problem is considered to illus-
trate the result of Propositions 5 and 6, before a sequence of such problems is considered
to demonstrate how the problem of optimal monitoring is solved.
5.8.1 Approximate Solution to One Optimal Control Problem
First, consider the solution of one optimal control problem deﬁned by (5.11) and (5.13)
for q1(0) = [−8,−8], q2(0) = [8, 8], q˜1 = q2(0) and q˜2 = q1(0): the virtual players
are such that the agents interchange positions. The situation in which both agents have
unicycle dynamics (5.30) is then considered for the same initial positions and φ1(0) = π8
and φ2(0) = −π.
The solid lines in Figure 5.5 shows the trajectories of agents 1 and 2 (black and gray
lines, respectively), assuming both have dynamics (5.5). The solid squares indicate the
initial positions of the two agents. The dashed lines show the trajectories of agents 1 and
2 (black and gray, respectively) assuming they have the unicycle dynamics (5.30). Along
the trajectories, the points where the distance between the agents are at a minimum are
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Figure 5.6: Time histories of the errors e1(t) (top) and e2(t) (bottom). The solid lines represent
the x-components and the dashed lines the y-components.
identiﬁed by the solid circles, the circles centred at these points are of radius r and R,
i = 1, 2, and show that the agents do not collide. The arrows indicate the direction of
travel.
Finally, the time histories of the distance between the two agents with single-
integrator dynamics (solid line) and unicycle dynamics (dashed line) are shown in Figure
5.7. The dash-dotted lines indicate the values of the risk distance, R (black line), and the
safety distance, r (gray line).
5.8.2 Monitoring by Solving a Sequence of Optimal Control Problems
Consider now the case in which q1(0) = [−8,−8], q2(0) = [8, 8], q˜1 = [6, 0], q˜2 =
[−6, 0] and the initial headings of the agents with the unicycle dynamics are φ1(0) =
−π
4 and φ2(0) =
π
2 . A sequence of ﬁfty optimal control problems have been solved to
approximate the differential game (5.7). Between successive optimal control problems the
values taken by the virtual players are selected according to (5.16), with Rd,1 = Rd,2 = 2.
Figure 5.8 shows the trajectories of agents 1 and 2 (black and gray lines, respec-
tively) with dynamics (5.5) and controllers (5.28), i = 1, 2, (solid lines) and with dynamics
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Figure 5.7: Time history of the distance between the two agents with single-integrator dynam-
ics (solid line) and unicycle-dynamics (dashed line).
(5.30) and the controllers (5.31), i = 1, 2, (dashed lines). The square markers indicate the
initial positions of the agents. It is clear that the agents with unicycle dynamics attempt
to track the trajectory plan.
Figure 5.9 shows the time histories of the x- and y-components (solid and dashed
lines, respectively) of the errors e1(t) (top) and e2(t) (bottom). As can be seen, errors
occur when infeasible trajectories are generated by the trajectory plan, which are more likely
to happen at each update of the virtual players. However, during each optimal control
problem the errors converge to zero in accordance with Proposition 6.
Figure 5.10 shows the coverage map (5.1) at the end of the ﬁnal optimal control
problem for the case in which the agents are assumed to have unicycle dynamics. Fi-
nally, Figure 5.11 shows time histories of the maximum and minimum coverage levels
(solid and dashed lines, respectively) across the region Ω. Both levels are monotonically
increasing, which implies that the region is being monitored continuously.
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Figure 5.8: Trajectories of agents 1 and 2 (black and gray lines, respectively) with single-
integrator dynamics and controllers (5.28) (solid lines) and unicycle dynamics with controllers
(5.31) (dashed lines) for a sequence of ﬁfty optimal control problems. The square markers
indicate the initial positions of the two agents.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
−4
−2
0
2
4
e1(t)
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
−4
−2
0
2
4
t(s)
e2(t)
Figure 5.9: Time histories of the errors e1(t) (top) and e2(t) (bottom). The solid lines represent
the x-components and the dashed lines the y-components.
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Figure 5.10: The coverage map at the end of the ﬁnal optimisation problem.
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Figure 5.11: Time histories of the maximum and minimum (solid and dashed lines, respec-
tively) coverage levels in Ω.
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5.9 Conclusion
The problem of monitoring a region using a team of N sensors can be formulated as a
differential game by introducing N virtual players. The differential game can be approxi-
mated as a sequence of inﬁnite-horizon optimal control problems. Assuming the agents
have single-integrator dynamics, closed-form solutions of the optimal control problems
can be found when N = 1. However, this is not the case for N > 1 and approximate
solutions must be sought. This can be done using a dynamic controller and the notion of
algebraic P¯ matrix solution as shown in Section 5.6. One way of extending the results to
situations in which the agents have more general dynamics is to use the results based-on
the single-integrator dynamics as a trajectory plan. For the case in which the agents have
unicycle dynamics controllers that track the trajectory plan have been designed. Simu-
lations have been presented for the case in which N = 2. First the solution of a sin-
gle optimal control problem has been considered for the cases in which the agents have
single-integrator dynamics and unicycle dynamics. Finally a sequence of ﬁfty optimal
control problems, which approximate the differential game, has been considered.
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Chapter 6
Mean-Field Games
6.1 Introduction
It has already been discussed how differential games introduce the notion of strategic
behaviour to control theory and how this can be useful for problems involving multi-
agent systems. With applications in economics and power systems, to mention but a
few, it is not difﬁcult to think of problems which involve a large number of players. Re-
call, however, that the solution of a N -player nonzero-sum differential game relies on the
solution of N coupled PDEs. Thus, as N becomes large obtaining solutions to the dif-
ferential games becomes increasingly cumbersome, even when settling for approximate
solutions, such as those introduced in Chapters 3 and 4. When considering differential
games in which N is large we start moving into the realm of mean-ﬁeld games. Albeit be-
ing a relatively new ﬁeld of research, this branch of game theory is of practical interest in
the study of a variety of problems [28,108].
Living at the interface of mathematical physics and differential games, mean-ﬁeld
games deals with the study of differential games with inﬁnitely many indistinghuishable
players [108]. As N grows, it becomes increasingly meaningful to study the behaviour of
the population of players, often referred to as agents, instead of considering each player
individually, and this collective behaviour is captured by a density distribution function.
Since the agents are indistinguishable, they are homogeneous and have the same objec-
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tives. The mean-ﬁeld approach uses ideas from physics, more precisely from mean-ﬁeld the-
ory, where complex models consisting of a large number of small, interacting components
are described by an average effect, which is referred to as the mean-ﬁeld. The same idea is
applied to the differential game setting: each of the agents attempts to minimise the same
cost functional, and both this cost functional and the state dynamics may depend on the
average behaviour of the agents [109]. Thus, in place ofN coupled PDEs governing the dif-
ferential game the problem can be equivalently described by two coupled PDEs, namely
a single Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and a Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation.
The former is similar to the equations encountered in optimal control, whereas the latter
describes the evolution of the density distribution of the agents. Thus, when considering
certain types of differential games, namely those in which there are a large number of
homogeneous players the framework provided by mean-ﬁeld games may be useful. In
particular the solution to N -player differential game problems can be approximated by
a mean-ﬁeld game. Furthermore, as will become apparent in Section 6.2, the approxi-
mation error scales as a function of N and the approximation becomes exact as N tends
to inﬁnity. Although the problem is reduced to solving two intertwined PDEs, an addi-
tional complication arises in this setting, namely the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDE runs
backwards in time whereas the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov PDE runs forwards in time.
This forward-backward structure is typical of mean-ﬁeld games.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. A brief background on
mean-ﬁeld games is provided in Section 6.2. Some results regarding solutions for certain
mean-ﬁeld games are presented in Section 6.3 before the theory is illustrated by numerical
examples provided in Section 6.4. Finally some concluding remarks and directions for
future work are given in Section 6.5.
The standard framework used to study mean-ﬁeld games is adopted in this Chap-
ter. When considering mean-ﬁeld games it is common to include stochastic variables.
Thus, some results from stochastic control theory are recalled in Section 6.3. However, a
detailed background is not included in the thesis. For details on stochastic control theory
see, for example, [34].
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We denote with (Ω,F ,P) a complete probability space. Let B be a ﬁnite-
dimensional Brownian motion deﬁned on this probability space. Let F = (Ft)t≥0 be
its natural ﬁltration augmented by all the P−null sets (sets of measure-zero with respect
to P). We use ∂x and ∂2xx to denote the ﬁrst and second partial derivatives with respect to
x, respectively.
6.2 Background
Mean-ﬁeld theory plays an important role in statistical physics and provides a method
of studying large stochastic models, for example when considering systems consisting
of a large number of particles. Often there are too many particles to consider the inter-
actions between each particle individually. Thus, mean-ﬁelds, which describe the inter-
particle interactions, are introduced and used to construct approximations of the systems
behaviour. The idea behind the introduction of the mean-ﬁelds is that the effect of the
population on an individual can be approximated by an average effect, which is described
by a mean-ﬁeld [108, 109]. The theory of mean-ﬁeld games, which was introduced inde-
pendently by J.M. Lasry and P.L. Lions in [28] and by M.Y. Huang, P.E. Caines and R.P.
Malhame´ in [29,30], draws inspiration from this. Differential games with a large number
of homogeneous players which interact strategically are considered and using tools from
mean-ﬁeld theory the effect all the players have on an individual is approximated by an
average effect, which is dependent on the density distribution of the players. Thus, in
place of N coupled PDEs, the differential game is described by two PDEs, namely the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDE, which relates to each individual agent, and the Fokker-
Planck-Kolmogorov PDE which describes the evolution of the density distribution of the
agents. Each individual player then constructs its strategy based on its own state and
information relating to the distribution of the rest of the population.
Consider a differential game with inﬁnitely many players, also referred to as
agents, with a scalar state x(t) ∈ R. The density distribution of the agents at time t is
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given according to a scalar function mt(x), namely
m : R× [0,+∞[→ [0,+∞[, (x, t) → mt(x)
mt(x) ≥ 0∫
R
mt(x)dx = 1 for every t .
Furthermore, suppose the initial density distribution of the agents is given bym0(x). The
density distribution gives a macroscopic description of the game. The states of each agent
evolve according to the dynamics
dxt = [f(x) + g(x)u)] dt+ σ [xdB + ζdt] , (6.1)
where u(t) ∈ R is the control strategy of an agent, f(x) : R → R and g(x) : R → R are
mappings, ζ(t) ∈ R is an adversarial disturbance, B(t) is a Brownian motion, which is
independent of the initial state x(0) = x0, and σ ∈ R. Over a time period [0, T ], the agents
seek to minimise the cost functional
J(x,m(x), u) =
∫ T
0
c(x, u,m)dt− γ2
∫ T
0
‖ζ‖2dt+ g(xT ,mT ) , (6.2)
where xT = x(T ), c(x,m(x), u) is a running cost, which may depend on both the state of
the agent and the overall distribution of the agents, the second term is a quadratic penalty
on the unknown disturbance and the ﬁnal term is a terminal penalty, which, again, may
depend on both the state of the agent and the distribution mt(x). The mean-ﬁeld game is
then deﬁned as follows.
Problem 12. Consider the system of agents with dynamics (6.1) and cost functionals (6.2).
Suppose that the initial conditions, x0, of each agent are such that their density distribu-
tion is given by m0(x). Let m∗t (x) be the optimal mean-ﬁeld trajectory. The mean-ﬁeld
game lies in determining the strategies, u(t), solving
inf
u
sup
ζ
J(x, u,m∗, ζ)
subject to the dynamics (6.1).
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Problem 12 is known as a robust mean-ﬁeld game. Note that Problem 12 describes a zero-
sum game between the agent and the disturbance. This is similar to what is often seen in
H∞ control.
Let H(x, λ,mt) denote the Hamiltonian, namely
H(x, u, λ,mt, ζ) = c(x, u,m)− γ2ζ2 + λ(f(x) + g(x)u+ σ(ζ(t)) ,
where λ ∈ R is the costate.
Theorem 9. Suppose we can ﬁnd a value function Vt(x) and a density distribution mt(x)
satisfying
V˙t +H
(
x,
∂Vt
∂x
, u∗,mt, ζ∗
)
+
1
2
σ2x2
∂2Vt
∂x2
= 0, in R× [0, T [,
VT (x) = g(x,m), in R,
∂mt
∂t
+ divx
⎛
⎜⎝mt∂H
∂λ
∣∣∣∣∣
λ=
∂V
∂x
⎞
⎟⎠− 1
2
σ2
∂2x2mt
∂x2
= 0, in R× [0, T [,
m0(x) , given.
(6.3)
Then the worst-case disturbance is given by
ζ∗ =
σ
2γ2
∂V
∂x
,
and the optimal strategies of each agent are given by
u∗ = inf
u
H
(
x, u,
∂V
∂x
,mt, ζ
∗
)
.

The ﬁrst equation in (6.3) is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDE, whereas the second equa-
tion is the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov PDE. For more detail and the proof see, for exam-
ple, [28, 108, 109]. The mean-ﬁeld game PDEs have a particular structure: the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman is solved backwards, as is the case with optimal control problems and
standard N -player Nash differential games. Thus mt(x) must be given to solve the
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Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDE. On the other hand, the second equation, namely the
Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov PDE, is solved forwards in time, with m0(t) speciﬁed at
the beginning of the problem. This forward-backward structure is typical of mean-ﬁeld
games [108].
Solutions to the two coupled PDEs in (6.3), i.e. Vt and mt with the given boundary
conditions on VT and m0 must be obtained, which is not generally straight-forward. This
is commonly done by iteratively solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for ﬁxed
mt and by entering the corresponding optimal control strategy u∗ in the Fokker-Planck-
Kolmogorov equation in (6.3), until a ﬁxed point in Vt and mt is reached. Any solution of
the system of equations (6.3) is referred to as worst-disturbance feedback mean-ﬁeld equilib-
rium.
In some cases solutions to the PDEs can be obtained. Notably, a class of linear-
quadratic mean ﬁeld games and their solutions are discussed in [109,110] . Furthermore,
it is shown in the following section that in some scenarios the PDEs (6.3) can be replaced
by a system of ODEs.
6.3 Mean-Field Games and Two-Point Boundary Value Prob-
lems
In this section a class of mean-ﬁeld games is considered. In line with the theory of mean-
ﬁeld games, a population of indistinguishable dynamic agents, the dynamics of which are
given by a linear stochastic differential equation driven by a Brownian motion and under
the inﬂuence of a control and an adversarial disturbance, is considered. We consider the
problem in which the population consists of so-called “crowd-averse” dynamic agents,
i.e. the agents are such that they seek to regulate their state to values characterised by a
low density, thus avoiding “crowded” states. Similar problems arise naturally in social
sciences: the states represent opinions, the dynamics represent the propagation of these
opinions, and crowd-averse attitudes capture the agents’ willingness to escape consensus
and seek dissensus. The crowd-averse behaviour is described by a cost functional which
167 6.3 Mean-Field Games and Two-Point Boundary Value Problems
involves quadratic penalty on control and mean-ﬁeld term involving the density of the
players. This problem, which includes both the individual agent and the behaviour of the
population can be classiﬁed as a mean-ﬁeld game, similar to Problem 12. The case in which
the initial distribution is a sum of polynomial terms and the value function is quadratic is
analysed. Problems similar to the one studied in the following sections arise in different
ﬁelds, for example in opinion dynamics in social networks [111]. Crowd-averse attitudes
in this setting imply that the players tend to have very different opinions. This is in
contrast to the “opposite” phenomena of “emulation”, “mimicry” or “herd behavior”.
The consideration of crowd-averse dynamic agents may also be of interest in problems
regarting crowd dynamics and pedestrian ﬂows [112].
6.3.1 Problem Formulation
Consider a game with inﬁnitely many homogeneous players, also referred to as agents.
Since the players are homogeneous they are indistinguishable. For each player let x(0) =
x0 be its initial state, which is realised according to the probability distribution m0(x).
The state of the player at time t denoted by x(t) ∈ R evolves according to a controlled
stochastic process over a ﬁnite horizon T > 0, i.e. it satisﬁes the dynamics
dx = [αx+ βu] dt+ σ [xdB + ζdt] (6.4)
where u(t) ∈ R is the control input, B(t) ∈ R is a Brownian motion, which is independent
of the initial state x0 and independent across players and time. The constants α ∈ R,
β ∈ R and σ ∈ R are parameters, and ζt ∈ R is an adversarial disturbance. This is a
class of the more general dynamics (6.1) in which the state is scalar and satisﬁes linear
dynamics.
Consider the following assumption on the distribution at time t, mt(x).
Assumption 13. The density distribution mt(x) has compact support and within its sup-
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port it is given by
mt(x) = a0t +
∑m
j=1
1
j ajtx
j , in R× [0, T ]
m0(x) = a00 +
∑m
j=1
1
j aj0x
j ,
aj0 given for all j = 0, . . . ,m.
(6.5)
Remark 30. The sum of polynomial terms in Assumption 13 can be interpreted as the
mth degree Taylor approximation of a general distribution mt(x). 
Each agent is associated with a cost functional of the form (6.2). We consider the running
cost
c(x, u,m) = a0t + a1tx+
1
2
a2tx
2 +
b
2
u2 . (6.6)
The ﬁrst three terms represent the mean-ﬁeld cost and their sum is the second order Tay-
lor approximation of the density distribution, whereas the last term, with b > 0, accounts
for a penalty on the control energy. The penalty on the ﬁnal state is
g(xT ,mT (xT )) = a0T + a1Tx+
1
2
a2Tx
2 , (6.7)
namely it is a penalty on the second order Taylor approximation of the state density
distribution at the end of the horizon.
Remark 31. The cost function (6.2) with running cost (6.6) and terminal penalty (6.7) is
such that each of the agents are crowd-averse in the sense that they seek to regulate their
states to regions of low density. Note, however, that the agents only consider the density
in the state they are in: this is known as local interaction. Thus, it may happen that all
agents attempt to regulate their state to the same low-density state. 
We then consider the following problem.
Problem 13. Consider the system of agents with linear dynamics (6.4) and cost function-
als (6.2) with running cost (6.6) and terminal penalty (6.7). Suppose the initial conditions,
x0, of each agent are such that their density distribution is given by m0(x). Let m∗t (x) be
the optimal mean-ﬁeld trajectory. Then, solving the mean-ﬁeld game consists in deter-
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mining the feedback strategies u solving
inf
u
sup
ζ
J(x, u,m∗, ζ) ,
subject to the dynamics (6.4).
As mentioned in Section 6.2, any solution of the system of equations (6.3) is re-
ferred to as worst-disturbance feedback mean-ﬁeld equilibrium. The existence of solutions for
problem (6.3) can be guaranteed under the following assumptions. Let the initial prob-
ability distribution m0 be absolutely continuous with a ﬁnite second moment. As the
integrand of the cost is convex in u, and concave in the disturbance ζ, one gets a convex-
concave stage cost function. The drift is linear and hence Lipschitz continuous because
α, β, σ are bounded. We assume that the Fenchel transform of c is Lipschitz in (x, z). Fi-
nally, we assume that the function p −→ σ2
4γ2
‖p‖2+H is strictly convex, differentiable and
σ2
4γ2
‖p‖2+H is Lipschitz continuous. Note that this last condition is weaker than the con-
vexity assumption on H . Under the above main assumptions, the existence of a solution
is established in Theorem 2.6 in [28]. In addition to this, as the cost is Lipschitz continu-
ous inmt the solution to the asymptotic case with inﬁnitely many players is related to the
case with a ﬁnite number of players N by the classical bound 1N provided in [28,30,108].
Thus, the solution to a mean-ﬁeld game can be used to approximate a similar differential
game with a ﬁnite number of players and the approximation improves as the number of
players increases.
6.3.2 Main results
Let Vt(x) be the (upper) value of the robust optimization problem under worst-case dis-
turbance starting at time t from state x. We consider quadratic value functions of the
form
Vt(x) = q0t +
∑2
j=1
1
j qjtx
j , in R× [0, T ]
VT (x) = g(xT ,mT (xT )) = q0T +
2∑
j=1
1
j
qjTx
j = a0T +
2∑
j=1
1
j
ajTx
j .
(6.8)
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The case of a crowd-averse system in which the players seek to drive their state towards
state values characterized by a lower density, namely Problem 13 is considered.
Theorem 10. The mean-ﬁeld system associated to the robust mean-ﬁeld game for the
crowd-averse system is described by the equations:
V˙t +
(
−β
2
2b
+
(
σ
2γ
)2)(∂Vt
∂x
)2
+ αx
∂Vt
∂x
+ a0t + a1tx+
1
2
a2tx
2
+
1
2
σ2x2
∂2Vt
∂x2
= 0, in R× [0, T [,
VT (x) = q0T +
∑2
j=1
1
j qjTx
j , in R,
∂mt
∂t
+
n∑
j=1
ajt
((
1 +
1
j
)(
α− β
2
b
q2t +
σ2
2γ2
q2t
)
xjt +
(
−β
2
b
q1t +
σ2
2γ2
q1t
)
xj−1t
)
+ a0t
(
α− β
2
b
q2t +
σ2
2γ2
q2t
)
− 1
2
σ2
∂2x2mt
∂x2
= 0, in R× [0, T [,
m0(x) = a00 +
∑n
j=1
1
j aj0x
j in R.
(6.9)
The optimal control and worst disturbance are then given by
u∗t =
−β
b
∂Vt
∂x
,
ζ∗t =
σ
2γ2
∂Vt
∂x
.
(6.10)

Proof: The proof consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part consists in showing that condition
(6.10) holds. It is then shown that (6.9) holds.
The Hamiltonian associated with Problem 13 is of the form
H(xt,
∂Vt
∂x
,mt) = a0t + a1tx+
1
2
a2tx
2 +
b
2
u2 − γ2ζ2 + ∂Vt
∂x
(αxt + βu+ σζ) . (6.11)
Differentiating with respect to u and ζ under the assumption of concavity on ζ gives the
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conditions for the optimal control and the worst case disturbance, respectively, i.e.
bu∗ +
∂Vt
∂x
β = 0 , (6.12)
−2γ2ζ∗ + ∂Vt
∂x
σ = 0 . (6.13)
Thus, the ﬁrst part of the proof is concluded by noting that (6.12) and (6.13) imply (6.10).
We now turn to the second part of the proof, namely showing that (6.9) holds.
First, note that the mean-ﬁeld system associated with the robust mean-ﬁeld game intro-
duced in Problem 13 is given by
∂V
∂t
+H
(
x,
∂Vt
∂x
,mt
)
+
(
σ
2γ
)2(∂Vt
∂x
)2
+
1
2
σ2x2
∂2Vt
∂x2
= 0, in R× [0, T [,
VT (x) = g(x,m), in R,
∂mt
∂t
+
∂
∂x
⎛
⎜⎝mt∂H(x, λ,m)
∂λ
∣∣∣∣∣
λ=
∂Vt
∂x
⎞
⎟⎠− 1
2
σ2
∂2x2mt
∂x2
= 0 , in R× [0, T [,
m0(x) given,
(6.14)
which follows directly from (6.3) since the state x is scalar.
The second and last equations of (6.9) are the boundary conditions and derive
straightforwardly from Bellman equations and the evolution of the state. The ﬁrst equa-
tion of (6.9) follows from substituting (6.10) in the Hamiltonian (6.11), yielding
H
(
xt,
∂Vt
∂x
,mt
)
= a0t + a1tx+
1
2
a2tx
2 − β
2
2b
(
∂Vt
∂x
)2
+ αx
∂Vt
∂x
+
σ2
4γ2
(
∂Vt
∂x
)2
.
Substituting the above expression into (6.14), the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in
(6.9) is obtained.
Finally, the third equation of (6.9), which is a PDE representing the Fokker-
Planck-Kolmogorov equation, is proved by substituting (6.10) into the Fokker-Planck-
Kolmogorov equation in (6.14) and expanding the divergence operation, namely
172 6.3 Mean-Field Games and Two-Point Boundary Value Problems
∂(mdx)
∂x
=
∂m
∂x
dx+m
∂(dx)
∂x
. This yields
∂mt
∂t
+
(
αx− β
2
b
∂Vt
∂x
+
σ2
2γ2
∂Vt
∂x
)
∂mt
∂x
+mt
(
α− β
2
b
∂2Vt
∂x2
+
σ2
2γ2
∂2Vt
∂x2
)
−1
2
σ2
∂2x2mt
∂x2
= 0 .
Using Assumption 13 and (6.8) it follows that
∂mt
∂x
=
n∑
j=1
ajtx
j−1 ,
and
∂Vt
∂x
=
2∑
j=1
qjtx
j−1 = q2tx+ q1t .
By substitution
(
αx− β
2
b
∂Vt
∂x
+
σ2
2γ2
∂Vt
∂x
)
∂mt
∂x
=
n∑
j=1
ajtx
j−1
(
αx− β
2
b
(q2tx+ q1t) +
σ2
2γ2
(q2tx+ q1t)
)
=
n∑
j=1
ajt
((
α− β
2
b
q2t +
σ2
2γ2
q2t
)
xj +
(
−β
2
b
q1t +
σ2
2γ2
q1t
)
xj−1
)
,
and
mt
(
α− β
2
b
∂2Vt
∂x2
+
σ2
2γ2
∂2Vt
∂x2
)
=a0t
(
α− β
2
b
q2t +
σ2
2γ2
q2t
)
+
n∑
j=1
1
j
ajt
(
α− β
2
b
q2t +
σ2
2γ2
q2t
)
xj ,
and the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation in (6.9) follows, which concludes the
proof. 
In the following statement it is established that the mean-ﬁeld system (6.9) can be re-
placed by a two-point boundary value problem.
173 6.3 Mean-Field Games and Two-Point Boundary Value Problems
Theorem 11. The mean-ﬁeld system associated to the robust mean-ﬁeld game for the
crowd-averse system is equivalently described by the ordinary differential equations:
q˙0t +
(
−β
2
2b
+
(
σ
2γ
)2)
q21t + a0t = 0 ,
q˙1t +
(
−β
2
2b
+
(
σ
2γ
)2)
2q1tq2t + αq1t + a1t = 0 ,
1
2 q˙2t +
(
−β
2
2b
+
(
σ
2γ
)2)
q22t + αq2t +
1
2
a2t +
σ2
2
q2t = 0 ,
qjT = ajT ,
a˙0t + a1t
(
−β
2
b
q1t +
σ2
2γ2
q1t
)
+ a0t
(
α− β
2
b
q2t +
σ2
2γ2
q2t
)
− 1
2
σ22a0t = 0,
a˙1t + a1t
(
α2 +
(
−β
2
b
+
σ2
2γ2
)
2q2t
)
+ a2t
(
−β
2
b
+
σ2
2γ2
)
q1t − 6
2
σ2a1t = 0 ,
1
j
a˙jt + ajt
(
α
(
1 +
1
j
)
+
(
−β
2
b
+
σ2
2γ2
)(
1 +
1
j
)
q2t
)
+ aj+1 t
(
−β
2
b
+
σ2
2γ2
)
q1t − 1
2
σ2
(j + 2)(j + 1)
j
ajt = 0, j = 2, . . . , n− 1
1
n
a˙nt + ant
(
1 +
1
n
)(
α− β
2
b
q2t +
σ2
2γ2
q2t
)
− 1
2
σ2
(n+ 2)(n+ 1)
n
ant = 0
aj0 given for all j = 1, . . . , n.
(6.15)
The optimal control and worst disturbance are then given by
u∗ = −β
b
(q2txt + q1t) ,
w∗ =
σ
2γ2
(q2txt + q1t) .
(6.16)

Proof: It follows from Assumption 13 and the expression for the value function in (6.8)
that
∂Vt
∂t
= q˙0t + q˙1tx+
1
2
q˙2tx
2 ,
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and
∂mt
∂t
= a˙0t +
n∑
j=1
1
j
a˙jtx
j .
Furthermore,
∂2x2mt
∂x2
= 2a0t +
n∑
j=1
(j + 2)(j + 1)
j
ajtx
j .
Substituting these expressions into (6.9) yields
q˙0t +
2∑
j=1
1
j
q˙jtx
j +
(
−β
2
2b
+
(
σ
2γ
)2)
(q1t + q2txt)
2 +
2∑
j=1
αqjtx
j + a0t
+
n∑
j=1
1
j
ajtx
j +
σ2
2
q2tx
2 = 0, in R× [0, T [,
vT (x) = q0T +
∑2
j=1
1
j qjTx
j , in R,
a˙0t +
n∑
j=1
1
j
a˙jtx
j + ajn
(
1 +
1
n
)(
α− β
2
b
q2t +
σ2
2γ2
q2t
)
xnt
+
n−1∑
j=1
ajt
(
α
(
1 +
1
j
)
+
(
−β
2
b
+
σ2
2γ2
)(
1 +
1
j
)
q2t
)
xjt
+
n−1∑
j=1
ajtaj+1 t
(
−β
2
b
+
σ2
2γ2
)
q1tx
j
t + a1t
(
−β
2
b
q1t +
σ2
2γ2
q1t
)
+ a0t
(
α− β
2
b
q2t +
σ2
2γ2
q2t
)
− 1
2
σ2
⎛
⎝2a0t + n∑
j=1
(j + 2)(j + 1)
j
ajtx
j
⎞
⎠
= 0, in R× [0, T [,
m0(x) = a00 +
∑n
j=1
1
j aj0x
j in R.
(6.17)
As the above equations must hold for all x ∈ R, the coefﬁcients of each power of x
must cancel. Thus, collecting the terms of the same powers of x, the ODEs in (6.15) are
obtained.
Finally, note that Vt = q0t + q1tx + 12q2tx
2 is the solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation in (6.9). The optimal control and worst-case disturbance (6.16) then
follows from (6.10) and this concludes the proof. 
175 6.3 Mean-Field Games and Two-Point Boundary Value Problems
Remark 32. The ODEs in (6.15) constitute a somewhat atypical two-point boundary value
problem since the initial conditions aj0 are given for all j, whereas the ﬁnal conditions
qjT = ajT for j = 0, 1, 2 are unknown a-priori. However, by performing the change of
coordinates q˜jt = qjt − ajt for j = 0, 1, 2, the problem can be transformed into a standard
two-point boundary value problem with ﬁnal conditions q˜jT = 0. Solutions to this mod-
iﬁed problem can be found numerically, for example using the shooting method, and
these can be used to obtain solutions to the original ODEs (6.15). 
6.3.3 Interpretation of Results
In this section it is shown that the stochastic differential equation describing the closed-
loop system has an exponentially and asymptotically stable equilibrium. Substituting the
optimal control and the worst-case disturbance (6.16) into the dynamics for x yields the
closed-loop system
dx =
[
α+
(
− β
2
b
+
σ2
2γ2
)
qt
]
xdt+ σxdB, t ∈ (0, T ], x0 ∈ R .
In what follows it is assumed that the following property holds true.
Assumption 14. There exists κ > 0 such that
−κx(t) ≥
(
α+
(
−β
2
b
+
σ2
2γ2
)
qt
)
x(t) , (6.18)
for all t ≥ 0.
Assumption 14 ensures that the evolution of the state is bounded from above by an ex-
ponential decay. With this assumption the stability analysis can be performed within the
framework of stochastic stability theory [113]. Consider the inﬁnitesimal generator
L = 1
2
σ2x2
d2
dx2
− κx d
dx
, (6.19)
and the Lyapunov function V (x) = x2. The stochastic derivative of V (x) is obtained by
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applying the inﬁnitesimal generator to V (x). This yields
LV (x(t)) = lim
dt→0
EV (x(t+ dt))− V (x(t))
dt
= [σ2 − 2κ]x(t)2.
Proposition 7. [113] Suppose Assumption 14 holds. If V (x) ≥ 0, V (0) = 0 and LV (x) ≤
−ηV (x) on Q := {x : V (x) ≤ }, for some η > 0, and for arbitrarily large , then the
origin is asymptotically stable “with probability one”, and
Px0
{
sup
T≤t<+∞
x(t)2 ≥ λ
}
≤ V (x0)e
−ψT
λ
,
for some ψ > 0. 
From the above theorem we have the following result, which establishes exponential
stochastic stability of the mean-ﬁeld equilibrium.
Corollary 2. Let Assumption 14 hold. If [σ2 − 2κ] < 0 then lim
t→∞x(t) = 0 almost surely
and
Px0
{
sup
T≤t<+∞
x(t)2 ≥ λ
}
≤ V (x0)e
−ψT
λ
,
for some ψ > 0. 
Remark 33. For the special case in which the density distribution mt(x) is purely
quadratic, some observations can be made on the evolution of the density distribution,
as illustrated in Figure 6.1. In particular, Figure 6.1(a) depicts the initial density distri-
bution m0(x) as a function of the state. The density m0(x) = 12a2tx
2 is quadratic in x
(depicted by the gray area). If the vector ﬁeld is converging to zero, the density function
shrinks towards zero and becomes “more convex”, as illustrated in Figure 6.1(b): this
corresponds to a2t increasing with t. This occurs when Assumption 14 holds true, as all
players are drawn towards the origin by the linear feedback. On the other hand, if the
vector ﬁeld is diverging from zero, the density function is drawn apart from zero and be-
comes “less convex” and ”more ﬂat”, which corresponds to a2t decreasing with t. This is
due to a higher inﬂuence on the part of the disturbances (both the stochastic one, namely
the Brownian motion, and the adversarial one ζ). This case is illustrated in Figure 6.1(c),
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in which the gray area is more dispersed. Furthermore, Figure 6.1(b) also illustrates the
observation made in Remark 31, namely the scenario in which all agents aim to reach the
same low-density point in the state space. 
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6.1: Initial distribution m0 (a) and ﬁnal distribution mT for converging (b) and diverg-
ing vector ﬁeld (c). Graphs are not to scale.
6.4 Simulations
Two numerical examples illustrating the theory are presented in this section. First, an
example in which the density distribution is quadratic is then considered. This example
illustrates the observations made in Remark 33. A second example, in which the distri-
bution function is a fourth order polynomial is considered. Both examples illustrate that
the agents may attempt to reach the same low-density states, as stated in Remark 31.
6.4.1 Quadratic Density Distribution
Consider a system consisting of n = 7700 indistinguishable players with dynamics (6.4)
and suppose each of the players seek to minimise the cost functionals (6.2) with running
cost (6.6) and terminal cost (6.7). Furthermore, suppose that the initial distribution is
quadratic, i.e. m0(x) = 12a20x
2 . It follows from Theorem 10 that the optimal control and
the worst-case disturbance are given by (6.16), which relies on the solution of the two-
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point boundary value problem (6.15). The numerical results are obtained by solving the
coupled ODEs (6.15) numerically before using the solution to simulate the closed-loop
system (6.4) for a discretised set of states, namely x ∈ [−1, 1]. The states of the n agents
are initially within this set. The state trajectories are computed over the period [0, 5] using
the sample time 0.01. The parameters used are a20 = 0.2597, α = −0.1, β = 0.1, b = γ = 1.
The simulations have been run for σ = 0, i.e. without noise, and σ = 0.1. Notice that in
this case, since the distribution is quadratic, the value function is quadratic too.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the solution to the coupled ODEs (6.15). The solid lines show
the time history of a2t, whereas the dashed lines show the time history of q2t, for σ = 0
(top) and σ = 0.1 (bottom). Note that the boundary conditions are satisﬁed, i.e. a2(0) =
a20 and q2T = a2T . Furthermore, a2t is monotonically increasing with time. Figures 6.3
and 6.4 show the initial (black, dashed line) and ﬁnal (black, solid line) distribution of
the states of the agents for σ = 0 and σ = 0.1, respectively. The black dash-dotted lines
indicate the distribution of the agents at t = 2.5. The gray lines indicate the distribution
“predicted” by the solution to the ODEs (6.15) , shown in Figure 6.2 for t = 2.5 (dash-
dotted line) and at the ﬁnal time (solid line). The distribution computed based on the
evolution of the states matches well with the solution of (6.15).
The time evolution of the distribution function is a shrinking quadratic function
in accordance with 6.1(b). Since the initial distribution is such that x = 0 is the state
with the lowest density, it is expected that the players move towards this point, which is
consistent with Figures 6.3 and 6.4.
6.4.2 Fourth Order Polynomial Distribution
Consider a system consisting of n = 5422 indistinguishable agents with dynamics (6.4).
Furthermore, suppose each of the agents seeks to minimise a cost functional of the form
(6.2) with running cost (6.6) and terminal cost (6.7). The initial distribution is given by
m0 = 0.0184+0.0184x+
1
20.0373x
2+ 130.0019x
3− 140.0100x4, i.e. the initial distribution is
such that Assumption 13 is satisﬁed. The optimal control and the worst-case disturbance
are then given by (6.16), which relies on the solution of the ODEs (6.15). These ODEs
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Figure 6.2: Time histories of a2t (solid line) and q2t (dashed line) for σ = 0 (top) and σ = 0.1
(bottom).
are solved numerically using the method discussed in Remark 32. As in the previous
example, the solution of (6.15) is then used to simulate the closed-loop system (6.4) for a
discretised set of states in the region [−1, 1]. The states of the n agents are initially within
this set of states and their trajectories are computed over the period [0, 5]. Simulations
have been run for σ = 0, i.e. without any noise or disturbance, and with σ = 0.05 and
σ = 0.1. The remainder of the parameters are α = −0.01, β = 0.2, b = 0.1 and γ = 1.
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 show the solution to the two point boundary value problem
(6.9), for the case in which σ = 0.05. The solid lines in Figure 6.5 show the time history
of the coefﬁcients a0t (top), a1t (middle) and a2t (bottom), whereas the dashed lines show
the time histories of the coefﬁcients q0t (top), q1t (middle) and q2t (bottom). boundary
conditions, qjT = ajT , are satisﬁed for j = 0, 1, 2. Figure 6.6 shows the time histories of
the coefﬁcients a3t (top) and a4t (bottom). The results are similar for σ = 0 and σ = 0.1.
Figures 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 show the initial (black, dashed line) and ﬁnal (black, solid
line) distribution of the states of the agents for σ = 0, σ = 0.05 and σ = 0.1, respectively.
The dash-dotted black lines indicate the distribution of the agents at an intermediate time,
namely at t = 2. The gray lines indicate the distribution expected from the solution of the
two-point boundary value problem (6.15) which is shown in Figures 6.5 and 6.6. Note
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Figure 6.3: Black lines: the initial (dashed line), intermediate (dash-dotted line) and ﬁnal (solid
line) distributions of the agents’s states for σ = 0. Gray lines: the intermediate distribution
(dash-dotted line) and ﬁnal distribution (solid line) resulting from the solution of (6.15) for
σ = 0.
that the distribution computed based on the evolution of the states of the agents matches
well with that predicted by the solution to the two-point boundary value problems in all
three cases. For completeness, Figure 6.10 shows the time histories of the state of each
player when the agents use the control strategies (6.16) for σ = 0 (top), σ = 0.05 (middle)
and σ = 0.1 (bottom).
The initial distribution is such that the distribution of agents is relatively low be-
tween x = −0.5 and x = −1. It is therefore expected that the agents move towards this
region. This is precisely what occurs, as can be seen in Figure 6.10.
6.5 Conclusion
Mean-ﬁeld games allows to obtain Nash equilibrium solutions for differential games with
inﬁnitely many indistinguishable players. These rely on the solution of two coupled
PDEs and can be used to obtain approximate solutions for differential games with a ﬁnite
number of indistinguishable players. In this chapter it has been demonstrated that for a
class of mean-ﬁeld games, the PDEs characterising the mean-ﬁeld game boil down to
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Figure 6.4: Black lines: the initial (dashed line), intermediate (dash-dotted line) and ﬁnal (solid
line) distributions of the agents’s states for σ = 0.1. Gray lines: the intermediate distribution
(dash-dotted line) and ﬁnal distribution (solid line) resulting from the solution of (6.15) for
σ = 0.1.
a system of ODEs with boundary conditions at the initial and ﬁnal time. Numerical
examples illustrate the theory.
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Figure 6.5: Solid lines: time histories of a0t (top) and a1t (middle) and a2t (bottom) for σ = 0.05.
Dashed lines: time histories of q0t (top) and q1t (middle) and q2t (bottom) for σ = 0.05
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Figure 6.6: Time histories of a3t (top) and a4t (bottom) for σ = 0.05.
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Figure 6.7: Black lines: the initial (dashed line), intermediate (dash-dotted line) and ﬁnal (solid
line) distributions of the agents’s states for σ = 0. Gray lines: the intermediate distribution
(dash-dotted line) and ﬁnal distribution (solid line) resulting from the solution of (6.15) for
σ = 0.
−1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
state
d
is
tr
.
Figure 6.8: Black lines: the initial (dashed line), intermediate (dash-dotted line) and ﬁnal (solid
line) distributions of the agents’s states for σ = 0.05. Gray lines: the intermediate distribution
(dash-dotted line) and ﬁnal distribution (solid line) resulting from the solution of (6.15) for
σ = 0.05.
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Figure 6.9: Black lines: the initial (dashed line), intermediate (dash-dotted line) and ﬁnal (solid
line) distributions of the agents’s states for σ = 0.1. Gray lines: the intermediate distribution
(dash-dotted line) and ﬁnal distribution (solid line) resulting from the solution of (6.15) for
σ = 0.1.
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Figure 6.10: Time histories of the state of each player for σ = 0 (top), σ = 0.05 (middle) and
σ = 0.1 (bottom).
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Summary of contributions
The main contributions of the work presented in this thesis are summarised in this chap-
ter before some directions for future research are identiﬁed in Section 7.2. The three main
parts of the thesis are discussed individually.
Considering the subject of differential game theory, we focus on feedback Nash
and Stackelberg equilibrium solutions for a class of nonlinear differential games. The no-
tion of algebraic P¯ matrix solution is introduced and used to construct dynamic feedback
strategies which approximate solutions for the nonlinear differential games. In particu-
lar we deﬁne the notion of α-equilibrium solutions and show that the dynamic feedback
strategies constitute local α-equilibrium solutions. The constructive methods rely on a so-
called algebraic P¯ solution, which is more readily found than solutions to the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Isaacs PDEs characterising the differential game and, as a result, the methods al-
low to study and obtain approximate solutions for problems which would otherwise be
difﬁcult to solve. This is illustrated by several numerical examples. Furthermore, as an
example of how differential games can be of use when dealing with problems involving
multi-agent systems, the multi-agent collision avoidance problem is introduced and solved
using the constructive methods.
Numerical examples illustrating the theory suggest possible areas of applications
186 7.2 Future
for the developed theory. Among other possible application domains, it is argued that
the framework provided by differential game theory can be useful to study problems
involving multi-agent systems. This is demonstrated when considering the multi-agent
collision avoidance problem and the problem of optimally monitoring a region using a
team of mobile agents equipped with sensors. The former problem is solved using the
theory developed to obtain approximate solutions for differential games. The latter prob-
lem is formulated as a differential game, for which ad-hoc solutions are found assuming
the agents satisfy single-integrator dynamics. The resulting trajectories are then inter-
preted as trajectory plans for agents with more complicated unicycle dynamics.
Finally, mean-ﬁeld games are considered. This is a natural extension of “stan-
dard” differential game theory and deals with problems in which a game consists of
inﬁnitely many indistinguishable players. It is demonstrated that speciﬁc class of mean-
ﬁeld games can be solved by obtaining solutions to a system of ODEs. These can be
solved more readily than the original PDEs characterising the mean-ﬁeld game and con-
sequently the developed theory is a powerful result.
7.2 Future
The results presented herein have the potential for further developments. This thesis is
concluded by describing some of these.
The methods introduced to construct approximate feedback solutions for differen-
tial games are applicable to certain classes of problems. These results could be extended
to a larger variety of problems: two extensions are of particular interest. First, ﬁnite-
horizon differential games can be considered similarly to what has been done for opti-
mal control problems in [82]. Second, differential games with non-standard information
structures can be considered, which partly motivates the discussion on approximate so-
lutions for Stackelberg differential games in Chapter 4. In differential games with several
players, situations may occur in which the players do not have access to the same infor-
mation. For example, in [90] the problem in which a differential game consists of two
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groups of players is considered. Within each group there is one leader and a Stackelberg
game is played between the leader and the rest of the players in the group (i.e. the fol-
lowers), whereas a Nash game is then played between the two groups of players. Clearly,
different information structures are possible. Once the problem formulation of differen-
tial games with general information structures is formalised the methods for constructing
approximate solutions using appropriately modiﬁed algebraic P¯ matrix solutions can be
developed.
Focusing now on the multi-agent problem considered in Chapter 5, it may be pos-
sible to achieve a better approximation of the optimal solution for the problem by ap-
plying methods similar in spirit to those developed for differential games in Chapter 3.
However, to do this, extensions able to deal with ﬁnite-horizon problems are necessary.
It may also be of interest to pose the monitoring problem as a Stackelberg-type game
in which each virtual player is the leader for its corresponding agent, and each agent
and virtual player pair play Nash differential games among each other, somewhat simi-
lar to the problem considered in [90]. Furthermore, in the current problem formulation
it is assumed that each agent has knowledge of the positions of all other agents (and
virtual players). Future work includes taking into account communication constraints
in the problem formulation. For example, in some applications it may be the case that
an agent can only communicate with neighbouring agents. These communication con-
straints could be considered using graph theory as in [16].
In Chapter 6 a class of mean-ﬁeld games in which the dynamics are linear, the
value function is quadratic and the density distribution is a sum of polynomials is con-
sidered. A more general class of problems could be considered. In particular it is of
interest to consider problems with nonlinear dynamics and more general value functions
and to develop methods for constructing approximate solutions using ideas similar to
those introduced in Chapter 3 for differential games.
188 7.2 Future
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